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Abstract 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze how recessions affect the impact of prior growth and 
capital structure on corporate performance. Using multiple regression analysis on financial 
statement data from the period 2000-2012 we were able to investigate this on a large sample 
of Norwegian firms. Splitting our performance construct into profitability and growth, our 
results show that i) recessions negate the positive effects of prior growth on growth that 
rapidly growing firms experience in non-recessionary years; ii) recessions induce a negative 
non-linear effect of prior growth on profitability, which particularly affects fast-growing 
firms; iii) recessions exacerbate the negative effect of high leverage found in non-recessionary 
years; iv) recessions induce an increasingly negative effect of leverage on profitability, and v) 
there is little evidence of an interaction effect between capital structure and growth on 
corporate performance in our sample. In sum, our findings indicate that both prior growth and 
high leverage can have substantial negative impact on firm performance in recessions.  
 
The thesis includes a brief investigation of potential causal mechanisms behind the negative 
effects we observe. We find support for a removal of creditors and investors’ intertemporal 
productivity indifference during recessions, and that industry affiliation and credit constraints 
provide important channels for recessionary impact. Lastly we provide directions for future 
research that can expand on our exploratory study.  
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1 Introduction  
Explaining corporate performance outcomes and how these differ between enterprises is one 
of the key endeavors in firm level research. Firm performance is often segmented into growth 
and profitability (Chakravarthy & Lorange, 2009), both of which are central measures of firm 
success. Profitability is required to generate return on capital, while growth is often desired to 
increase firm value or long-term profits (ibid). 
 
Two key factors that are important for understanding differences in performance outcomes are 
capital structure and prior growth. Both these factors have received extensive academic 
attention regarding their effects on corporate performance (Petty & Guthrie, 2000; Brealey, 
Myers & Allen, 2008). In the capital structure literature, several departures from Modigliani 
and Miller’s (1965) seminal capital structure irrelevance theorem have been established, and 
empirical research illustrate how various market imperfections can cause capital structure to 
have a substantial impact on corporate performance (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Fama & 
French, 2002; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999; Graham & Harvey, 2001). Similarly, the effects 
of prior growth on firm performance have also been extensively researched in fields like 
strategy, neo-classical theory, stochastic modelling and organizational theory (Geroski, 1999; 
Coad & Holzl, 2009; Carizzosa, 2005).  
 
Although growth and capital structure are often studied in isolation, the two are arguably 
interrelated concepts that could benefit from being studied simultaneously. For example, the 
growth potential of firms can impact their capital structure (Knudsen & Lien, 2014), while 
debt level might dictate growth investment decisions of managers (Myers, 1977; Myers & 
Majluf, 1981). A theoretical prediction from the simultaneous study of growth and capital 
structure is that these firm characteristics should not cause discrimination in financial markets 
in normal times (Knudsen & Lien, 2014). There should be minimal discrimination between 
firms that have low leverage and high profitability today, and those that have high leverage 
and low profitability today, but high growth potential.  
 
The big question is, however, how the various theoretical mechanisms mentioned above are 
affected by changes in macroeconomic conditions. Although the current research on both 
capital structure and growth on product market outcomes is relatively well developed, less 
attention has been given to how these effects vary over the business cycle. Recessions have 
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naturally not gone unheeded in the academic world – the field of economics is brimming with 
business cycle theory and macro level research on the causes and impacts of downturns. 
However, less attention has been devoted to micro level issues such as how firms’ prior 
growth and capital structure affect  product market outcomes in recessions. In the limited 
existing literature, there seems to be a link between growth, capital structure and corporate 
performance in recessions. Growth, normally a desired state for firms, has been shown to 
induce high vulnerability during downturns (Geroski & Gregg, 1996; Knudsen, 2014). 
Similarly, high leverage has been shown to negatively affect product market outcomes in 
recessions (Parsons & Titman, 2008; Campello et al., 2010). Furthermore, as capital structure 
and growth are interrelated concepts, it seems appropriate to study their simultaneous impact 
on corporate performance during recessions, and explore potential interaction effects between 
the two. To the extent of our knowledge, this has not been addressed before. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to address these gaps in the literature by investigating how capital 
structure and prior growth influence corporate performance outcomes depending on the state 
of the overall economic environment. Our aim is to provide a broad exploration of how these 
relationships change during recessions. Our research question is: 
 
How does capital structure and prior growth influence corporate performance outcomes 
during recessions? 
 
To study this research question, we use annual financial statement data on Norwegian firms in 
from 2000 to 2012. Comparing real GDP developments to a polynomial long term GDP trend 
line, we identify two recessions during our time period: The dot com crisis of 2001, with its 
following recessional years 2002-2003, and the financial crisis of 2008, with the subsequent 
2008-2009 real recession. While separating industry and idiosyncratic firm effects, and 
controlling for relevant firm characteristics, we perform multiple regression analysis to isolate 
the effects of capital structure and growth on performance outcomes. To increase robustness, 
we use two separate measures for both profitability and growth. In order to investigate how 
the effects of growth and capital structure are affected by recessions, we shift our OLS 
specifications across the 13 annual databases, while accounting for non-linear and interaction 
effects among the main variables.   
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Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that in non-recessionary years, the presence of 
a convex quadratic effect indicates that fast growers are able to sustain their growth, while 
firms with moderate growth are subject to a mean reversion effect. Recessions appear to 
negate this growth momentum effect for fast growers, exposing them to the negative prior 
growth effect of other firms. Regarding the effects of growth on profitability, we find 
evidence that recessions induce a negative effect of prior growth on profitability performance. 
Specifically, we find a non-linear, concave relationship between prior growth and profits, 
indicating that particularly fast growers experienced negative profitability outcomes during 
recessions. 
 
Second, in our analyses of capital structure on growth we find that recessions exacerbate the 
negative effect of high leverage in normal years. Again we find evidence of non-linear 
relationships, where high-leveraged firms are most severely affected by recessions. Similar 
results are found when investigating the effects of capital structure on profitability. We find 
that recessions induce a negative exponential relationship between leverage and both 
profitability measures.  
 
Third, we do not find evidence of an interaction effect between growth and capital structure 
during recessions. Though there are traces of a negative interaction effect during the dot-com 
crisis, this does not replicate during 2008-2009 recession. Additionally, the interaction term 
consistently displayed a lack of economic significance. We investigated the presence of an 
interaction effect further by segmenting our sample into 10% percentiles based on prior 
growth and debt levels. However, this method also failed to yield sufficient evidence to 
conclude with the presence of a negative interaction effect between capital structure and 
growth during recessions. 
 
Fourth, we explored some causal pathways for the negative effects of prior growth and capital 
structure in downturns. We investigated whether investors and creditors discriminate against 
firms with low current performance, but potentially high performance in the future. We find 
strong indications that this is the case. Further, we test industry affiliation as a pathway for 
recessionary impact. Our findings indicate that affiliation with severely impacted industries 
provided an important causal pathway for negative performance impacts during the 2008-
2009 recession. We also investigate the causal impact of credit constraints during recessions, 
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and find that firms with high credit rating experienced considerable better performance 
outcomes during recessions than low-rated firms. 
 
Before we start off, we provide some delimitations for the scope of our thesis. First of all, we 
only look at the effect of downturns. We do not discern between types of recessions (Morley, 
2009; Chen et. al, 2011) or their cause (Hamilton, 1989). This is discussed in further detail in 
the theory section on recessions. Second, multiple theoretical approaches can be probably be 
assumed when investigating firm performance. We assume a combined strategy and finance 
approach. An in-depth argument for this is provided in the theory section. Moreover, the 
literature on both capital structure and growth is too vast to be reviewed in detail in our thesis, 
so we focus on the most central contributions. The reasoning behind inclusion of specific 
theories is also provided in the theory section. Third, we aim to provide a broad, exploratory 
study that lays a foundation for future research. As a result, our focus has not been on 
generating econometrically bulletproof results. This is discussed in-depth in the methods 
section. Another implication is that we have not provided extensive analyses on the causal 
mechanisms behind the impact of recessions on firm performance. Though we compare our 
results to theoretical predictions and prior empirical research, we only briefly test specific 
causal mechanisms. Fourth, we wanted to investigate the performance of representative 
Norwegian firms, which means we have limited our sample to profit-maximizing firms of 
medium and large size.  
 
The rest of our thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter 2 we will present the theory and 
literature we use to answer our research question, while also developing the hypotheses we 
test in the analysis chapter. Chapter 3 presents an in-depth discussion of our methodological 
approach, including a discussion of research design, sampling strategy, multiple regression 
analysis and the thesis’ validity and reliability. In chapter 4, identify the most severely 
affected years during the dot-com crisis and the 2008-2009 recession, and their impact on key 
performance variables using descriptive statistics. We then present results from the regression 
analysis.  In chapter 5 we discuss our findings in light of relevant theory and literature. 
Chapter 6 concludes the paper by summarizing our findings, and providing suggestions for 
future research. 
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2 Theory 
The purpose of our thesis is to investigate how capital structure and growth influence 
corporate performance outcomes depending on the state of the overall economic environment. 
There are multiple ways to approach this, so we briefly expand on our theoretical approach. A 
discussion that involves capital structure must necessarily rely on finance literature at some 
point. Another natural approach is the strategy field, which is occupied with explaining 
differences in performance outcomes. We argue that a multidisciplinary approach which 
combines these two fields could be appropriate. When researching growth and capital 
structure we would likely benefit from accounting for both product and factor market 
conditions. The finance field is naturally oriented towards factor markets, with an inherent 
focus on capital market imperfections. A strategy approach, however, could contribute with 
insights from both product and factor markets, but could probably not offer much insight into 
capital markets, which are often presumed perfect in strategy literature (Besanko, 2008). 
Furthermore, the strategy field is predominantly occupied with explaining differences in 
corporate performance. The finance field focuses on how firms’ assets are financed, which 
necessarily includes assets providing superior performance. Overall, therefore, these research 
areas seem to complement each other well. Though not all theories we have included fall into 
either of these fields, these are the two major research areas from which we have drawn our 
theories. 
 
In this chapter we start by discussing how capital structure and growth can explain corporate 
performance outcomes in normal times. We then introduce theory on recessions and their role 
in business cycles. The last part of this chapter discusses how economic downturns affect the 
relationships between growth, capital structure and performance. The final subchapter also 
contains the development of our hypotheses. 
 
2.1 The importance of capital structure and growth (in 
normal times) 
Why does capital structure and growth matter for firms? We start with a discussion of how 
growth influences performance, before presenting theory on the effects of capital structure. 
Third and last we discuss how growth in conjunction with capital structure might affect 
corporate performance outcomes.  
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2.1.1 Growth and corporate performance 
Why and how firms grow has naturally received substantial academic attention (Hart, 2000; 
Geroski & Mazzucato, 2002; Geroski, 1999; Carrizosa, 2007). Given the complexity of the 
topic, various approaches to growth has emerged (Correa, 1994). Geroski (1999) identifies 
four main streams of literature on growth: stochastic growth models; the classical economic or 
‘optimum firm size‘ approach; models of organizational capabilities; and life cycle or stage 
theories. We limit our discussion to theories that explicitly or implicitly predict how corporate 
growth might affect performance. This limits the field somewhat, as we find that life cycle 
models are less applicable in our setting. That leaves us with three theoretical approaches to 
growth. In order to ensure a broad and robust foundation for the rest of the thesis, we choose 
to present theories from all three approaches.  
 
The rest of the subchapter is structured as follows. The first theory we discuss comes from the 
stochastic approach. Gibrat’s law is arguably the most influential stochastic theory (Coad & 
Holzl, 2009), and views growth as a random process. We then move on to the organizational 
capabilities approach. Here we present a growth theory based on one of the key contributions 
to the strategy field – the resource-based view. The resource-based model predicts that 
Gibrat’s law breaks down in the presence of Penrosian firm resources. The classical economic 
approach to firm growth is covered through presenting implications from economies of scale, 
the Kaldor-Verdoorn law and optimum firm size theory. The implication here is that firm 
growth has positive performance effects until a critical size is reached. Lastly we present two 
theories that does not easily fit into Geroski’s framework, namely organizational inertia and 
fitness landscape theory. These theories provide a counterweight to the other theories, 
indicating a possible negative relationship between growth and firm performance. 
 
2.1.1.1 Gibrat’s law 
In his 1931 paper, Robert Gibrat found that firm size in his sample was almost perfectly 
lognormally distributed. To explain this distribution, he developed a model that describes firm 
growth as a process of small, stochastic shocks (Coad & Holzl, 2009).  
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We follow Steindl’s (1965) method of presenting Gibrat’s argument. Assume xt denotes the 
size of any firm x in period t, and εt is a random variable measuring individual growth shocks 
from period t-1 to period 1. The growth in any period can then be generalized as 
 
𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1 = 𝜀𝑡𝑥𝑡−1     (2.1) 
 
Building on this, to find the firm size at any period t, we have 
 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥0(1 + 𝜀1)(1 + 𝜀2) … (1 + 𝜀𝑡)    (2.2) 
 
Steindl (1965) then argues that 𝜀𝑡 can be approximated by taking log(1 + 𝜀𝑡). Sutton (1997, 
p. 40) states that this is justifiable as long as t  is a “short” time period. Taking logs, we obtain 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥0 + 𝜀1 + 𝜀2 +  … + 𝜀𝑡    (2.3) 
 
The model can then be developed further to demonstrate an expected lognormal distribution 
of firm size. As we can see, equation 2.3 predicts that firm growth at any period is a purely 
stochastic variable, completely independent of growth in other periods. The shocks in any 
period t is not affected by either firm size or growth in other periods. Therefore, according to 
Gibrat’s law, previous growth should not influence future growth. This theory then provides 
an irrelevance theorem of growth, even if it can give no predictions regarding the effect of 
growth on future profitability. Gibrat’s law provides the null hypothesis for the discussion of 
growth: that it is a random, unpredictable process. We now turn to situations where other 
theories predict that Gibrat’s law breaks down. 
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2.1.1.2 Organizational resources and capabilites 
We now turn to the organizational capabilities approach to growth. This approach builds on 
the resource-based view of firms. Resource-based theory (RBT) differs sharply from Gibrat’s 
law when predicting the effect of growth on performance outcomes. In this theory firms can 
be seen as bundles of resources, which are defined as stocks of inputs that affect firms’ 
relative ability to implement product market strategies (Jacobsen & Lien, 2001). These 
resources form the basis for sustained competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  Nelson (1991) argues that firms have routines, processes 
and knowledge that aggregate into organizational capabilities. These capabilities can be seen 
as part of a firm’s resource base (Geroski, 1999).  
 
Peteraf (1993) identifies four prerequisites for resource-based competitive advantage. The 
first is that there is some heterogeneity of resources among firms in an industry. This allows 
for generation of economic rent for those with superior resources. The second criterion is that 
there must be imperfect ex post competition when utilizing these superior resources, to allow 
for sustainable competitive advantage. If this prerequisite is not met, other firms will mimic 
the resource portfolio of superior performers and any economic rents will be competed away. 
Limited ex post competition is achieved through inimitability or imperfect substitutability of 
rent-generating resources. One way this could arise is through causal ambiguity of how a 
resource is acquired or created, for example if competitors or potential industry entrant are 
unable to identify which resources generate economic rent. The third criterion is that 
resources are imperfectly mobile. This could arise from resource intangibility, which is the 
case for assets such as brand names, or high transaction costs when purchasing the resource. 
Imperfect mobility prevents resources to be bid away, therefore ensuring sustained 
competitive advantages. The last criterion states that there must be imperfect ex ante 
competition, in other words there must be imperfect resource factor markets. Otherwise, any 
profitability generated through superior resources will be negated by the cost of acquiring 
them.  
 
As we have seen, RBT is based on the assumption of imperfect factor mobility, heterogeneity 
in resources and imperfect factor markets. As factor mobility and markets grow increasingly 
imperfect, firms are increasingly dependent on generating resources internally. Financial 
resources are arguably of lesser worth, since capital markets are often (at least in the strategy 
literature) assumed to be approximately perfect. Some resources will tend to be completely 
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untradeable, such as brand names, and can only be acquired through accumulation. It is 
therefore important to make a distinction between stocks of resources and flows which 
increase or decrease these stocks (Dierickxs & Cool, 1989). An often used metaphor is the 
image of a bath tub, where the stock of resources at any given time is equal to the amount of 
water in the tub. Water added or drained from the tub signifies resource flows. Geroski 
(1999), building on RBT and Dierickxs and Cool’s stocks and flows view, present a formal 
model for firm growth. Assume that the size of firm i at period t is denoted by Si(t), and, 
following Gibrat’s law, growth is measured as the change in the natural logarithm of size, 
formally ∆ log Si(t). Xi(t) signifies a measure of firm i’s competencies or resource stocks at 
time t. The key assumption in Geroski’s model of firm growth is dependent on the resource 
stock of firms. In other words, resource stocks do not only generate economic rents as 
presented by Peteraf (1993), they also provide the basis for growth. Given the discussion and 
variables introduced above, growth can then be measured as 
 
 
∆log Si(t) = g(t) + Xi(t)     (2.4) 
 
 
where g(t) is the growth rate of firms with no advantage in organizational competencies 
(X=0). Another way to view this is that firms with X=0 are industry average performers. 
Firms who are at a disadvantage in competencies (X<0) will grow even slower, or face 
negative growth (Geroski, 1999). If competencies develop in a systematic way, where 
incremental increases in resources or competencies depends on previous levels, competency 
or resource level can be modeled as 
 
 
Xi(t) = ρ1Xi(t-1) + ρ2Xi(t-2) + εi(t)    (2.5) 
 
 
where ρ1 and ρ2  indicate the growth rate of resource or competency stocks (i.e. its resource 
flows). εi(t) measures unexpected changes in these stocks. If ρ1 + ρ2 > 1, competence stock 
growth is positive and increasing, which then leads to sustained firm growth. When ρ1 + ρ2 < 
1 is maintained over time, competence stock levels will revert to a long-run mean level 
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(Geroski, 1999). Unlimited growth is of course not realistic, but asset stock flows can credibly 
be thought to fluctuate around 1 for highly successful firms with high resource maintenance 
and development capabilities. However, even if ρ1 + ρ2 < 1 over long periods of time, we 
would still expect to see a positive relation before resource stocks revert to the mean. 
 
Furthermore, Penrose (1959) argues that if firm resources are discrete, i.e. “lumpy” or 
unscalable, firms will seek to grow to ensure full resource exploitation. If firms have stocks of 
underutilized resources they will then seek to “push” on to further expansion, predicting a 
positive relation between resource stocks and growth. As we have seen, and in contrast to 
Gibrat’s law, the RBT model introduced above attributes prior growth to firm resource stocks 
and flows. Based on the classical profitability predictions of Peteraf (1993), combined with 
Geroski’s (1999) modification into a growth model, we should therefore see a consistent, 
positive relation between firm growth, ∆log(S), and both future growth and profitability.  
 
2.1.1.3 Economies of scale, the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law and the ‘optimal size firm’ 
We now turn to the third category of growth theories: the classical economic approach. 
Besanko (2008) and Gupta (1981) argue that scale economies can drive profitability. This 
theory also offers a clear departure from Gibrat’s law. As enterprises grow, cost advantages 
can be realized as fixed costs are spread over more units of output. This generates lower costs 
per units, increasing profitability. In conjunction with Bertrand competition, lowering unit 
cost might also allow firms to increase market shares if prices are reduced (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2009), potentially also increasing growth. This would likely happen in industries 
or markets where goods are relatively homogenous and competitive behavior is price-
oriented. Examples of such industries in Norway could be convenience stores or salmon 
farming. Additionally, Gupta (1981) argues that operational efficiency increases with scale, 
reducing variable costs and further decreasing unit cost.  
 
Related to economies of scale and Gupta’s argument, the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law implies a 
positive, causal relationship from output growth rate to productivity growth rate (Kaldor, 
1966). Formally, the law assumes that p and q represent the logarithmic growth rates of labor 
productivity and manufacturing output, respectively. The Kaldor-Verdoorn Law is estimated 
as  
 
𝑝 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑞      (2.6) 
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where b is a positive parameter measuring the elasticity of labor productivity to output. The 
estimate of b, known as the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient, was originally found by Verdoorn to 
be approximately 0.5 for British manufacturing firms. In other words, the law states that 
simply increasing the size of a firm’s operations should induce higher productivity. According 
to Verdoorn (1980), this productivity growth arises from increasing returns to scale when 
output is raised. A source of these increasing returns could be indivisibilities of key assets 
such as machinery or managerial talent. As the scale of operation increases, so does asset 
utilization, and overall costs decrease. Another underlying driver could be the realization of 
increased specialization in labor, machinery and management.  
 
The discussion so far assumes unlimited returns to scale. As is clear from the neoclassical 
‘optimal size’ literature, however, increasing firm size also entails some diseconomies of 
scale. These are often portrayed as bureaucracy and agency costs related to controlling a 
larger organization (Coad & Holzl, 2009). Firms therefore seek some optimal size where the 
marginal overall benefits of increasing size equals costs. This makes it harder to predict the 
effects of growth, as at some point it becomes costly to grow. However, if we assume firms 
rationally evaluate benefits and costs of output levels each year, we should still expect firms 
of sub-optimal sizes to increase their size to reap scale benefits. Firms that have reached their 
optimal size will choose not to grow. The net effect of growth on performance should 
therefore still be positive. 
 
Overall, in light of theories on economies of scale and the Kaldor-Verdoorn law, we should 
therefore expect a positive effect of growth on future profitability, unless all of the cost 
savings are spent on price reductions. The effect on growth levels depends on whether the 
firm wishes to increase market shares by cutting prices or retain the higher margins scale 
economies provide. If we assume some share of firms engage in market capturing strategies, 
we should expect a positive relationship also for growth on growth.   
 
2.1.1.4 Organizational inertia and fitness landscapes 
The theoretical departures from Gibrat’s law we have considered so far largely indicate that 
growth has positive effects on corporate performance. The theory on organizational inertia, 
coupled with fitness landscape theory, however, provides a different view. Hannan and 
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Freeman (1984) argue that there exist strong internal and external forces which provide 
“inertial pressures” on organizations. Examples of internal forces could be internal politics, 
sunk costs and organizational structure, while external forces could arise through legislature 
or the need for legitimacy (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Hannan and Freeman argue that 
these forces are the reason organizations rarely perform fundamental changes.    
 
One of the key theorems in Hannan and Freeman (1984) is that organizational inertia 
increases with size. They present a threshold model where management in firms above a 
certain size is forced to relinquish and delegate power in order to continue to grow. Firms 
above this threshold rapidly lose agility as top management exerts increasingly smaller 
influence on daily operations. Very large firms have limited methods with which to change 
the behavior and actions of its employees. They will also likely be relatively more restrained 
by a deeply embedded culture, sunk costs, or other path-dependent influences.  
 
Furthermore, Hannan and Freeman also state implications for firm performance given high 
inertia. In the case that firms must reorganize, they state that “the process of attempting 
[change] lowers reliability of performance” (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, p. 159).  They also 
argue that firms who undergo reorganization are more vulnerable to bankruptcy. We know 
that organizations might frequently need to adapt to changes in the environment (Siggelkow, 
2001; Cappelli et al., 1997). This does not necessarily involve major exogenous shocks, but 
also incremental adaptions. One theory that illustrates this is fitness landscape theory 
(Siggelkow, 2001). The theory states that firms can have varying degrees of internal fit 
between organizational activities, and external fit with the general environment the firm faces. 
High fit means that firms are on or close to performance ‘peaks’ in the landscape, while less 
well-adapted firms are closer to the ‘valley floors’ of the landscape. Firms whose fit levels 
allow them to reach peaks should outperform less well-adjusted firms. A key implication in 
the theory is that the overall geography of fitness landscapes might can change, creating new 
peaks and destroying old ones. This can happen gradually, or relatively quickly. Changes in 
fitness landscapes forces firms to adapt their activities to retain performance.  
 
In light of theory on organizational inertia, larger firms should find this adaption to new 
landscapes harder than smaller, more agile firms. This prediction is supported by Audia, 
Locke and Smith (2000). Intuitively, we could also expect a non-linear relationship between 
size and inertia. Very small firms might not experience noticeable inertia effects even if they 
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double in size. Multinational firms, on the other hand, might face such large degrees of inertia 
that adapting to abrupt or major exogenous shocks becomes an insurmountable challenge. An 
example of this might be Kodak, the previous world leader in photography equipment. During 
the 1990s and 2000s, the company completely failed to adapt to the digital revolution in 
camera equipment, which slowly eroded away the old peak where activities oriented towards 
analogous camera technology provided high fit and profit levels. This inability to adapt could 
arguably have been caused by Kodak’s commitment to analog technology (McCarthy & Jinks, 
2012).  
 
Overall, we should expect the positive effects of growth discussed above to be affected 
somewhat by inertia effects of size: As firms grow, organizational inertia causes firms to 
become less agile, thus becoming more vulnerable to changes in the environment, and less 
able to seize new opportunities. Hannan and Freeman’s theory therefore predicts a negative 
relationship between growth and performance outcomes, particularly in environments where 
frequent or major adaptations are required. 
 
 
2.1.2 Capital structure and corporate performance 
Having discussed some central theoretical predictions from the effect of growth on 
performance, we now turn to how capital structure might impact firm outcomes. Capital 
structure is arguably one of the most extensively researched areas in the field of finance 
(Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008), and again we are forced to narrow the discussion. As above, 
some theories are excluded because they have limited applicability in our setting. Most 
noticeably, perhaps, this includes agency cost theories. Apart from this, we aimed to include 
the most central theories in the capital structure literature. We therefore set out with the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem, a natural starting point for any discussion on capital structure. 
Similar to Gibrat’s law, the Modigliani-Miller theorem also provides a useful ‘irrelevance 
platform’ from which to discuss our other capital structure theories. We then move on to debt 
overhang theory, another key contribution to the finance literature. This theory states that a 
departure from the Modigliani-Miller theorem occurs when leverage becomes sufficiently 
high to deter further investments. The third theory we present is pecking-order theory, which 
also predicts negative effects of using debt financing. Another central theory we present is 
trade-off theory, which accounts for tax shield effects and bankruptcy costs of debt, predicting 
that firms will ‘trade off’ between these two until an optimal debt ratio is found. The theories 
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so far are heavily oriented towards factor market mechanisms, and so lastly we include theory 
on capital structure’s effect on product market outcomes. 
 
2.1.2.1 The Modigliani-Miller theorem 
This seminal theorem has shaped much of the modern thinking on capital structure. 
Modigliani and Miller presented four distinct propositions published in a series of papers 
(Modligani & Miller 1958; 1961). Their first proposition states that, given certain conditions, 
the debt-equity ratio of a firm does not influence its market value. Their second proposition 
states that a firm’s average weighted cost of capital (WACC) is not affected by its leverage 
ratio. The last two propositions in the theorem are less relevant for our thesis, so we will not 
present them in further detail.  
 
There are four main conditions Modigliani and Miller assume in their derivation of the 
theorem. The first is that there are no taxes. The second is that there are no capital market 
frictions, including bankruptcy costs or transaction costs. The third is that there are symmetric 
interest rates, meaning investors and firms can lend at equal rates. The fourth and final 
assumption is that the financial policies adopted by firms reveal no information (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958).  
 
The authors derive their theorem as follows. Imagine two companies, one completely 
unlevered (Firm U), and one financed partly with debt and partly with equity (Firm L). The 
first proposition of the Miller-Modigliani theorem states that the value of these two firms is 
exactly the same. Miller (1991) explains the intuition behind the theorem by comparing the 
firm to a large tub of whole milk. The farmer who owns the whole milk can sell it as it is, or 
he can separate it into cream and skimmed milk. The Modigliani-Miller theorem states that if 
there are no costs of separation, selling the cream and the skimmed milk would net the same 
price as selling the whole milk. This is essentially an arbitrage argument. If proposition 1 does 
not hold, investors could buy and sell securities in order to generate risk-free economic rent 
until prices move to an equilibrium (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). In a formal argument, 
assume that  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑈 < 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐿 , but that expected return on income streams (𝑋) is identical. 
Furthermore, assume an investor holding 𝑠𝐿 worth of company L’s shares, which equates a 
fraction 𝛼 of total shares 𝑆𝐿. The investor’s return,  (𝑌𝐿), given interest rate 𝑟 on debt  𝐷,  can 
then be written as 
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𝑌𝐿 = 𝛼(𝑋 − 𝑟𝐷𝐿)     (2.7) 
 
 
The investor now sells his 𝛼𝑆𝐿 shares and instead purchases shares in company U, to the 
amount of  𝑠𝑈 =  𝛼(𝑆𝐿 + 𝐷𝐿).  In order to take personal debt 𝛼𝐷𝐿, the investor uses 𝑠𝑈 as 
collateral. This would give him the fraction 𝑠𝑈
𝑆𝑈
= 𝛼(𝑆𝐿+𝐷𝐿)
𝑆𝑈
  of the income from company U. 
Given 𝑟𝛼𝐷𝐿 in personal debt costs, the net income from this portfolio is  
 
 
𝑌𝑈 = 𝛼(𝑆𝐿+𝐷𝐿)𝑆𝑈 − 𝑟𝛼𝐷𝐿 =  𝛼 �𝑉𝐿𝑉𝑈� 𝑋 − 𝑟𝛼𝐷𝐿    (3.4) 
 
 
When comparing equations (3.3) with (3.4), we see that if  𝑉𝑈 < 𝑉𝐿, 𝑌𝑈 < 𝑌𝐿 must hold under 
the conditions stipulated by Modigliani and Miller. Basically, the investor reverses company 
U’s decision of pure equity financing through personally leveraging his investments. 
Similarly, it can be shown that if  𝑉𝑈 > 𝑉𝐿, investors have the opportunity to undo the 
leverage of firm L by adjusting their individual portfolios to account for arbitrage 
opportunities. In general, it is this “undoing” of leverage that hinders  𝑉𝑈 to systematically 
differ from 𝑉𝐿 (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
 
The second proposition of Modigliani and Miller basically states that overall capital costs are 
unchanged by leverage ratio. Continuing our analogy, increasing the amount of debt (cream) 
lowers the value of the remaining equity (skimmed milk) as the total fat content is lowered. In 
other words, any financial gain achieved from increasing debt is balanced by the higher cost 
associated with riskier equity. Thus, given a certain level of total capital, the distribution of 
capital and debt is inconsequential because the weighted average of the different capital costs 
is equal for all possible combinations of the two. Formally, this last argument can be 
presented with the help of the weighted average cost of capital formula (WACC):  
 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷
𝐷+𝐸
𝑟𝐷 + 𝐸𝐷+𝐸 𝑟𝐸     (2.8) 
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where 𝑟𝐸 is the cost of equity and 𝑟𝐷 is the cost of risk-free debt. Given proposition 1 and the 
conditions of the theorem, the WACC is independent of  𝐷
𝐸
. While increased leverage ratios 
must be compensated with a higher return on equity, this does not imply that greater value is 
created by highly leveraged firms, since this would violate proposition 1 (Brealey, Myers & 
Allen, 2008).  
 
While some might regard Miller & Modigliani’s theorem as irrelevant due to its strict and 
unrealistic assumptions, it is very useful for highlighting why and how capital structure does 
matter. For example, Villamil (2004) views the theorem as fundamentally a structured debate 
on why capital structure irrelevance fails in a real world setting.  
 
In sum, the Miller-Modigliani theorem states that capital structure should not influence 
product market outcomes, either in terms of growth or profitability. In other words, capital 
structure does not influence corporate performance at all. In a real world setting, the 
assumptions of Modigliani and Miller are likely to fail. The rest of the theory presented in this 
subchapter will explore situations where the Modigliani-Miller assumptions are likely to 
break down. 
 
2.1.2.2 Debt overhang theory 
As mentioned above another key contribution to the financial structure literature is debt 
overhang theory, developed by Myers (1977). Debt overhang occurs when an organization 
has a sufficiently high leverage that further borrowing becomes financially unfeasible, even 
for investments with positive NPV. In his 1977 paper, Myers views the value of firms as 
determined by the present value of options for future investments. He then argues that firms 
with and without risky debt behave differently when faced with these investment options. If a 
firm is highly leveraged, the cost of issuing further risky debt causes the value of debt to 
exceed expected profits from the investment (Myers, 1977). Equity holders or managers that 
act in the best interest of stockholders will therefore hesitate to invest because most or all of 
the profits accrue to debt holders. As Huang and Song (2002) point out, such investments 
effectively shift wealth from stockholders to debtors. Even if debtors are willing to allow 
increased leverage, indicating that the firm is technically not financially constrained, rational 
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managers will still avoid such investments. This causes the firm to potentially forgo growth 
investment opportunities.  
 
Thus, a departure from the Modigliani-Miller theorem occurs when creditors demand extra 
compensation for perceived bankruptcy costs when firm debt increases. This theory therefore 
predicts a negative relationship between the leverage ratio and growth levels of firms, because 
leveraged firms will tend to underinvest. Furthermore, if creditors “punish” highly leveraged 
firms with extra compensation for bankruptcy costs, we might also expect a negative relation 
between debt and profitability. Taken together, debt overhang predicts a negative relationship 
between debt and both measures of corporate performance. 
 
2.1.2.3 Pecking-order theory 
Pecking order theory, first presented by Donaldson (1961) and popularized by Myers and 
Majluf (1984), is based on information asymmetry between corporate managers and external 
investors. More specifically, the theory states that managers are better able to evaluate 
opportunities and asset values of a firm than investors. Myers and Majluf argue that if the 
disparity in information becomes too great, this will distort financing and investment 
decisions, potentially affecting corporate growth and profitability. 
 
Myers and Majluf develop a stylized explanation. In the theory, firms face three options for 
financing investments: internally generated funds, issuing debt and issuing fresh equity. A 
firm has one asset A and one investment opportunity I. The firm has a sum S < I of 
immediately available capital.  The difference I – S must then be financed with either risky 
debt D or new equity E. In a model where managers have superior information on firm and 
investment value, Myers and Majluf show that firms will always prefer to issue debt over new 
equity. This occurs regardless of whether the firm is over- or undervalued relative to market 
expectations. Their reasoning is that issuing new equity E signals overpriced assets and 
opportunities, which investors punish by placing a lower value on E. The market, upon 
receiving news that the firm is issuing new equity, will assume that management has 
information indicating overvaluation of the firm. Though the market will not know the true 
value of the firm, they will assume it is below current levels, and therefore reduce their 
valuation. If the firm acts in the interest of old stakeholders, they might prefer to forgo the 
investment opportunity instead of incurring stock value losses (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This 
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occurs when overall value of old assets A plus the reduced value of E  is less than the value 
gains from the investment.  
 
Issuing new debt partly mitigates the underinvestment issue. Doing so signals profitable 
investment opportunities. It also signals a potential undervaluation, or at least a correct 
valuation, because the firm refrains from issuing new equity (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008). 
Myers and Majluf show, however, that only internally generated funds completely solve the 
underinvestment problem.  
 
Issuing new debt incurs flotation costs and potentially requires disclosing proprietary 
information that could lead to either market punishment or a loss of competitive advantage. 
This could again distort investment decisions, in worst case scenarios forcing management to 
refrain from issuing further debt in order to invest in a growth project. Furthermore, as seen in 
debt overhang theory, issuing further debt might also be unfeasible for firms with very high 
leverage. In sum, according to pecking-order theory, firms investing in growth opportunities 
will prefer to do so using internal funds. Though debt is a preferred financing choice over new 
equity, it still suffers from underinvestment issues associated with external capital financing. 
Therefore, the theory predicts a negative relation between debt levels and growth.  
 
Pecking-order theory can also provide predictions for the relationship between debt and 
profitability. Given the arguments above, firms should prefer internal financing. However, 
unpredictable cash flows and investment opportunities mean that capital expenditures are not 
always covered. When internal financing of cash expenditures is insufficient, firms must seek 
external finance. According to the theory discussed above, firms will prefer issuing new debt, 
then potentially issue hybrid securities, and lastly turn to new equity when all other options 
are exhausted. The pecking-order theory therefore implies that firms with low levels of debt 
typically are highly profitable, and thus able to cover capital expenditure through retained 
profits (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008). Firms that are less profitable are more dependent on 
external funds to cover their expenditures. In light of pecking-order theory we should 
therefore expect a negative relationship also between debt and profitability. 
 
2.1.2.3 Trade-off theory 
Trade-off theory of capital structure, originally proposed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), 
proposes that a departure from the Modigliani-Miller theorem occurs with the presence of 
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both bankruptcy costs and tax shield effects of debt. We can see this when modifying 
equation 2.8 with the presence of tax deductible interest rates,  
 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝐷
𝐷+𝐸
𝑟𝐷(1 − 𝑇𝑐) + 𝐸𝐷+𝐸 𝑟𝐸     (2.9) 
 
 
where TC is the corporate tax rate. The weighted average cost of capital can now be reduced 
by increasing debt. This is what Kraus and Litzenberger calls the tax shield effect. With 
frictionless capital markets, the end result should be fully leveraged firms. However, Kraus 
and Litzenberger argue that with capital market imperfections debt also entails costs for the 
firm. These costs are usually referred to as bankruptcy costs, and are taken as the increased 
compensation that must be paid to creditors as the risk of bankruptcy increases. However, 
these costs can also plausibly include costs related to deteriorating stakeholder relations 
(Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), which we will discuss in greater detail in the next 
subchapter.    
 
The prediction from trade-off theory is that leverage can increase profitability through recued 
tax costs, as long as the tax shield benefit of debt exceeds its bankruptcy costs. The theory 
predicts a diminishing marginal benefit from the tax shield effect as bankruptcy costs 
increase. When the benefits equal costs, in other words when the firm has completed a trade-
off between these marginal effects, it has reached its optimal capital structure (Brealey, Myers 
& Allen, 2008).  
 
An implication from the trade-off theory is that increases in bankruptcy costs, for example if 
creditors’ risk perception increases, should induce a negative effect of high leverage on 
profitability. This reduces the target debt ratio, but firms cannot quickly or costlessly shift 
their capital structure (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008). This can cause a negative effect of 
debt on profitability. 
 
2.1.2.4 Capital structure and product market outcomes 
The Miller-Modigliani theorem states that capital structure choices should not influence 
company value and product markets outcomes. However, there exist several theoretical 
implications for how debt levels influence competitive behavior and relations between firms 
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and stakeholders. Parsons and Titman (2008) aggregate several findings and implications 
from the finance and strategy literature on how capital structure might affect product market 
outcomes. A key prediction from their paper is that highly leveraged firms are less willing and 
able to compete aggressively with relatively unleveraged competitors. Highly leveraged firms 
may for example lack the financial reserves and solidity to sustain a prolonged price war 
(Parsons & Titman, 2008). They are also more vulnerable to predation by competitors, as they 
may be perceived as “softer” targets due to their inability to weather predatory moves. In 
other words, if a firm’s capital structure is characterized by high debt levels, the firm might 
struggle to capture or defend market shares in the event of predation, thereby predicting a 
negative relationship between leverage and growth.   
 
Furthermore, Parson and Titman (2008) and Titman and Wessel (1988) argue that capital 
structure affects supplier and customer relations. The following argument relies on asset 
specificity theory as presented by Williamson (1981). In a relationship with high asset-
specificity and high switching costs, suppliers and customers might demand compensation 
from highly leveraged firms. For the stakeholders, the risk of losing relation-specific 
investments increases with the client’s leverage, which raises his bankruptcy vulnerability 
(Parsons & Titman, 2008). This implies that highly leveraged firms are at a disadvantage 
when attempting to grow or increase profitability through partnerships or alliances with other 
firms. At the same time, a risk-premium cost might be incurred when selling to customers 
who face high switching costs. Suppliers might also refuse to extend credit to clients with 
high perceived bankruptcy risk, or charge a premium if they do. Therefore, in light of these 
theories, we should see a negative relationship between debt and corporate performance. 
 
2.1.3 Capital structure, growth and corporate performance 
So far we have discussed the effects of growth and capital structure separately. The theories 
we presented on growth largely predicted a positive relationship between growth and 
performance, with the exception of Gibrat’s law and inertia theory. Capital structure theory 
largely predicted a negative link between debt levels and firm outcomes, excepting trade-off 
theory and the Modigliani-Miller theorem. In this subchapter we present theories where 
growth and capital structure in conjunction determine performance outcomes. We first discuss 
capital opportunity cost theory, before reviewing a holistic model for firm growth and capital 
flows.  
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2.1.3.1 Capital opportunity cost theory 
The capital opportunity cost theory state that there should be a positive relationship between 
leverage and the current growth opportunities a firm faces (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Toy et 
al., 1974). The theory states that high-growth firms have above-average investment 
opportunities, i.e. projects generating positive net present value (NPV) for the firm. These 
firms therefore have a high opportunity cost of hoarding capital rather than investing the 
money. For particularly fast-growing firms, it is reasonable to expect that cash requirements 
for further investments at some point exceed the capacity for generating funds internally 
(Barton & Gordon, 1988). The best solution, according to pecking-order theory, then becomes 
borrowing external capital to continue growth. Gupta (1969) further argues that high growth 
firms might frequently turn to external capital, as this allows flexibility in investments 
decisions. Managers with a sufficient desire for high growth might also accept restrictive debt 
covenants to achieve leverage (Barton & Gordon, 1988). This might mitigate some of the 
potential underinvestment problems associated with debt-overhang and pecking-order theory.  
 
If high-growth firms actually do face above-average investment opportunities, we should 
expect a positive relationship between leveraged growth and performance outcomes. 
Assuming managers make accurate project NPV predictions, firms with above-average 
investment opportunities should also be more profitable. Naturally, they should also have 
larger growth potential relative to other firms. In sum, capital opportunity cost theory state 
that there should be a positive relationship between high leverage and high growth 
opportunities, and performance outcomes. 
 
2.1.3.2 Capital allocation, growth prospects and the selection environment 
So far we have presented a number of different theories and ideas. In an attempt to pull the 
different strands together, we present a holistic model for capital structure and growth, 
developed by Knudsen & Lien (2014). The model combines product market insights from our 
growth theories with factor market insights from theory on capital structure. 
 
In the model, productivity is the determining factor of competitive outcomes in both factor 
and product markets. More productive firms “win” in product markets, where selection 
pressures cause these firms to increase market shares. A similar pattern will emerge in factor 
markets, where capital is allocated to more productive firms at the expense of less efficient 
companies. A key difference in factor market allocation, however, is the existence of a time 
30 
 
horizon aspect. Firms with low levels of profitability or productivity today might still be 
attractive if growth prospects are sufficiently high. In normal times, investors are therefore 
indifferent regarding the exact period in which productivity occurs. An example used by 
Knudsen and Lien is the recent valuation of Snapchat to 19 billion dollars – a company almost 
completely devoid of current revenue generation. This characteristic of capital markets is 
important for ensuring efficient resource allocation. Without it, financing R&D-intensive 
projects and innovation might for example be problematic. In addition to attracting equity and 
credit in factor markets, a third and last source of finance is through retained earnings. The 
discussion so far can be summed up in the model below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Selection environments and capital flows 
 
The left hand side of the figure shows the three potential capital sources of firms – retained 
profits, equity and credit. The inflow from these increase capital reserves of companies, which 
is depleted by capital outflows – deficits, investments in growth and dividend payouts. The 
inflows can also be seen as a form of feedback from the environment. If investors and 
creditors view the company as a viable investment object, they will allocate capital to the 
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firm. If customers value and purchase the firm’s products and services, feedback is provided 
through high earnings.  
 
A central implication from the model is that the nature of these capital flows will depend on 
the type of company. Companies that are highly profitable today receive substantial capital 
inflows through retained earnings. However, they might have fewer investment opportunities, 
therefore preferring to let the cash flow out through dividends. Firms with high growth 
potential, on the other hand, might have negative current profits, while the majority of capital 
outflows are funneled into growth investments. This is supported by Chakravarthy & Lorange 
(2009), who find that only a small percentage of firms are able to simultaneously achieve high 
growth and high profitability. The growth projects of high-potential firms are then mainly 
financed through equity or credit, since they have limited ability to use retained earnings. The 
point is that two companies can have the same net capital inflow, but through very different 
channels. Furthermore, two companies can have the exact same valuation, with drastically 
different earnings and dividend flows.  
 
What does all of this mean? First, there is a key implication for the interplay between growth 
and capital structure. So far the discussion points towards equity and credit as the most viable 
source of finance for high growth firms. However, in light of pecking-order theory, funding 
growth by issuing new equity should be the last resort for firms. This leaves high-growers 
with debt as their main source of capital. This model therefore also predicts a positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and debt levels, similar to the capital opportunity 
cost theory. Furthermore, provided the temporal indifference of investors hold, a firm’s access 
to external capital should not depend on current performance and growth prospects. In other 
words, factor market allocation should not discriminate against firms whose high-productivity 
phase lies in the future, rather than today. 
 
So far we have discussed a variety of theoretical mechanisms that explain how growth and 
capital structure affect corporate performance. The structure and theoretical relationships can 
be illustrated in the model below. We started with discussing effect 1, the impact of growth on 
corporate performance. We then moved on to theoretical implications for capital structure on 
performance outcomes, before arguing that there could be an interaction effect between our 
two main variables. We now turn to how recessions can impact the mechanisms discussed 
above. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between growth, capital structure and corporate performance 
 
2.2 The game changer: When recessions hit. 
Implicitly, most of the theories presented above presume stable or ‘normal’ firm 
environments. We now turn to how the mechanisms of prior growth and capital structure 
might be affected by recessions. In this subchapter we start off with a discussion of what 
recessions are and how they fit in the context of business cycle theories. We then explain how 
the theoretical relationships introduced above are affected by recessions. Since there are few 
relevant theories on how downturns impact firms (Agarwal et al., 2009; Garcia-Sanchez, 
Mesquita & Vassolo, 2013; Bromilley, Navarro & Sottile, 2008; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 
1989), this subchapter relies more heavily on empirical findings. Parallel to this discussion we 
also develop our hypotheses.  
 
2.2.1 What are recessions? 
There are various definitions of what constitutes a recession. We use the definition provided 
by the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to identify whether 
macroeconomic conditions are recessionary. NBER state that “(…) a recession is a significant 
decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, 
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normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment and industrial production” (NBER, 
2010). In other words, recessions are lasting economical contractions that impact entire 
economies. 
 
2.2.1.1 Business cycle theory 
To better understand recessions, we put them in the context of business cycles. The idea of 
business cycles was first introduced in 1819 by historian Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi, 
and has since garnered substantial academic interest (Burns & Mitchell, 1946; Hamilton, 
1989; Hodrick & Prescott, 1997; Lucas, 1977). Business cycles are defined as the fluctuation 
in economic activity around an economy’s long-term trend (Hamilton, 1989). Gartner (2009) 
posits that boom years occur when an economy exceeds its potential or optimal GDP, while 
downturns occur when GDP falls below potential GDP.  
 
 
Figure 3: Phases of the business cycle. Source: Gartner, 2009; Benedictow & Johansen, 2005. 
 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates how business cycles cause variations around the long-term trend as 
posited by Garner (2009) and Hamilton (1989). There are various classification schemes for 
different phases of the business cycle. Gartner simply distinguishes between cyclical 
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downturns, which last from peak to bottom of the cycle, and expansions, which last from 
bottom to peak. Benedictow and Johansen (2005) adopt a more detailed approach, 
differentiating between four phases of a business cycle: expansion, slowdown, downturn and 
retrieval. In this model, the downturn and retrieval phases constitute the recessionary stage of 
the business cycle. Our focus lies on the impact of recessions, and so we naturally concentrate 
on the downturn stage. Throughout the rest of our thesis, the terms recessions and downturns 
will be used interchangeably. 
 
2.2.1.2 Impact of recessions 
Cyclical downturns usually involve higher unemployment rates, lower GDP growth, less 
positive forecasts, reduced investments and a slump in stock markets (Gartner, 2009). 
According to the IMF, global recessions typically occur every 7-10 years, and can last 
anywhere from 8-18 months (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2013). The IMF have identified six periods 
since 1970 that qualify as global recessions, the two most recent being the dot-com bubble 
and the 2008-2009 downturn. These recessions caused a negative real GDP-growth of 0.4 and 
2.3 in the OECD area, respectively (OECD, 2015).  
 
For firms, the impact of recessions is likely to be twofold (Tong & Wei, 2008). The first is a 
reduction of consumer demand, where real and anticipated reduction in consumer spending 
power reduces consumers’ purchasing power. This decreases the aggregate consumer demand 
over which firms compete. During the financial crisis more than two thirds of Norwegian 
firms experienced a decline in demand (Lien & Knudsen, 2012). The second impact is that 
access to equity and credit is reduced. In short, there are less available funds in capital 
markets for firms to compete over. Both of these indicate that the selection environment faced 
by firms becomes harsher during recessions. We return to the impact on Norway and 
Norwegian firms in greater detail in the analysis section. 
 
A characteristic of recessions is that they are highly unpredictable (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2013). 
Therefore, their impact can be viewed as exogenous, environmental shocks for firms. This 
makes recessions interesting in a research perspective, because they can be viewed as large 
natural experiments imposed on corporations. However, empirically investigating the impact 
of recessions is not quite as straightforward as this might imply. We briefly present a model 
from Knudsen (2014) to illustrate conceptual issues with using recessions as exogenous 
treatments on firm performance. 
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Figure 4: Impact of recessions. Source: Knudsen (2014) 
 
As we can see from the model above, three categories of factors influence firm performance 
outcomes in recessions. First, there is the impact of the recession itself. Second comes the 
response of firms to the occurrence of a downturn. Third is the error term, which accounts for 
all other factors that influence firm performance in the period that are not related to the 
downturn. We return in detail to the error term in the methods section, where we discuss 
control variables that allow for us to capture some of this variation. We can therefore argue 
that we can control for at least parts of the error term. Separating recessionary impact from the 
response of firms, however, is not something we can easily do. For example, the impact of a 
recession can cause a reduction in sales growth for a given firm, but the response of the firm 
can be to engage in a spontaneous (and successful) viral marketing campaign, ending with a 
net positive effect on growth. To us, this would only register as a small positive increase in 
sales growth, since the marketing campaign is not the result of observable firm characteristics. 
We return to the problem of separating impact and response in the discussion chapter. 
 
2.2.1.3 Types and causes of recessions 
Various types of recessions have been identified based on the “shapes” they impose on long-
term growth patterns, and whether they can be considered structural or cyclical (Morley, 
2009; Chen et. al, 2011). We do not spend time on distinguishing between types of recessions, 
since this falls outside the positioning of our thesis.  
 
There are also differing opinions on the cause of recessions, and whether they originate in 
demand or supply side factors (Hamilton, 1989). However, the underlying drivers for 
downturns are not highly relevant for this thesis, only their effects. Therefore, we devote no 
more time to the underlying economic explanation of recessions. 
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2.2.2 Capital structure and growth in recessions 
So far we have presented some theoretical underpinnings for recessions and how they fit in 
business cycles, and their likely impact on firms. We now turn to how recessions affect the 
impact of capital structure and growth on corporate performance. We follow the same 
structure as above, meaning we start with the discussion of growth, before moving on to 
capital structure and lastly consider the combined effects of growth and capital structure. As 
mentioned above, the lack of theoretical contributions on the effect of growth and capital 
structure during recessions, we adopt a more empirical approach in this chapter. 
 
 
2.2.2.1 Growth and corporate performance in recessions 
As we saw above, Gibrat’s law predicted no relationship between current and future growth, 
while Geroski’s RBT model predicts a positive, stable relationship between current growth 
and future profits and growth rates. Theory on economies of scale and the Kaldor-Verdoorn 
Law also predicted a positive relationship between growth and profitability. Organizational 
inertia theory, coupled with fitness landscape theory, indicated potentially negative effects of 
growth on performance. Generally, empirical findings for normal years indicate that 
predicting firm growth is difficult, and that firm growth largely follows a random pattern 
(Geroski, 1999; Geroski, Machin & Walters, 1997; Coad & Holzl, 2003; 2007). This lends 
credibility to Gibrat’s law, and indicates that sustaining growth over time is very difficult. 
However, regarding the effects of growth, some empirical support is provided for the positive 
relationships predicted by RBT, economies of scale and the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law 
(Davidsson & Fitzsimmons, 2009; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Coad, 1997). Some authors, on 
the other hand, find that growth can have a negative impact, particularly on profitability 
(Chakravarthy & Lorange, 2009) 
 
Now we turn to how these relationships are affected by downturns. Intuitively, we might 
expect fast growers to be less severely affected during recessions. High growth is, after all, a 
desired state for many firms, and might be an indicator of the general ‘proficiency’ of firms in 
meeting consumer demand. Additionally, from a competitive forces perspective, high-growth 
industries might be subject to less intense rivalry during recessions, since demand is relatively 
abundant (Knudsen, 2014; Porter, 1980). To the contrary, however, several authors find that 
recessions induce a negative effect of prior growth on corporate performance (Geroski & 
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Gregg, 1996; 1997; Knudsen, 2014; Lien, 2010). Geroski and Gregg (1996) find that British 
firms with high growth rates prior to a recession were more vulnerable during the downturn 
than other firms. Using survey-based data from a sample of 614 manufacturing firms, they 
find a positive, significant relationship between prior growth and the probability of being 
extremely severely or severely affected. Their vulnerability construct encompasses both 
profitability and growth (Geroski & Gregg, 1997). 
 
Knudsen (2014) arrives at a similar conclusion. Combining survey and financial statement 
data for over 1000 Norwegian firms he finds that Norwegian high-growth firms were more 
likely to experience severe demand reductions in the 2008-2009 recession. Lien’s (2010) 
findings are similar to those of Geroski and Gregg and Knudsen. He argues that industries 
with high pre-recession growth have a large share of marginal customers, whose perceived 
utility from purchases just exceeds their costs (ibid). These customers only enter the market 
because of the peaking economic boom. When the downturn hits, these customers are the first 
to leave the industry (Lien, 2010). Examples of such boom industries might include luxury 
spas or limousine services.  
 
Taken together, these findings indicate that high-growth firms are more vulnerable during 
recessions than their more modestly growing competitors. In other words, the empirical 
findings indicate that recessions actually reverse the positive relationship between growth and 
corporate performance predicted by the RBT model, economies of scale, and the Kaldor-
Verdoorn Law.  
 
How do recessions reverse the theoretical mechanisms above? We briefly attempt to outline 
how downturns can effectively reverse relatively robust theoretical mechanisms. We start 
with RBT. Knudsen and Lien (2014) offer a potential explanation: recessions can change the 
fitness landscapes of the competitive environment, as presented by Siggelkow (2001). These 
changes can be imposed through shifts in customer and investor preferences (Knudsen & 
Lien, 2014). Investors and creditors will tend to “flee to quality” during recessions (Bernanke, 
Gertler & Gilchrist, 1991). Similarly, customer demands have been shown to change during 
downturns, for example in disfavor of luxury and durable goods (Knudsen, 2014). This might 
alter the worth or exploitability of resource bases during downturns. The flight to quality is 
just one example of capital market inefficiency during recessions, a phenomenon that 
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strategists typically do not account for. Overall, these explanations might provide some basis 
for understanding how recessions might reverse RBT predictions on firm performance. 
 
Regarding economies of scale and the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law, we can turn to organizational 
inertia to explain why these mechanisms might be reversed during recessions. If large firms 
typically reap economies of scale and benefit from the Kaldor-Verdoorn prediction, we can 
also assume that these organizations will experience more inertia than smaller firms (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1984). Therefore, when recessions hit and potential fitness landscape changes 
occur, these firms are less able to adjust to the new environment. In the long term, the effects 
of inertia depends on whether landscape changes are temporary or permanent, but in the short 
term larger firms are likely to suffer more than smaller, more agile firms. Organizational 
inertia might therefore explain why the growth mechanisms are reversed in recessions. 
 
Based on the discussion above, we develop the following hypothesis. 
 
H.1.a: Prior firm growth has a negative effect on growth performance in recessions.  
 
and 
 
 H.2.a: Prior firm growth has a negative effect on profitability performance in recessions. 
 
Similar to growth, it is unlikely that these relationships are linear for all degrees of leverage. 
We intuitively expect the effects of prior growth to display non-linear relationships with 
corporate performance. Firms with high pre-recession growth levels, for example, might 
suffer relatively more in recessions than more modest growers. In light of the resource-
negation and marginal customer effects during recessions, these high growers might suffer 
disproportionate negative impacts of recessions that would not be captured by linear models. 
We therefore add two more hypotheses we will use to test for non-linearities in the effects of 
prior growth on performance. 
 
H.1.b: During recessions the negative effect of prior growth on growth performance 
increases exponentially with prior growth levels.   
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H.2.b: During recessions the negative effect of prior growth on profitability increases 
exponentially with prior growth levels.   
 
 
2.2.2.2 Capital structure and corporate performance in recessions 
As we saw above, the theoretical predictions for the effect of capital structure on performance 
were somewhat disparate. Pecking-order and debt overhang theory predicts a negative 
relationship, as did the product market theories. On the other hand, capital opportunity cost 
theory predicted a positive relationship between debt levels and performance outcomes. 
 
For normal years, overall empirical findings suggest that there is a negative relationship 
between debt levels and future growth (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Gupta,1969; Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Chen & Zhao, 2001). Some, however, find a positive relationship (Barton & 
Gordon, 1988). Largely, it seems predictions from pecking-order and debt overhang theory 
hold firm in empirical investigations. Empirical investigations of capital structure’s effect on 
profitability have yielded rather disparate findings. Some authors find that leverage has a 
positive relationship with profitability (Abor, 2005; Gill, Biger, Mathur, 2011). Others find 
that high leverage is associated with reduced profits (Hurdle, 1974; Shubita & Alsawalha, 
2012). One explanation for the disparity in findings could be the different methods and data 
used in the analysis.  
 
However, we are more concerned with the impact of capital structure during recessions. In the 
empirical studies we have reviewed, highly leveraged firms appear to be more severely 
affected by recessions. Geroski and Gregg (1996) find that firms with high levels of debt 
relative to total assets were more vulnerable in recessions. As we discussed above, their 
vulnerability construct encompassed both output growth and profit rates, indicating that 
highly leveraged firms suffer in both performance dimensions during downturns. Similar to 
Geroski and Gregg, Lien and Knudsen (2012), measuring recessionary impacts on demand 
reductions and credit constraints using survey data, find that industry-adjusted debt level was 
the most influential factor in determining vulnerability among Norwegian firms.  
 
Campello et al (2010) find that financially constrained firms, i.e. firms unable to further 
increase their debt ratio, to a larger extent reduced investments, number of employees and 
marketing expenditures relative to unconstrained firms during the 2008-2009 recession. 
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Though they do not explore the capital structure characteristics of credit constrained firms, it 
seems natural to assume that the reason they are denied further credit is an already high debt 
ratio. Campello et al. further show that three aspects of credit constraints drove the negative 
relationship between debt and performance: limited credit availability, higher costs of external 
funds and difficulties in retaining or establishing new lines of credits with banks. They do not 
investigate the impacts on profitability and growth, but the increased interest rates indicate 
that profitability should suffer as a consequence of being highly leveraged during recessions. 
Furthermore, the reduction in investments, employees and marketing expenditure should 
intuitively induce a reduced growth relative to more moderately leveraged competitors.  
 
Braun and Larrain (2004), when performing analyses on industry level, found that industries 
that are more dependent on external finance are more severely affected during recessions. 
Using a sample of multiple manufacturing industries in more than a hundred countries, they 
find that output growth rates are disproportionately reduced for industries where high debt 
levels were the ‘norm’. Additionally, they discover that this leverage effect is exacerbated by 
capital market inefficiencies. In other words, the less effective capital markets were, the worse 
the impact on high-leverage industries. 
 
Similar predictions as the ones discussed above are presented by Opler and Titman (1996). 
They find that firms with a high debt to assets ratio lose market shares to less leveraged firms 
when faced with financial distress. They argue that this negative growth is partly attributable 
to customer and competitor actions, not only downsizing decisions by managers. Zingales 
(1998) show that exogenous shocks affected highly leveraged firms more heavily. He argues 
this is caused by predatory pricing of competitors viewing leveraged firms as easy targets for 
a price war. These findings coincide with the conclusions made by Chevalier (1995a; 1995b), 
who investigated competitive behavior among supermarket stores and found that prices 
tended to drop following leveraged buyouts. She argues that this is caused by predation on the 
buying firm, which experiences a sharp increase in debt levels following the buyout. In a 
related stream of research, Titman & Wessels (1988) investigate the effects of leverage on 
customer and supplier relations. They find that firms which can potentially incur high 
liquidation costs among stakeholders tend to choose lower debt ratios.  
 
How can we explain the empirical findings above? Seen in light of debt overhang theory, the 
findings of Geroski and Gregg (1996), Lien and Knudsen (2012) and Campello et al. (2010)  
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might indicate that recessions further increase the cost of financing investment projects with 
debt. For example, firms with high debt levels, who have already incurred high risk in the 
eyes of debtors, should face even steeper interest rates during downturns. As we saw above, 
this is directly supported by Campello et al. (2010). In the debt overhang model, this 
exacerbates the underinvestment problem, since debtors now retain even more of a project’s 
potential profit. Highly leveraged firms are therefore forced to forgo even more investment 
prospects with positive NPV, reducing growth. In light of this theory, recessions should 
therefore a greater reduction in profitability and growth relative to more modestly leveraged 
firms.  
 
These findings can also be seen in light of trade-off theory. Recessions are likely to reduce the 
optimal debt ratio of firms, as creditors risk perceptions increase, effectively raising 
bankruptcy costs. This should lead firms to attempt a reduction in debt ratio, but this is costly 
and takes time. Meanwhile, their profitability performance is likely to suffer.  
 
The findings of Braun and Larrain (2004) indicate that the underinvestment problems 
predicted in pecking-order theory is exacerbated by recessions. That decreased financial 
market efficiency further reduces growth might indicate that the preference of internal capital 
is strengthened during downturns.  
 
The findings in Opler and Titman (1996), Zingales (1993) and Chevalier (1995a; 1995b) 
indicate recessions aggravate the mechanisms of capital structure on product market outcomes 
we presented in chapter 2.1.2.3.  The findings from Titman and Wessels (1988) point in a 
similar direction. Their results indicate that firms anticipate that credit constraints exacerbate 
the mechanisms of switching costs and asset specificity. 
 
In sum, it seems downturns exacerbate many of the theoretical mechanisms of how capital 
structure might affect growth. These findings point to a clear negative relationship between 
debt levels and growth and profitability during recessions. When comparing our discussion to 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem, it could be argued that recessions put further distance between 
the ‘real’ world and the one Modigliani and Miller imagined. 
 
When formalizing our discussion into hypotheses, we have  
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H.3.a: Debt has a negative effect on corporate growth performance during recessions. 
 
H.4.a: Debt has a negative effect on corporate profitability performance during recessions. 
 
Similar to the relationships in growth, we expect non-linearities in the effects of capital 
structure. This is perhaps most evident when looking at debt overhang theory, which implies 
that there exists some threshold before underinvestment problems start to arise. Above this 
threshold, we should intuitively expect the negative effects of debt to be increasingly 
negative. Firms with particularly high debt levels should therefore be relatively more severely 
affected. 
 
H.3.b: During recessions the negative effect of debt on growth performance increases 
exponentially with debt levels.   
 
H.4.b: During recessions the negative effect of debt on profitability performance increases 
exponentially with debt levels.   
 
2.2.2.3 Growth, capital structure and corporate performance in recessions 
As we can see from the discussion so far, recessions seem to induce a negative effect of both 
high growth and high leverage on firm performance. In the capital structure lens, recessions 
force a departure from the Modigliani-Miller world by punishing firms with high leverage, 
exacerbating the mechanisms of debt overhang and product market theories.  The discussion 
on growth revealed that the growth mechanisms were largely reversed during recessions. In 
sum, therefore, we should expect high levels of both pre-recession growth and leverage to be 
particularly harmful to performance.  
 
This can be further discussed in light of Knudsen and Lien’s (2014) model on capital flows 
and selection environments, as presented in 2.1.3. In normal years, there is not much factor 
market discrimination between firms regarding their growth prospects and capital structure. 
Put differently, the mix of the three capital inflow channels should not affect a company’s 
operations. Similarly, product market selection pressures, which favor high current 
productivity, are mitigated by access to efficient financial markets, which provide a “buffer” 
for high-potential firms.  
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As we mentioned in 2.2.1.2, two things tend to happen in recessions – demand reductions and 
equity and credit availability reductions. In light of Knudsen & Lien’s model, demand 
reductions are likely to decrease capital inflows from retained profits. Another way to think of 
equity and credit availability reduction is that investors increase their threshold for required 
future growth, and banks increase their demands for collateral or solidity (Knudsen & Lien, 
2014). This last effect can cause recessions to induce a distorted or myopic selection effect on 
firms. The intertemporal productivity indifference discussed above, where productive firms 
can be valued equally regardless of when high productivity occur, is gone or at least 
weakened. In other words, markets will discriminate heavily towards firms with high growth 
opportunities. Additionally, firms that have low current profitability might find retained 
revenues insufficient to cover deficits or dividend payments. 
 
This effect can be exacerbated if we include capital opportunity cost theory in the discussion. 
In light of this theory, firms with high growth potential should have higher opportunity cost of 
capital reserves. In other words, they should have fewer reserves to draw on during a crisis. 
Additionally, if these firms have chosen a high degree of leverage to finance growth 
investments, they are likely to be particularly severely affected.  
 
Based on the discussion above, we propose the following effect of the interaction between 
debt levels and growth during recessions. 
 
H.5: There is a negative interaction effect between prior growth and debt levels on growth 
performance in recessions. 
 
H.6: There is a negative interaction effect between prior growth and debt levels on 
profitability performance in recessions. 
 
To sum up, we have seen that from both a theoretical and empirical viewpoint, recessions can 
have a potentially large impact on the effects of growth and capital structure. Building on the 
visual representation from above, we have included the following figure to demonstrate the 
mediating effect of recessions. 
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Figure 5: Growth, capital structure, corporate performance and the mediating effect of recessions. 
3 Research design and method 
In this chapter we will present our methodological choices. We start by describing the general 
research design of our thesis, before discussing data acquisition and our sampling strategy. 
We then present the variables we include in our models before discussing multiple regression 
analysis. Lastly, we discuss the reliability and validity of the thesis. 
 
 
3.1 Research design 
As stated in our research question, the purpose of this paper is to investigate how capital 
structure and growth patterns influence firm performance in recessions. Johannesen et. al 
(2005) underline that the purpose dictates the research design, in other words should the 
research question shape design choices. Therefore, we have structured our research design 
after the purpose of our study. At the same time, coherence between different aspects of the 
research design should be emphasized (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). The rest of this 
subchapter discusses the suitability of research design choices and the overall coherence of 
our research.   
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Saunders et al. (2009) develop a framework for research purpose and design. We use this 
framework to verify that our design choices are appropriate given the purpose of our thesis. In 
the model research purpose can be placed in three different categories: explorative, 
descriptive and explanatory. Explorative studies seek to reveal new information and evaluate 
a phenomenon from a different perspective. Descriptive research aims to establish an accurate 
description of people, events or situations. Explanatory studies aim to explain causal 
relationships between variables. Saunders et al. state that the different approaches are not 
mutually exclusive or even easily separable from each other.  
 
Our research arguably contains aspects of exploratory, descriptive and explanatory purposes. 
We seek to further explore relationships that have not been investigated thoroughly in a 
business cycle context, and therefore our thesis can be said to be exploratory. At the same 
time, it is our aim to describe our empirical findings as accurately and robustly as possible, 
which in Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill’s framework indicates a descriptive purpose. 
Furthermore, our research also implicitly attempts causal explanation of how certain firm 
characteristics affect recessionary impacts, through tying a causal link between debt and 
growth levels and firm outcomes. However, the focus in this thesis is not why, but rather 
what. By this we mean that our main purpose is to establish whether the broad relationships 
between debt, growth and performance exist, not why these relationships might occur. At the 
same time, it is our aim to be as transparent and accurate while performing analyses. 
Therefore, we conclude that our thesis has a mostly descripto-exploratory purpose. We now 
turn to the implications this classification has for our research design. 
 
A key consideration is what Saunders et al. call research approach. They state that research 
can be either inductive or deductive. In inductive approaches, the researcher explores data and 
subsequently creates, modifies or refers to theory to explain findings. Deductive research 
typically develops hypotheses from existing literature and then test hypotheses on data. We 
argue that the last approach fits a descripto-exploratory purpose well. Our purpose dictated 
that we base our analysis on existing research, since we were dependent on previous literature 
to develop our baseline relationships between growth, capital structure and performance in 
normal times. Furthermore, we were reliant on existing empirical studies to develop our 
hypotheses on how recessions affect these relationships.  
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Additionally, our research question dictates that we use quantitative data. It seems highly 
unfeasible to collect sufficient qualitative data for a representative sample of Norwegian 
firms. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009), however, argue that use of qualitative data 
might be better suited to exploratory studies. But this seems to disregard the potential wealth 
of information that can result from exploring quantitative data, as well as the feasibility of 
data access. Furthermore, quantitative data is intuitively better suited to perform objective, 
accurate portrayals of reality, in line with the descriptive purpose of our thesis. Additionally, 
our access to databases of financial statement data is a resource we should utilize. It therefore 
seems appropriate to use quantitative data.  
 
The research design is summarized in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 6: Research design 
 
 
3.2 Data and sample 
3.2.1 Data 
The data we have used in this thesis stems from the Norwegian Entity Registry database 
(Brønnøysundsregisteret), delivered to SNF by Dun & Bradstreet Norge and Menon Business 
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Economics. The data is mainly comprised of yearly individual financial statements from every 
firm operating in Norway. These statements are intended to provide information to various 
interested parties, such as tax authorities and investors, and therefore contain in-depth 
financial information about the enterprises. The database is therefore comprised of key 
financial information on all Norwegian enterprises, published in separate databases released 
annually from 1992-2012. In addition to variables reporting profit margins, debt and 
liabilities, cash holdings and so on, the data sets contain information about firms’ ownership 
structure, legal form, and industry affiliation. 
 
The databases from the Entity Registry fall under the definition of secondary data given by 
Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009, p. 681): “(…) secondary data is data collected by others 
for another purpose than yours”. A brief assessment of how well-suited the data are to our 
purposes is therefore expedient. Our aim is to explore relationships between key 
characteristics of firms and how these are affected by business cycles. Many of these 
characteristics can be computed or approximated from variables in the databases, so our 
application of the data seems justifiable. Furthermore, the Entity Registry supplies an 
unparalleled sample of firms, and data is provided for almost two decades. Lastly, there are 
few viable alternative methods. The only other realistic option for generating a comparable 
amount of relevant data would be through a quantitative survey, as in Knudsen (2014), but 
such an endeavor falls beyond the scope of this thesis. Mjøs and Øksnes (2012) have also 
performed a quality assurance of the entire database, mitigating data quality concerns.  
    
3.2.2 Empirical setting and sampling strategy 
We aim to describe the relationships between capital structure, growth and corporate 
performance among Norwegian firms during the two recessions in the 2000s. It is therefore 
crucial to generate an empirical setting that allows for an accurate portrayal of reality and 
generalization of results. We sought to generate a base sample of Norwegian firms that were 
representative for a hypothetical “normal” Norwegian firm. Our reasoning is that certain 
organizations, such as very small firms, holding companies, or charities might exhibit 
characteristics and behavior that differ substantially from a “normal” firm. These non-normal 
firms might generate noise and inaccuracies in our analysis results.  
 
Here we faced a general trade-off. On one hand we could include more firms and thus achieve 
higher “realism” and external validity. On the other hand we could exclude certain firms in 
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order to remove noise from non-normal firms and increase internal validity. This would 
arguably also increase external validity when generalizing to our sub-group of “normal” 
firms, as opposed to the entire population of Norwegian firms. Since this thesis is focused on 
profit-maximizing corporations and on generating results representative for these, the latter 
sampling approach was preferred. The drawback remains, however, that this involves a non-
probabilistic sampling method and manipulation of the data sets that will clearly influence the 
base sample. We have therefore strived for transparency whenever performing manipulations 
on the data sets, while also attempting to remove as few observations as possible from the 
data. Additionally, an argument for using our selection criteria is to generate a comparable 
sample to Bjørkli and Sandberg (2012), Fjelltveit and Humlung (2012), Brynildsrud (2013) 
and Lien & Knudsen (2013), which should allow for more easily comparable results. 
 
3.2.3 Selection criteria and sample size 
Selection criterion 1: Time period 1999-2012 
Ideally, we would want to use data from every year in the database. However, while data as 
far back as 1992 is available, the implementation of Regnskapsloven renders pre-1999 
unusable, due to large disparities in accounting practices. The period 1999 to 2012 was 
chosen since it should allow us to capture two recessions in our analyses. Data for 2013 has 
not yet been released at the time of writing. 
 
Selection criterion 2: Sales revenue > 10.000.000 NOK 
This selection criterion was chosen for several reasons. First, to ensure a minimum size of the 
firms included, and so exclude small firms that could potentially exhibit very high growth 
rates. The second reason was to eliminate non-commercial, non-profit maximizing firms. The 
selection criterion has been adjusted for inflation using Statistics Norway’s (Statistisk 
Sentralbyrå) inflation index. The basis year for all inflation adjustments is 2007, and a table 
with the inflation rate index can be seen in appendix A.1. 
 
Selection criterion 3: Labor costs and social expenses > 3.000.000 NOK 
The criterion that firms have above 3 million NOK in labor costs and social expenses was 
included to ensure that juridical entities such as holding companies were dropped from the 
base sample. Again the reasoning was that these might behave and respond in different ways 
than a typical commercial firm. As we see below, we used labor costs and social expenses as a 
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criterion instead of number of employees, since the latter displays faulty reporting. This 
criterion was adjusted for inflation using the same method as above.  
 
Selection criterion 4: Legal form = AS, ASA ANS or DA 
This criterion was intended to remove publicly owned entities or other non-profit maximizing 
firms that were not excluded by the criteria above, mainly government-owned firms. The 
included legal forms are limited companies (AS for short in Norwegian), public limited 
companies (ASA), general partnerships (ANS) and liable companies (DA). While the list of 
legal forms that are excluded from the base sample is relatively long, the number of firms 
excluded is relatively low. Around 90 % of firms in the databases are of the AS, ASA, ANS 
or DA legal forms. 
 
Selection criterion 5: Competitive, profit-maximizing industries 
Several industries were excluded because affiliated firms are likely to exhibit non-competitive 
or non-profit maximizing behavior, or otherwise reduce the generality of the sample. The list 
of excluded industries is given below. The numbers and percentages are from a dataset with 
no prior cutoffs. 
 
2002 two-digit 
NACE code 
Industry name  Average 
number 
Average 
percentage 
1 Crop and animal production  2023 0.8 
2 Forestry  444 0.2 
65 Financial services  23748 9.2 
66  Insurance  229 0.1 
67 Financial support services  845 0.3 
75 Public/defense firms  3464 1.3 
80 Education  1802 0.7 
85 Health and social services  10053 3.9 
90 Sanitation / garbage disposal  485 0.2 
91 Interest groups  562 0.2 
92 Culture / sports  4478 1.7 
99 International organizations  0 0.0 
Table 1: Excluded two-digit NACE industries 
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The exclusion of some of these, such as interest groups or cultural or sports organizations, 
probably speak for themselves. Agricultural industries were excluded because they are 
subsidized by the government, therefore contaminating the impact of recessions. Financial 
industries were excluded because of the unique capital structure patterns typically observed 
among affiliated firms. Banks, for example, can typically operate with debt levels between 
90-95% of total assets (Gropp & Heider, 2009). We excluded the health services industry 
because while some health firms might be private and profit-maximizing, demand for health 
services are likely to be highly inelastic, even during recessions. The sanitation industry was 
excluded for the same reason.   
 
Total sample size: 
Below is a table showing total sample size for each year as each selection criteria is 
implemented.  
 
Criteria 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
None 140248 150048 140969 153789 156769 170928 201404 221815 234213 237947 240758 244184 247457 
Sales 24252 25381 24896 24357 25971 28452 30462 33774 34762 33850 34661 35472 36283 
Salary 15630 16769 16601 16560 17518 19522 21254 23993 25588 25338 25983 26031 26229 
Legal 
form 
14763 15964 16003 15997 16925 18597 20324 22984 24357 24088 24689 25290 25891 
Industry 14001 14779 15201 14894 15718 17203 18820 21206 21132 22005 21806 22322 22659 
Table 2: Criteria and sample size 
 
As we can see, the most drastic reductions in sample size occur when we implement the sales 
and salary criteria. Excluding the legal forms and industries discussed above removes 
relatively few firms. There seems to be a clear trend of increasing number of firms in the 
datasets.  
 
3.2.4 Outliers 
When performing regression analysis, it is often appropriate to check for outliers. An 
observation is defined as an outlier when its omission substantially impacts regression results 
(Chatterjee & Hadi, 1986). These influential observations have the potential to greatly affect 
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OLS results (Wooldridge, 2010), and can also cause violation of the normality criteria 
common in some statistical analysis tools (Keller, 2009). Regressions are susceptible to 
outliers because residuals with large absolute values are allocated disproportionate weight in 
the OLS method. Generally, outliers can arise in two different ways, through errors or through 
unusual characteristics of cases. It is impossible to assert outright that the outliers in our 
datasets are erroneous, so we must treat them as unusual, but correct, observations. The 
decision to keep or drop these observations is not trivial. Extreme observations can provide 
important information by increasing the variation in the independent variables (Wooldridge, 
2010). However, as mentioned above, they have the potential to impact analysis results 
substantially. It is a similar dilemma to the one discussed in section 3.2.2, where we must 
decide between realism and representativeness. Again, we stress the importance of 
minimizing the extent of “tampering” with the dataset. Ideally, we would present our analysis 
results both with and without outliers, but due to our focus on generating a representative 
sample and scope restrictions, we decided to instead only report results where we remove the 
outliers. To retain as many observations as possible, we only trim the dependent and key 
independent variables. In other words, we trim sales and asset growth, debt levels, ROA and 
EBITDA margins.   
 
When dealing with influential observations there are two possible approaches. We can either 
create our own limits for accepted values of a variable and trim it accordingly, or we can use 
statistical techniques designed for identifying outliers. Because we lack extensive experience 
or expertise in handling large datasets, we decided to use statistical techniques to identify 
outliers. These should provide a more objective and less arbitrary handling of influential 
observations.   
 
Our approach is comprised of two steps. First we identify extreme observations using the 
Cook’s Distance and Leverage techniques. We decide how to handle these outliers based on 
robustness test where we examine the impact of their omission on our models. Afterwards, we 
identify observations ± 3 standard deviations from the mean. Similar robustness tests are then 
performed. The intention behind performing outlier detection first is to smooth variation 
across years. Some years have outliers with substantially higher values than others, which 
affect the size of the standard deviations and therefore the trimming in step two.  Similar 
trimming by standard deviations is also performed by Bjørkli and Sandberg (2012), Fjelltveit 
and Humlung (2012) and Brynildsrud (2013), except that these studies use 2 standard 
52 
 
deviations. We argue that this would remove too many observations from the datasets, so we 
increase the limits to 3. 
 
Implementation of Cook’s Distance and Leverage trimming 
We included two different methods for identifying outliers so we could cross-check extreme 
observations. Our strategy for dealing with outliers is to minimize the number of deleted 
cases.  
 
Cook’s Distance indicates whether any single observation has a disproportionally large impact 
on the regression model. The value of Cook’s D is a measure of the change in the regression 
coefficients that would take place if an observation were omitted from the analysis (Field, 
2009). There are differing opinions on the threshold of Cook’s D: Hamilton (1992) argues that 
observations with a value above 4/N are influential, while Cook and Weisenberg (1982) 
advices that observations with a value above 1 should be investigated. In accordance with our 
outlier handling strategy, we choose to follow Cook and Weisenberg and set our limit to 1.  
 
Leverage is also a measure of an observation’s potential influence, and flags observations 
with an unusual combination of values among the independent variables. We feel this 
technique fits our sampling strategy and complements Cook’s D well, since Leverage is 
useful in identifying unusual but not necessarily extreme observations. Again, there is no 
definite threshold value: Huber (1981) argues that values above 0.5 should be avoided, while 
Hamilton (1992) states that Leverage values below 0.2 is advisable. Using a threshold of 0.2 
flags a substantial number of observations in our datasets, so in accordance with our outlier 
strategy we set the limit to 0.5.  
 
In practice, both values were generated by running the complete regression model with 
variable generation for Cook’s Distance and Leverage values for each observation. Trimmed 
variables were then recoded on the condition that they satisfied the criteria discussed above. 
This had to be done for each model, as different dependent variables could incur different 
outliers. Below is an overview of excluded cases and changes in R2 upon implementation of 
Cook’s Distance and Leverage. For brevity, we only present results from the sales growth and 
ROA models. The numbers below are from our sales growth model. 
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Criteria 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Excluded 
cases 
            
Cooks D 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 
Lev 5 3 2 2 3 4 5 2 6 3 2 4 
Tot excl. 7 4 2 3 4 6 6 3 8 4 3 4 
R2             
Before .038 .103 .039 .027 .092 .017 .021 .027 .055 .020 .041 .037 
After .055 .116 .040 .031 .102 .038 .031 .032 .093 .022 .045 .041 
Change +.017 +.013 +.001 +.004 +.010 +.021 +.010 +.005 +.038 +.002 +.004 +.004 
Table 3: Excluded cases and R2 after implementing Cook’s D and Leverage trimming, sales growth model. 
 
To also test the effects of our outlier handling for profitability models, we include the same 
table for the ROA model. 
 
Criteria 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Excluded 
cases 
            
Cooks D 3 1 0 0 1 3 1 1 2 1 2 1 
Lev 5 4 7 5 3 3 5 2 7 3 3 4 
Tot excl. 8 5 7 5 4 6 6 3 9 4 5 5 
R2             
Before .198 .239 .131 .269 .274 .281 .297 .338 .122 .334 .316 .321 
After .212 .245 .144 .273 .281 .303 .318 .341 .137 .336 .326 .329 
Change +.014 +.006 +.013 +.004 +.007 +.022 +.003 +.004 +.015 +.002 +.010 +.003 
Table 4: Excluded cases and R2 after implementing Cook’s D and Leverage trimming on ROA model. 
 
Implementation of standard deviation trimming 
After we removed the most extreme observations we implemented stage two of the trimming 
process. This involved removing observations above or below 3 standard deviations from the 
mean. Trimming by standard deviations offers a somewhat crude but easy and consistent 
method for removing extreme observations (Cody, 2005).  
 
When reporting the effects of implementing standard deviation trimming, we start with 
skewedness and kurtosis. Skewedness measures the symmetry of the distribution of the 
different variables, where a value of 0 indicates perfect symmetry around the mean. An 
unsymmetrical distribution might indicate extreme observations in one of the tails that 
displaces the mean. Kurtosis measures how sharp or flat the distribution is. A normally 
distributed variable will have the kurtosis value of 0. Negative values indicate a flat 
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distribution, indicating a sample with disproportionally many observations in one or both of 
the tails (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
The following table shows average kurtosis and skewedness values of variables before and 
after standard deviation trimming. The before values are after Cook’s Distance and Leverage 
trimming. The table also lists effects on the explanatory power of the different models, as well 
as the average number of cases excluded across years. 
 
Criteria Sales growt Asset growth Debt level ROA EBITDA 
Kurtosis      
Before 304.1 425.1 290.7 805.2 250.5 
After 3.2 2.1 0.6 12.6 3.3 
Skewedness  
 
   
Before 8.7 10.8 8.4 -13.9 -9.2 
After 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 -0.3 
R2      
Before  0.052 0.059 N/A 0.270 0.395 
After 0.068 0.071 N/A 0.332 0.465 
Change +0.016 +0.012 N/A +0.062 +0.07 
Cases excluded      
Average 95.5 140.7 86.2 30.4 83.9 
Table 5: Effects of introducing standard deviation trimming on kurtosis, skewedness, R2 and cases excluded. 
 
As we can see, both kurtosis and skewedness values are substantially closer to zero after 
implementing the standard deviation trimming. Kurtosis values in particular are far closer to 
the normal distribution. Skewedness values also improve, all of which are close to 0, 
indicating a far more symmetrical distribution after standard deviation trimming is performed.  
 
The effects on explanatory power are also consequently positive across models. Particularly 
the ROA and EBITDA models benefit from implementing standard deviation trimming. As a 
whole, it seems appropriate and justifiable to perform the trimming measures we use. 
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3.2.4 Data issues 
Though the data sets have undergone quality assurance by Mjøs & Øksnes (2012), some 
issues remain concerning the quality of the data. First, even though the data has been 
standardized across years, no attempt has been made to correct for the effects of changes in 
accounting law, accounting practices or other reforms that affect the content of accounting 
posts (Mjøs & Øksnes, 2012). This renders complete consistency of data over years 
unrealistic. Some care must therefore be taken in interpreting results from the analyses. 
Second, some variables frequently contain missing or even faulty data. This particularly 
applies to posts where reporting is voluntary, such as the number of employees, which some 
firms refrain to report or update.  
 
3.2.5 Validity and reliability 
Validity and reliability are central measures of research quality. It is difficult to obtain definite 
conclusions on either of these measures, but we have evaluated the characteristics of this 
thesis as best we could to evaluate its validity and reliability. 
 
Reliability relates to consistency in data collection and analysis. High reliability means that 
the sampling and analysis techniques used would generate the same results if performed by 
others or at a different time (Saunders et al., 2009). Common threats to reliability are bias in 
data collection. Since we use quantitative secondary data, we consider this threat as very low. 
We also consider the risk of reaching non-replicable findings to be low. The multiple 
regression analyses and related sub-methods we apply are commonly used and easily 
repeatable. We also strive for high transparency throughout the thesis, both in sample 
generation and in the analysis section. We therefore consider the overall threat to reliability to 
be low. 
 
Validity is concerned with the causal arguments made in research. It is defined as the degree 
to which variables used in the analysis actually measure their intended constructs, and the 
degree to which findings actually represent the stated causal relationships (Saunders et al., 
2009). It is common to separate the discussion into internal, external and construct validity. 
 
Construct validity basically relates to how well constructs are operationalized. This is a 
relevant issue for us, since we can only approximate certain constructs in our analysis. For 
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example, measuring knowledge intensity in industries is difficult. As we see in the next 
chapter, we control for this using research and development expenditures, which is unlikely to 
capture the full meaning of the term ‘knowledge intensity’. Similarly, controlling for 
ownership structure might inadvertently encompass a range of effects beyond the actual 
ownership effects. Though the construct validity of such proxies could rightly be debated, we 
argue that the key variables in our models are adequately operationalized. ROA, for example, 
is a commonly used measure of profitability among practitioners. Similarly, asset and sales 
growth are frequently used measures of growth. The construct validity for key variables is 
therefore likely adequate. 
 
Internal validity concerns the robustness of causal claims, in other words whether findings are 
correct  and tenable. Running regressions is basically an exercise in uncovering correlations, 
not causations. In other words, we cannot necessarily claim a causal relationship between an 
independent and dependent variable in a regression model. To assert a definite causal 
relationship, we would have to prove that there were no correlation between the error term 
and any independent variables (Keller, 2008). In practice, this is very difficult. Furthermore, 
as we will discuss later, omitted variable bias and reverse causality could contaminate results. 
Since our thesis is based on financial statement data, we must also bear in mind that 
management can manipulate this data. Furthermore, this incentive possibly increases during 
recessions, where “embellishing” financial data might become necessary to attain funding.  
However, one thing that works in our favor when arguing for causality is the exogenous 
nature of recessions. As mentioned in section 2.2.3, they can be thought of as unpredictable 
shocks applied to the entire population of firms. Combined with theoretical and empirical 
foundations, this provides some basis for making causal claims, indicating adequate internal 
validity of results.  
 
External validity relates to how generalizable findings are. As we saw in the theory section, 
recessions vary in nature, and so will likely their effects. Whether findings are generalizable 
to future downturns can therefore be debated. Furthermore, it can be discussed whether our 
results can be generalized to other countries or economies. However, as we discussed in 3.2.2, 
we have gone to some lengths to ensure generalizability to a core group of average, profit 
maximizing Norwegian firms. By cross-examining the results from two separate recessions, 
our findings should also be more robust to the heterogeneous nature of recessions. Neither is 
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it within our scope to generate results that transfer to other countries. We conclude that the 
external validity given our purposes and is sufficient.   
 
 
 
3.3 Variables 
In this subchapter we present our various dependent and independent variables. The chapter 
also provides a discussion of why we chose the measures we used, and how they are 
computed. We also discuss some factors that could influence performance outcomes but were 
not included in our models. First, however, we start with a discussion on separating firm level 
effects from industry effects. 
 
3.3.1 Separating firm level effects from industry effects 
A central challenge in our research was separating industry effects from idiosyncratic firm 
effects. This is important because a substantial share of firm performance can be attributed to 
the industry of a firm, and not firm characteristics (McGahan & Porter, 2002). For example, 
the pharmaceutical industry usually have far higher profit margins than, say, the steel 
production industry. Similarly, emerging industries such as cloud computing services might 
experience faster growth than a mature industry like furniture production. Refraining from 
controlling for industry effects could contaminate our results. Furthermore, prior research has 
indicated that some industries are far more cyclical than others (Petersen & Strongin, 1996). 
Durable goods industries, for example, are found to be more severely affected by downturns 
(Knudsen, 2014, Petersen & Strongin, 1996). This makes controlling for industry affiliation 
even more important during recessions.  
 
Separating industry-level effects from firm-level effects is therefore crucial, and as a 
consequence, every explanatory variable has been adjusted for industry average. This was 
performed by using the aggregate function in SPSS instead of simply taking the mean of for 
example ROA. Our reasoning was that industries with a few extreme observations could 
heavily skew average industry profitability. We therefore instead sum industry-wide profits 
and divide by the sum of industry assets. Similar treatment was performed on all industry 
ratios we calculated.  
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The entire endeavor of separating industry and firm effects relies on a realistic definition of 
industries and subsequent allocation of firms into industry groups. Unfortunately, a clear 
drawback of the datasets is that industry definition is imprecise. One reason for this becomes 
apparent when comparing the industry definitions used in the NACE codes to the one in 
industrial organization (IO) literature. The main focus of IO industry definition is 
substitutability (Besanko, 2008). NACE codes, however, simply uses the products or services 
provided by the firm as the basis for segmentation. This means that a carpenter in Finnmark is 
considered a competitor of his colleagues in Oslo, even when this is very rarely the case. 
Additionally, the crudity of industry groups might also play a part. Industry 74, R&D, might 
for example encompass both high-tech subsea solution providers and biotechnology 
developers, which might respond very differently to recessions. 
 
The imperfect industry codes can be seen by a crude analysis of the variation in profitability 
explained by industry dummies. In McGahan & Porter’s (2002) landmark study, they find that 
10.3 % of variation in accounting profitability can be explained by industry affiliation. When 
we perform regression analysis with dummies for two-digit NACE code affiliation, while also 
controlling for relevant variables, the explained variation in profits that can be attributed to 
these industry dummies is around 1 % across datasets. Though dissimilarities in methods and 
data make ours and McGahan & Porter’s results difficult to compare directly, we think this is 
a clear indicator that industry coding is imperfect in the data sets. Using more detailed NACE 
codes is not an option, since this quickly generates a large quantity of single-firm industries, 
and does not solve the substitutability problem. In sum, there is very little we can do about 
this, except acknowledging that industry effects cannot be perfectly accounted for.   
 
3.3.2 Dependent variables 
As mentioned above, we split corporate performance measures into growth and profitability. 
Our dependent variables will therefore vary across models as we investigate these two aspects 
of performance.  Additionally, we use two separate measures for each performance measure. 
Growth is measured by sales and asset growth. Profitability is measured by return on assets 
(ROA) and EBITDA margins. 
 
Growth 
There are two basic approaches on how to define corporate growth: absolute and proportional 
measures (Coad & Holzl, 2012). Absolute measures tend to be biased towards large firms, 
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while proportional measures lend more weight to small firms (Birch, 1987). Since small firms 
are largely removed from the sample, and due to the difficulty of comparing absolute growth 
across companies of different sizes, we will be using proportional growth as our measure, 
where growth of firm i in year t is 
 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  
 
Birch (1987) developed the hybrid Birch index to diminish firm size bias on the growth 
indicator. The index is calculated as  
  
𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = (𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1)( 𝐺𝑖,𝑡𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1) 
 
Another common way of measuring corporate growth is by taking the log-differences of the 
growth variable V (Coad & Holzl, 2012). Formally we have 
 
 log�𝑔𝑖,𝑡� = log�𝑉𝑖,𝑡� − log (𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1) 
 
 
There is no ideal way of measuring growth. The appropriate measure depends on data and 
research question (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000). We feel using simple relative growth rates 
as the main measure will increase transparency, and so we will use this measure in our 
analysis. 
 
Furthermore, firms grow in different ways: in output, total assets, market share and sales, to 
name some. Delmar, Davidsson and Garner (2003) find that correlations are high between 
different types of growth, but research results might still differ. According to Davidsson & 
Delmar (1997) growth in assets and sales are two common approaches in financial statement 
analysis. They argue that these growth measures are well suited to capture the “real” growth 
of a firm. Sales growth is the most common measure, and is frequently used in studies with a 
univariate growth measure (Davidsson & Fitzsimmons, 2005). Additionally, we will also use 
changes in assets as a growth variable, similarly to Berry (1972) and Jacquemin & Berry 
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(1979) to further increase the robustness of results. Correlation levels between these measures 
did not allow us to include both as independent variables. Therefore, when using asset growth 
as the dependent variable, the same measure while be used as the explanatory variable, and 
vice versa. No effort will be made to distinguish between organic and acquisition-led growth.  
 
Profitability 
A multitude of different estimation methods have been developed to measure firm 
profitability (Horngren et. al, 2008). A commonly used measure is return on assets (ROA), 
calculated as  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
i.e. simply the ratio of net income to total assets of a firm (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008). 
ROA is a popular measure because it is easily calculated and allows for straightforward 
comparison between projects and firms (Horngren et. al, 2008), and should therefore suit our 
purposes well. Bettis (1981) also supports the use of ROA as a profit measure, showing that it 
is highly correlated with alternative return measures. Other measures of profitability include 
return on equity (RoE), residual income (RI) and economic value added (EVA) (Horngren et. 
al, 2008). The latter two are problematic because they require an estimation of each firm’s 
minimum required return on assets, which in our case would be hard to identify. RoE is 
naturally susceptible to changes in equity, and Damodaran (2012) demonstrates that the 
composition of debt and equity is correlated with the business cycle. Total assets are arguably 
more stable over time and we therefore consider ROA a better profitability measure in a 
business cycle context. 
 
We have also included the EBITDA/total earnings ratio in our analyses, to complement ROA 
by capturing the operating efficiency of firms. EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2011). These earnings are then 
taken as the ratio of total income. Formally, this can be stated as 
 
 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 
 
61 
 
 
The EBITDA/Total revenues ratio is a popular measure because it excludes effects stemming 
from capital structure, tax rates and collections of assets, therefore effectively capturing the 
operational efficiency of firms (ibid). A useful characteristic of the EBITDA margin in our 
setting will be the exclusion of interest payments or tax shield effects stemming from capital 
structure. This could better expose the EBITDA margin to “external” effects during 
recessions, such as the flight to quality-mentality of investors and creditors. 
 
In profitability models we had to choose between sales and asset growth as our growth 
measure, since correlation levels will not allow us to include both. We chose sales growth, 
since this is the most commonly used measure for growth (Coad, 2009, Davidsson & 
Fitszimmons, 2005), and is frequently used in studies with a univariate growth measure 
(Davidsson & Fitzsimmons, 2005). 
 
3.3.3 Independent variables 
Across all models independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent 
variables. In practice, this was done by importing the dependent variables into the preceding 
year’s data set. This was done to ensure a plausible causal effect of firm characteristics on 
performance outcomes. A requisite for causal claims on the effect of X on Y is that X 
precedes Y in time (Kenny, 1979). It also alleviates some of the endogeneity issues we will 
discuss in section 3.4.5. 
 
Capital structure 
We have assumed a relatively simple approach to measuring overall capital structure of the 
firms in our sample. We take the debt level of the firm relative to total assets, formally 
calculated as 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
This measure will be critical when investigating our hypotheses on how capital structure 
impacts performance outcomes in recessions. This is also the measure chosen by several 
major studies (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1991), and so we adopt the same 
approach. Additionally, we include the quadratic term of our growth measures as independent 
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variables. As discussed in the theory section, the effect of capital structure is unlikely to be 
uniform or linear regardless of the level of debt. Including the squared term allow us to 
investigate non-linear effects of leverage. 
 
Growtht-1 
To measure the effect of previous growth, we include year-on-year growth rate from the 
preceding year. Growtht-1 is measured and calculated in the same way as the dependent 
variable. This variable is included to test the growth hypotheses discussed in the theory 
section. Though firms can grow in different ways, primarily organically or through mergers 
and acquisitions (Coad, 2007), we do not investigate growth paths in detail. Similar to the 
debt level variable, we include a quadratic growth term in our models. 
 
 
3.3.4 Control variables 
As we will see in the next subchapter when we discuss multiple regression analysis, the 
robustness of our estimated beta values increase as we control for variation in corporate 
performance not explained by our independent variables. We have therefore aimed to include 
as many relevant control variables as possible. When evaluating potential control variables, 
we used the strategy field’s approach to explaining variation in corporate performance. This 
segments the factors influencing performance outcomes into two groups: firm effects and 
industry effects (Besanko et al., 2006). This should allow a structured, systematic review of 
relevant control variables. 
 
3.3.4.1 Firm characteristics 
Profitability 
We use previous profitability as an independent control variable. This allows for controlling 
for variation in performance attributable to prior profitability. This makes sense if profits are 
generated as predicted by resource based theory, where inimitability of valuable resources 
creates sustained competitive advantages. Profits should therefore be autocorrelated over time 
(an econometrical problematization of this expectation is presented in section 3.4.5). In 
empirical findings, profitability is shown to be stable over time (Bharadwaj, 2000; Geroski, 
1999), even if the duration of competitive advantages might be diminishing (D’Aveni et al, 
2010). Controlling for profitability should therefore allow us to filter out a potentially large 
degree of variation in next year’s profitability. It also makes sense to include these measures 
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in our growth regressions, since profitable operations might be a favorable or even necessary 
“platform” from which to grow (Davidsson & Fitzsimmons, 2009). Correlation levels 
between profitability and EBITDA margins were low enough to allow us to include both in 
our models. 
 
Age 
Age is a popular variable in firm performance models. Bankruptcy rates are higher for 
younger firms (Geroski, 1995), and they have smaller financial reserves and arguably less 
well-established products and relationships with suppliers and customers (Knudsen, 2014). 
There are therefore many potential age-effects coming into effect in recessions. They might 
exacerbate the marginal-customer mechanism predicted by Lien (2010) if they have poorly 
established customer relations. Additionally, they might be more severely affected by credit 
constraints if lenders are unwilling to extend credit to young firms. Controlling for age 
therefore seems appropriate.  
 
Intuitively, age should have a diminishing impact on performance, as the difference between 
being, say, 41 and 40 years is likely to have a smaller effect than between 2 and 1 years old. 
We therefore log-transform the age variable in order to linearize the relationship between 
performance and age. The variable was calculated by subtracting the year of founding from 
the year of analysis. We added 1 year to ensure correct log-transformations of firms founded 
in the current year. Formally, we have 
 ln ((𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠 − (𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 1)) 
 
Though a certain correlation is expected between age and size, Ohlson (1980) advises that 
they should be analyzed separately. 
 
Size 
Size is another factor that might become important during recessions. On one hand, larger 
companies might have easier access to credit, and are viewed as safer by banks and capital 
owners (Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist, 1996), increasing their access to external finance and 
therefore resilience during economic hardship. On the other hand, size might cause inertia, 
reducing a firm’s ability to make required adjustments during a recession (Knudsen, 2014; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
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In our thesis, size is measured by two different variables, the logarithm of total income and 
the logarithm of total assets. The log-transformations were performed in order to linearize the 
expected relationship between size and the dependent variables, similarly to age. Correlation 
levels indicate that both can be included simultaneously.  
 
Debt maturity 
Debt maturity was included to account for effects stemming from the repayment horizon of 
corporate debt. Firms with a high degree of current debt relative to long-term debt might be 
worse off during recessions. We saw in the theory section that the climate for renegotiation of 
debt is likely to worsen during downturns, particularly for firms with poor current 
performance. Including this variable makes sense if firms with a high degree of short-term 
debt suffer more during recessions due to an inability to renew loans. Formally, the variable is 
calculated as 
  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡  
 
Liquidity 
Accounting liquidity refers to a firm’s ability to pay its debts (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008), 
and usually indicates short-term solvency (Hoff, 2010). Controlling for liquidity also seems 
natural during recessions. Low liquidity are likely to exacerbate many of the credit constraint 
issues presented by Campello et al. (2010), discussed in the theory section.   
 
A commonly used measure is Liquidity 1 (L1), which captures firms’ opportunity to convert 
relatively liquid assets to cover short term debt (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008). Formally, 
this ratio is computed as  
 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
Additionally, we use the ratio of cash holdings to total assets as a further measure of liquidity. 
Formally, the cash holdings ratio is calculated as 
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𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
Some argue that the cash to assets ratio in some circumstances works better as a liquidity 
proxy, since certain assets in the L1 ratio are hard to convert into usable funds, at least in the 
short term (Goyenka, Holden & Trzincka, 2009). To increase robustness we use both ratios. 
Correlation levels between the variables allow us to do so. 
 
Fixed assets 
Firms with a high ratio of fixed assets to total assets are likely to be able to offer more 
collateral to banks and lenders. They might therefore be considered “safer” by banks and 
lenders. This is consistent with the “flight to quality” findings from Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1993). Similarly they might also be less affected by credit constraint effects as 
found in Campello et al (2010) and Campello and Fluck (2006). Formally, the variable is 
calculated as  
 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
 
Credit rating  
A potentially useful variable in the datasets is the credit rating post. This is Dun & 
Bradstreet’s internal evaluation of companies’ credit rating (Mjøs & Øksnes, 2009). This 
variable should allow us to control for “invisible” factors influencing a firm’s credit 
worthiness. The advantage of this is of course that we can control for certain firm 
characteristics that are not captured by the other explanatory variables. Even if a firm has low 
leverage and high liquidity, there could be issues related to operations, market prospects or 
legal matters that influence a firm’s ability to access external credit. Ideally, these factors 
would be captured and controlled for through the credit rating variable. In our models, the 
post has been transformed to dummy variables, where credit ratings AAA and AA are 
categorized in the High rating dummy; ratings A and B equal Medium rating dummy; rating C 
is Low rating dummy and the Not rated and Liquidated categories have their respective 
dummies. Below is a table showing the distribution of the different variables. The reference 
dummy in our case is Low rating dummy. 
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Value Category  Code Distribution Dummy 
0 Not rated  N/A 11.5% Not rated 
1 Credit not recommended  C 2.4% Low 
2 Credit with collateral  B 16.6% Medium 
3 Credit worthy  A 35.6% Medium 
4  Highly creditworthy  AA 22.8% High 
5 Highest credit rating  AAA 8.0% High 
9 Liquidated  N/A 3.2% Liquidated 
Figure 3.7: Credit rating dummies 
 
However, given that every firm in the datasets has received an individual rating, it seem likely 
that Dun & Bradstreet have run a standardized model using statement data to calculate a credit 
rating, rather than performing individual evaluations. Therefore, it is unlikely that many 
“invisible” firm traits can be accounted for through this variable. Still, there could be 
explanatory value in including the variable in our model, assuming Dun & Bradstreet has a 
sufficiently high-quality credit rating model. 
 
Ownership structure  
This was included to capture potential effects stemming from the type of ownership. Without 
launching into another theoretical discussion, there could be potential effects stemming from 
type of ownership of firms during recessions (McGahan & Porter, 2001). For example: 
intuitively, listed companies might feel the effects of a financial crisis relatively fast. Changed 
market expectations of future growth and profitability could quickly impact company value, 
which could again impact real economic choices of managers. This variable was also 
transformed into dummies, with listed companies as the reference variable. 
 
Value Category   Distribution 
0 Ownership structure unknown   9.9% 
1 Listed   0.2% 
2 Corporate ownership   27.8% 
3 Private ownership   55.2% 
4  Combination private/corporate   1.2% 
5 Publicly owned (excluded)   1.2% 
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6 Joint-stock company, not listed   1.3% 
7 Cooperation   0.1% 
9 Foreign ownership   4.2% 
Table 6: Ownership structure dummies 
 
 
3.3.4.2 Industry characteristics 
In addition to adjusting independent variables for industry mean, we also include industry 
characteristics variables in our regression. This should allow us to further separate industry 
effects from firm characteristic effects. Since industry variables are ratios, we needed to take 
special care in our calculations. If we for example simply took the mean of all individual 
ROA observations, our industry mean would be biased towards observations with particularly 
high or low ratios. Instead, we used the aggregate function in SPSS. This allowed us to 
aggregate both numerator and denominator prior to computing the industry ratio.  
 
Industry growth 
Industry growth is calculated as 
 
  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = ∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡)𝑛,𝑚𝑖=1,𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡 − 1)𝑛,𝑚𝑖=1,𝑗=1
∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡 − 1)𝑛,𝑚𝑖=1,𝑗=1  
 
for all firms i in industry j in time periods t and t-1. Controlling for industry growth seems 
appropriate, as affiliation with high growth industries might induce performance effects 
during recessions. As we saw in the theory section, industries with high pre-recession growth 
might have a large share of marginal customers. Firms within such industries could be 
particularly severely affected during downturns, even if there are no firm-specific 
characteristics driving the negative performance outcomes. 
   
Industry leverage 
Industry leverage is calculated as 
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𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = � 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1 / � 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1  
 
Similar to growth, debt levels are likely to vary systematically across industries. Aluminum 
production, for example, is a relatively capital-heavy industry that might require substantial 
investments in fixed assets, making high leverage viable. Service firms, on the other hand, 
might not require much debt at all. Being part of highly leveraged industries might exacerbate 
the debt mechanisms discussed the theory section. For example, investors and creditors might 
avoid entire industries or sectors if they anticipate high industry leverage will induce a 
particularly severe impact. It therefore seems appropriate to control for this factor. 
 
Industry profitability 
We use ROA as our measure of industry profitability. Analogous to industry leverage, this 
variable is calculated as 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑜𝐴 = � 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1 / � 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1  
 
Accounting for industry profitability is necessary as recessions are likely to affect profits 
differently across industries. For example, construction firms were particularly heavily 
affected during the 2008-2009 crisis (SSB, 2009). Furthermore, firms in industries that are 
characterized by high profitability rates might for example be better suited to deal with credit 
reductions, as implied by pecking-order theory.  
 
Industry debt maturity 
This variable is calculated as 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = � 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1 / � 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1  
 
Similarly to individual debt maturity, the industry level variable is included to account for 
possible effects stemming from shorter repayment horizons during recessions.  
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Industry Liquidity 1 
Industry Liquidity 1 is calculated as 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 = � 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1 / � 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1  
 
Controlling for industry liquidity can also be expedient. Industries that operate with low 
liquidity in normal times might be more severely affected during recessions, even if firms in 
such industries are only following the industry “norm”.  
 
Industry impairment  
This variable is calculated as  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = � 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1 / � 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1  
 
Controlling for industry impairment allow us an additional control for how severely an 
industry was affected by a recession. Intuitively, industries that are particularly afflicted by 
downturns are more likely to readjust expectations of earnings or the value of fixed assets, 
forcing impairment. Controlling for this industry effect should therefore allow us to better 
isolate firm specific effects.  
 
Industry fixed assets ratio 
The variable is calculated as  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = � 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1 / � 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1  
 
This variable was included to control for effects of affiliation in industries with high fixed 
assets rates.  
 
Industry R&D expenses 
This variable is the mean of research expenditures by all firms in an industry, calculated as  
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𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 = � 𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑛,𝑚
𝑖=1,𝑗=1 /𝑁𝑗 
 
This variable was included to capture effects induced by highly knowledge intensity. As 
discussed below, firm-level R&D expenditure is not included as an individual variable due to 
poor data quality. However, when these expenses are aggregated at industry level, the data 
arguably give a more credible portrayal of knowledge intensity.  
 
 
3.3.5 Variables not included in the model 
A number of variables had to be excluded from the analysis due to incompatibility with the 
model or data quality limitations. The following is a discussion of variables not included in 
the model for various reasons. As we will see, the explanatory power of our models will vary 
substantially, with our growth and profitability models generally having low and high R2, 
respectively. It therefore seems appropriate to spend some time discussing control variables 
we would have wished to include in our model. The discussion follows the same structure as 
above, where we review firm level variables first, and then move on to industry level 
variables afterwards.  
  
Firm level variables 
In general, financial statement data is poorly suited to identify intangible assets that are 
potentially important for understanding competitive advantage. For example, there is a large 
stream of literature on how knowledge creation, transfer, maintenance and development can 
serve as foundations of competitive advantages (Argote & Ingram, 2000;  Matusik & Hill, 
1998; Tallmann et al., 2004; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). This human or innovation capital is 
naturally hard to account for with our data. Arguably, however, some of these advantages will 
be incorporated and controlled for in the variables for previous growth and profitability.   
 
One way of approximating more directly for knowledge generation is through research and 
development (R&D) expenditures. There are also several theoretical implications regarding 
R&D and recessions (Knudsen & Lien, 2012), which could be expedient to control for. There 
exists an R&D variable in the datasets, but this is unfortunately sparsely reported. 
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Furthermore, there might be incentives and opportunities for firms to report losses to the R&D 
post. We therefore conclude that including individual R&D expenditure in our model is 
unfeasible. 
 
We also wanted to include employee growth as a growth measure, since this is a common 
method (Coad & Holzl, 2009). Due to flawed data, however, this was not feasible. Reporting 
number of employees is only mandatory the first time a company files statements the the 
Entity Registry, leading to missing or faulty data for this variable. To illustrate this, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between employee growth and salary growth is on average 
around 0.4 across datasets, which is a weaker linear correlation than we would intuitively 
expect between these variables.  
 
 
Figure 7: Correlation between salary and employee growth. 
 
We were also unable to find sufficient data to generate variables that could account for access 
to internal capital markets, which could potentially be important to control for during 
recessions. Firms with very high leverage and low current performance, for example, would 
in our model be highly likely to experience severe negative consequences of a recession. 
However, the negative effects could be mitigated or negated by access to internal financial 
markets. If the parent company viewed future growth potential of the struggling subsidiary as 
sufficiently high, they could intervene by lending extra funds. This is a realistic scenario if the 
parent company has information advantages over external investors, which in some cases is a 
reasonable assumption. 
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Furthermore, firm investment is a highly relevant variable, as it is a key determinant of future 
growth. However, the data sets lack a variable measuring real investment. There exists a 
variable for short-term investments in various securities, but this is a poor operationalization 
of the investment construct we are interested in measuring.  
 
Last but not least, as is evident from our earlier discussion of resource-based theory, 
controlling for idiosyncratic resource stocks would be highly expedient. In an RBT view, 
these should account for the vast majority of firm performance differences. However, as is 
also clear from our theoretical discussion, controlling for these resources is very hard to do, 
particularly with just financial statement data.  
 
Industry variables 
There are several industry characteristics we were unable to control for in our analysis. From 
a strategy perspective entry rates, industry concentration and number of competitors are 
examples of highly relevant variables (Porter, 1991). These can all shape competitive forces, 
affecting product market outcomes as discussed in 2.1.3. Measuring market concentrations 
and number of competitors was unfeasible due to imperfect industry codes.  
 
Another relevant variable is the durability of products of an industry. Knudsen (2014) finds 
that industries that produce durable goods were particularly severely affected by recessions. 
There can be several explanations for this, amongst them that customers prefer to delay such 
purchases when under uncertainty. Naturally, controlling for this would benefit our model, but 
there is no method we have thought of that allow us to create a proxy for goods durability.  
 
Furthermore, export intensity might affect how severely firms are impacted. The 2008-2009 
recession in particular was relatively mild in Norway compared to other OECD countries, as 
we will see in figure 4.1. Firms that were exposed to the larger international demand shock 
should therefore be more severely hit than other Norwegian firms. Export intensity is, 
however, not something we can control for using our data.  
 
Lastly we discuss the use of industry dummy variables. When including industry dummies in 
the regression, this excludes the use of industry characteristic variables, such as industry ROA 
and leverage. These variables are incompatible because any industry characteristic effects will 
be perfectly predicted by the dummy variables. Therefore, we faced a trade-off between fully 
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accounting for industry effects by using dummies, and using industry characteristics variables 
to isolate specific industry effects. Since the uses of industry variables allow us a more 
nuanced view of industry effects, we chose to use this alternative. 
 
 
3.4 Empirical method 
This subchapter discusses the primary statistical tool we used in our analyses, multiple 
regressions analysis. We present the basics of regression analysis, before discussing non-
linearities and interaction terms. Lastly, we present our empirical specifications, and discuss 
the prerequisites for performing regressions. 
 
3.4.1 Regression analysis 
The simple linear regression model can be used to explain how independent variable X affects 
the dependent variable Y. The equation for the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) model is 
written as 
 Y =  β0 +  β1x +  ε 
 
Where β0 is the constant, β1 is the coefficient of X and ε is the error term, which denotes the 
effect of any unobserved variables on Y (Wooldridge, 2010). Mathematically, the OLS model 
fits a straight line through all observations in the sample to minimize the sum of squared 
residuals. Residuals are defined as the differences between actual sample observations and the 
fitted OLS line (Keller, 2009). If certain prerequisites are met, OLS can be shown to provide 
unbiased estimates of β0 and β1, while minimizing the variance in Y. For unbiased estimation 
of the relationship between X and Y, the error term must be uncorrelated with the independent 
variable X. The error term would in theory need to have an expected value of zero, regardless 
of values of X. Breach of this assumption can occur for various reasons, but they all lead to 
biased estimations of the OLS line (Wooldridge, 2010). Formally, this assumption can be 
written as   
E(ε|x) = 0 
 
Multiple linear regression differs from the bivariate model in that it can accommodate any 
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number of independent variables. Where the bivariate model would only include a single 
independent variable and leave potential others unobserved, the multiple linear regression 
model can include an indefinite number of variables. The multiple regression equation  
 Y =  β0 +  β1x1 +  β2x2 + . . . + βkxk +  ε 
 
is generalized to accept any number of independent variables. The interpretation of the beta 
coefficient for any independent variable will be its effect on the dependent variable when we 
hold all other independent variables constant (Wooldridge, 2010).  The major advantage of 
multiple over bivariate regression analysis is that we can account for relationships between an 
indefinite number of independent variables and Y. Naturally this is often of interest, as several 
factors are likely to influence the dependent variable.  
 
The ability to include several explanatory variables can also prevent omitted variable bias 
(OVB), where unobserved factors in ε are correlated to one or more independent variables. In 
our case, multiple regression models make sense because many different factors will influence 
both growth and profitability. OVB will be discussed in greater detail in subchapter 3.5.1.2. 
At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that some independent variables will be 
correlated. For example, there might be correlations between Liquidity 1 and the cash to 
assets ratio. Not accounting for these correlations by including the variables in our model 
could therefore lead to biased estimations.  
 
Furthermore, multiple independent variables also allow us to test for non-linear relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables. This is also useful to us, since some of the 
variables in our models could potentially exhibit non-linear relationships with the dependent 
variable. For example, log-transforming age and firm size is common in the existing literature 
on both growth and profitability (Knudsen, 2014; Huynh & Petrunia, 2010; Evans, 1997). 
Another non-linearity that will be relevant for us is using squared variables. We return to this 
in the subchapter below. Overall, using multiple regression models seems like a highly 
appropriate tool given our purpose and data. 
 
Multiple analysis regression can be applied in different ways. In our study, we shift our model 
across each dataset, in practice running the regression model for each year in our time period. 
This allows us to test how the relationships discussed in the theory section change over 
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recessions. To measure the degree of variation explained by our models, we will use adjusted 
R2, as this measure of explanatory power corrects for the number of predictors included 
(Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
3.4.1.3 Interaction terms 
Sometimes the effect of an independent variable on Y might depend on the magnitude of 
another independent variable. For example, we have argued extensively that the combination 
of high leverage and high growth induces particularly high vulnerability for firms during 
recessions. Put differently, the effect of leverage would depend on the degree of growth: the 
higher pre-recession growth levels are, the larger the marginal negative effect of leverage. In 
statistical terms, this would mean that there is an interaction effect between debt levels and 
growth. 
 
Introducing interacted terms in the regression changes the interpretation of coefficients. 
Assuming we interact X on Y, the coefficient of the main effects (the original individual 
variables) now provides the effect of X on Y when Z is 0.   
 
3.4.1.4 Quadratic terms 
As mentioned above, multiple regression analysis allows testing for non-linear relationships. 
We utilize this opportunity by log-transforming certain variables, but more importantly we 
include squared independent variables in our models. This allows us to test for non-linear 
relationships between growth, capital structure and performance outcomes.  
 
Including quadratic terms in our models changes the interpretation of the main coefficients. 
Say we include the quadratic term X2 of the variable X. In this case, the beta coefficient of X 
is no longer the unique effect on y, since interpreting the effect of X on y while holding X2 
constant does not make sense. βx is now the instantaneous slope of X when X=0 (Wooldridge, 
2009). This could make interpretation of βx problematic in our models, since certain 
independent variables are unlikely to contain observations of 0. However, all our independent 
variables have been adjusted for industry mean. This means that the 0 value of any 
independent variable equals industry average, making interpretation easier. This has the 
additional advantage of letting us explore developments of firms with average values of the 
main variables debt levels and growth. The beta coefficient of X2 measures the change in the 
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instantaneous slope of βx. This provides us with insights in how the effects on industry-
average firms change as we move away from the mean.   
 
If the beta of X2  is negative while the coefficient of X is positive, or vice versa, the 
relationship has a parabolic shape. This means that there will always be some positive value 
of x where the combined linear and quadratic effects on y are 0. Before this point, denoted 
X*, the effect of x on y is positive; after, the effect is negative. In practice this means that 
inclusion of a quadratic term always includes a “turning point”, at least as long as the signs on 
the linear and quadratic terms are opposite. What happens if the coefficients of the linear and 
quadratic terms have the same sign? In that case, there is no turning point. If for example both 
terms have negative signs, the largest expected y value (given non-negative values of x) will 
occur when x = 0, with increasing negative effects of x on y.  
 
3.4.1.5 Visual binning / percentile analysis 
A last submethod of regression analysis we would like to expand upon is segmenting our 
sample through visual binning. This is a tool in SPSS that allows us to split the dataset into 
equal percentiles. We use this to segment our sample based on prior growth levels and 
leverage. The subsequent regression analysis will then provide individual results from each 
predefined percentile. This should allow us to investigate whether effects of growth and 
capital structure changes based on the level of these variables. For example, the highest 10 % 
leveraged firms might behave differently than the 10 % lowest leveraged firms. 
 
3.4.1.5 Model specifications 
It is about time to introduce our full specification. The following is an overview of the 
different regression models we used in our analyses. A brief recap: we had two performance 
constructs, profitability and growth. Profitability was measured by EBITDA margins and 
ROA; growth by asset and sales growth.  
 
Since control variables are identical across models, and to conserve space, we grouped these 
into the bracketed variables. 
 
Our sales growth model specification: 
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𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 +  𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ∗
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ2 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2 + [𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +  𝜀   
 
The asset growth specification: 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 +  𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ∗
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽4𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ2 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2 +  [𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +  𝜀   
 
The ROA specification: 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 +  𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +
𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ2 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2 +  [𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +  𝜀   
 
The EBITDA model specification: 
 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 +  𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +
𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ2 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2 +  [𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +  𝜀   
 
 
3.4.1.6 Prerequisites for regression analysis 
As mentioned briefly above, there are prerequisites for generating unbiased estimates with 
OLS models.  Failure to meet these criteria can lead to biased estimations which prevents 
causal inferences. The following is a brief examination of these requirements and their 
implications for our study.  
 
The first criterion states that the expected value of the error term should be 0. Formally,  
 
E(ε) = 0 
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This is almost a trivial assumption for models with a constant, as the intercept value can be 
adjusted to fulfill this criterion.  
 
The second criterion states that the variance in the error term is constant for all values of the 
independent variable. Formally, 
 
Var(ε|x) = σ2 
 
Where σ2 the constant variance in u. Breach of this assumption is called heteroskedasticity. 
Heteroskedasticity can also reduce the efficiency of our models through underestimating true 
variance (Johnston, 1997). In practice, this has greater implications for models with smaller 
samples. Since true variation cannot be estimated, hypothesis testing on variables in the model 
is also invalid. On the other hand, OLS regressions will still generate unbiased estimates even 
with the presence of heteroskedasticity (Johnston, 1997). This can be seen because the E(ε|x) 
= 0 assumption is not violated by increasing or decreasing variance in the error term.  
 
The third criterion states that the error term of two different time periods should not be 
correlated with each other (Wooldridge, 2010). Formally, this can be written as 
 
Corr(ε t, ε s|x) = 0 for all t ≠ s 
 
Where t and s denote different time periods. Violation of this assumption is called 
autocorrelation and naturally only arises in data with multiple observations of the same cases 
over time. An example of autocorrelation arises from the predictions by the RBT theory made 
in subchapter 2.1.1.2. If a firm experiences high profit rates one year, this should occur due to 
superior resources or capabilities. If these are sustained, profits should therefore be high also 
the next year. Since we know firm profitability is relatively (though decreasingly) stable on a 
year-on-year basis (D’Aveni, Dagnino & Smith, 2010), even if growth is not (Geroski, 2001), 
autocorrelation is likely to be present for key variables in our models. Variance in beta 
estimations is underestimated, and, similarly to heteroskedasticity, hypothesis tests on 
variables are invalid. However, also similar to the discussion above, the presence of 
autocorrelation still allows for unbiased estimation of beta values.   
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The fourth and last criterion, also mentioned above, is the non-endogeneity assumption of 
independent error terms regardless of the values of the explanatory variables. Breaches of this 
assumption are more serious since they create biased estimations, meaning that our beta 
coefficients are no longer accurate representations of the linear relationship between 
dependent and independent variables (Wooldridge, 2010). We discuss two key causes of 
endogeneity. 
 
The first source of endogeneity is omitted variable bias (OVB), briefly mentioned above. 
OVB is a breach of the  [E(ε|x) = 0] assumption if covariance between values of ε and one or 
more independent variables exist. The error term can still contain factors influencing Y as 
long as no correlation with any independent variable exists. We have attempted to include as 
many relevant variables as possible in our model in order to mitigate OVB. This battery of 
control variables should go some way towards avoiding omitted variable bias. However, as 
can be seen from both the discussion on variables not included and the low R2 in growth 
models, there are omitted variables in our models. Whether these cause bias depends on the 
correlation with any independent variables. An exhaustive discussion of potential correlations 
between omitted and included variables seems unfruitful, but it is reasonable to assume that 
some OVB exist in our models. There is little to be done about this, except to take care when 
making interpretations. We simply cannot control for everything.  
 
The second source of endogeneity is reverse causality. Reverse causality or simultaneity bias 
occurs when any independent variable is potentially affected by the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2010). As an example, we have shown theoretical mechanisms that argue for an 
effect of capital structure on profitability. But we have also shown that profitability can affect 
the capital structure of firms. More specifically, if a firm is highly profitable, they might be 
able to finance investments with retained earnings, meaning they can operate with low debt 
levels. However, prior leverage, particularly during recessions, might impact a firm’s ability 
to generate profits after compensating for bankruptcy risk to creditors and customers. In our 
models, we switch variables from exploratory to explanatory positions, and vice versa. If we 
are to make causal arguments in every model, we must also concede to reverse causality 
problems. However, this reverse causality problem can be mitigated through lagging variables 
(Self & Grabowski, 2003). The problem in any business situation, however, is that firms are 
likely to base current actions on forecasts. Current capital structure has the potential to 
influence future profits, but expectations on future profits can also influence capital structure 
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decisions made today. Therefore, certain causal inferences become problematic because we 
cannot identify the causal direction. Arguably, however, the combination of lagged 
explanatory variables and multiple theoretical foundations for causal directions mitigates the 
reverse causality problem in our case.  
 
A last area of concern we address is multicollinearity. This arises when the independent 
variables are no longer independent of each other, which can lead to imprecise estimates of 
coefficient values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). There are various methods for testing the 
presence of multicollinearity. Probably the most robust methods would be to run VIF- tests on 
individual predictors (Wooldridge, 2010). However, given the number of variables across 
different specifications, we found it more practical to use correlation matrixes. This is a 
somewhat crude approach, but the advantage is that correlations only have to be investigated 
once per dataset/year, instead of after each regression. Different thresholds for allowed  
correlation exists. Field (2009) operates with ± 0.9, but Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) argues 
for a limit of 0.7. To minimize the presence of multicollinearity, we follow Pallan (2007), 
who use a threshold of 0.5. Given this limit, we found that multicollinearity was not a large 
problem in our datasets. We found that high and medium credit rating dummies were 
frequently highly correlated, but we did not have to remove them. Sales and asset growth 
frequently exceeded the limit and were consequently not simultaneously included, as 
mentioned above. We had to remove industry EBITDA in 2008 due to high correlation with 
industry impairment. For a full correlation matrix for that year, see appendix A.4.  
 
What are the practical implications from the discussion on OLS requirements? We argue that 
the worst problems arise from endogeneity issues. If we cannot trust our beta coefficients, this 
thesis has little value. However, as we have seen above, both reverse causality and OVB 
problems are mitigated through our research design. In the case of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity, we could have spent time on econometric techniques that account for these 
issues. However, the purpose of this study is to perform a broad, exploratory investigation of 
growth and capital structure mechanisms during recessions. Whether our p-values are spot on 
is not our primary concern. We rather invest our time in mapping how the relationships 
develop.  
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4 Analysis 
In this chapter we examine the results of our analysis. We will start with examining the 
overall economic conditions in Norway from 2000 to 2012, to get a better impression of how 
the dot-com crisis and the 2008-2009 recession affected the Norwegian economy. We also 
attempt to identify the specific years that were more severely impacted. We then provide 
descriptive statistics for key variables before presenting the findings from our regression 
models. Before presenting our main findings, we provide an overview of our models and their 
explanatory power. The presentation of findings follows the same structure as the theory 
secion: first we analyse the effects of growth on corporate performance, before investigating 
the impact of capital structure. Lastly we present our findings from the interaction effect. 
 
4.1 Norway during the recessions 
In order to investigate the effects of firm characteristics during recessions, we have to identify 
when the Norwegian economy experienced downturns.  
Below is a graph indicating real GDP growth for Norway, the U.S. and the EU. We can see 
clear dips in GDP growth around 2001-2003 and 2008-2009, the latter being more prominent. 
Particularly 2009 seems to be a severely affected year. The dot-com crisis appears to have 
impacted the U.S. first, with the deepest through in Norway occurring in 2003. In earlier 
chapters, we have stated that the 2008-2009 recession hit Norway relatively less severely than 
many other countries. Data from the World Bank show that the Norwegian economy was 
indeed less severely afflicted than the EU and the U.S.  
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Figure 8: Real GDP growth for Norway, the European Union and the U.S. 2000-2012. Source: Statistics Norway 
(2015); OECD (2015) 
 
As we saw in the theory section, a recession is “… a significant decline in economic activity 
spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP…” 
(NBER, 2010). Based on the findings in figure 4.1, both the dot-com bubble and the 2008-
2009 recession fits this definition well. We see clear reductions in real GDP growth lasting 
over time. 
In order to further investigate the downturns, we combine GDP growth data with findings 
from Brynhildsrud (2013), who estimated a polynomial trend line for Norwegian GDP 
between 1999 and 2012. This trend line can be thought of as the potential GDP in Gartner’s 
(2009) definition of business cycles. When comparing this trend line to annual GDP levels, 
we can more clearly see the business cycles during the 2000s. We segmented the graph into 
the four business cycle phases identified by Benedictow and Johansen (2005). As we can see, 
the real GDP level clearly fluctuates around the GDP trend line. In 2000, real GDP lies above 
the trend line, but is falling relative to the long-term trend. GDP drops below the trend in 
2001, indicating that this year can be classified as a slowdown phase. The negative distance 
between GDP level and trend line is largest in 2003, so we classify this year as the downturn. 
Between 2004 and 2005, GDP keeps rising back towards the trend line, making this the 
retrieval period. 2006 and 2007 sees GDP levels rise above the trend line, indicating an 
expansion or boom phase. Another slowdown occurs in 2008, where GDP falls back toward 
the trend line. A new trough then takes place in 2009, indicating a new downturn phase. A 
new retrieval occurs in 2010 and 2011, with 2012 seemingly starting a new expansion phase. 
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Figure 9: Business cycle phases in Norway, 2000 – 2012. Source: Statistics Norway, 2015; Brynhildsrud, 2013 
 
This brief comparison of GDP  levels and trend line reveals that there were clear downturns in 
the Norwegian economy during the 2000s. It has also revealed 2002-2003 and 2009 as the 
years where the Norwegian economy was most severely affected.  
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Before presenting our regression findings, we provide some descriptive statistics on our main 
variables. We use mean and median values to illustrate overall developments in growth, 
profitability and debt levels in our time period. Since mean values can be susceptible to 
extreme observations, we remove observations that lie more than four standard deviations 
from the mean, in addition to including the median. We also present developments in standard 
deviations, which measures the variation or dispersion in the variables we present. We felt 
that adjusting for industry-affiliation was less appropriate in the descriptive statistics, as we 
wanted to convey the aggregate developments in the Norwegian economy. The numbers used 
below have therefore not been subject to industry adjustments.  
84 
 
 
4.2.1 Corporate growth  
Sales growth mean and median generally follows the previously discussed business cycle 
patterns. There is a noticeable through during the dot-com crisis. Growth rates picks up again 
during the retrieval and boom periods, with the peak of the boom in sales growth occurring in 
2007. Sales growth rates display a sharp decline during 2008 which continue into 2009, with a 
mean growth reduction of 102.5% (0.1781 to -0.0045) over these two years. The retrieval can 
be seen in 2010-2011, as growth started to pick up again. As we can also see, median values 
are consistently somewhat lower than mean values. 
 
Figure 10: Mean and median sales growth 
 
Asset growth largely follows the same pattern as sales growth.  There is a clear through in 
2002-2003, while the peak in asset growth comes one year earlier, in 2006. The start of the 
new recession is evident in 2008 as we see asset growth rates falling 86% (0.1809 to 0.0254) 
from its 2007 level to the through in 2009. Similarly to sales growth, there appears to be a 
slight dip in growth in 2012. Another similarity in the two graphs is the disparity between 
mean and median. However, this is also as expected based on Gibrat’s law, which predicted a 
lognormal growth distribution of firms. Thus, a long tail of high growers draw the mean 
upwards, potentially causing the difference between mean and median.  
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Figure 11: Mean and median asset growth 
 
Intuitively, we would expect standard deviations of growth rates to spike during recessions, as 
some industries and firms might grow counter-cyclically, while others are highly vulnerable. 
To the contrary, however, the general pattern seems to be reduced standard deviations in 
recessions. This pattern is clearest in asset growth, with sharp “negative spikes” in 2003 and 
2009, the most severely affected years. Additionally, the peaks in standard deviation for asset 
growth are in 2000 and 2007, two boom years. While the spread in sales growth seems to get 
smaller during the period as a whole, there also seems to be dips in standard deviation during 
downturns and higher values during boom years. Combined with the sharp reductions in 
average growth above, this might indicate that there is a uniform growth reduction across 
firms in recessions. In other words, there are few counter-cyclical growth “winners” during 
downturns.  
 
Figure 12: Standard deviations sales and asset growth 
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4.1.2 Corporate profitability  
We now turn to how our other performance measure, profitability, developed during the 
recessions. Return on assets (ROA) displays low levels during the dot-com crisis. In contrast 
to GDP and growth developments, the increase in ROA seems well underway in 2003, but the 
low ROA in the 2001-2003 period can still be linked to the dot-com crisis. Through the boom 
period ROA increases steadily year over year, reaching a peak in 2007. After the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2008, we see a considerable decline in ROA.  It is worth noting that the 
average ROA levels in 2010 were still higher than any year in the pre-boom period of our 
dataset, which runs contrary to GDP growth developments. Mean and median levels follow 
each other closely throughout the period, with median values seemingly slightly higher 
(lower) than the mean in recessions (booms). 
 
Figure 13: Mean and median ROA 
 
EBITDA levels are low throughout the dot-com crisis. During the boom period margins 
increases considerably. At the onset of the crisis in 2008, we see a drastic drop in the margins. 
During the first year of the crisis, margins had dropped by more than 13% (0.0871 to 0.0756), 
and by 2009 margins had dropped by almost 26% (0.0871 to 0.0646) compared to pre-crisis 
levels. The retrieval for EBITDA margins comes in 2010, as the margins experienced a 
mediocre rebound. The retrieval brings margins above their pre-boom levels, although they 
are still noticeably lower than in the 2004-2007 period.  
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Figure 14: Mean and median EBITDA margins 
 
The standard deviations for EBITDA margins show a pattern that is consistent with the 
expectation of divergent performance in recessions we discussed above. We see a clear spike 
during the dot-com bubble, and a declining spread in margins after the recession. The 
standard deviation is relatively stable at low levels during the boom period, until a new spike 
occurs during the 2008-2009 recession. This indicates that the differences in margins 
increased during downturns. In other words, it seems some firms did poorly while others 
profited from the recessions. Another way to view this is that the difference between “good” 
and “poor” firms increased during recessions. This is consistent with findings from Knudsen 
& Lien (2012).  
The graph for ROA does not show as clear a pattern, but there seems to be less spread in ROA 
during the boom period of 2004-2007, and an increase after the onset of both crises. Similar to 
the EBITDA pattern, we generally see more diversity in performance during downturns.  
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Figure 15: Standard deviations ROA and EBITDA 
 
4.1.3 Capital structure 
Given the discussion on capital constraints in the theory section, we would expect firms to 
attempt to reduce debt levels during recessions. The financial crisis of 2008 was also 
characterized by a credit squeeze created by the slowdown in interbank lending. Therefore, 
we intuitively expect the financial crisis to induce lending constraints on  Norwegian firms. 
This should cause overall debt levels to drop during the 2009 recession. 
As we can see from the next graph, debt levels increased steadily in the time after the dot-com 
crisis, with a sharp peak in both mean and median in 2004. Since then, the mean debt level 
declines steadily. In the years following the onset of the financial crisis, the debt levels 
stabilize at the lowest observed values in our observed time period, substantially lower than 
previous years. What is somewhat surprising is the apparent lack of recessionary impact on 
debt levels. There is little trace of the patterns we saw previously. If anything, debt levels are 
increasing during the dot-com crisis, and developments in and after 2009, where the reduction 
in leverage stops and flats out, also run counter to our expectations.  
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Figure 16: Mean and median debt levels 
 
The standard deviation for debt level have relatively large spikes in 2003 and 2008, which 
suggests that the dispersion in leverage increased in these two years. We can also see that the 
difference in debt levels among firms decreased steadily through the boom period, but has 
increased every year since the start of the crisis in 2008. The largest increase in standard 
deviation occurs in 2008, potentially reflecting the shock effect on the financial structure of 
Norwegian firms. 
 
Figure 17: Standard deviations of debt levels 
 
4.2 Model overview 
Before we start presenting our main findings, we briefly discuss the explanatory power of the 
different models we have used. We also provide a discussion of the economic significance of 
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the main variables. In the following discussion we use numbers from our full specifications as 
presented in subchapter 3.4.1.5, meaning that we include both quadratic terms and the 
interaction variable. 
 
We start with the growth models. As we can see from the figure below, the explanatory power 
of our sales growth model varies somewhat noticeably across years. The year which displays 
the lowest adjusted R2 value is 2010, with 3 %. The highest value is found in 2009, where 
15.7 % of variation in sales growth can be explained through our model. Furthermore, we can 
observe three clear spikes, in 2002, 2005 and 2009. The average explained variation in sales 
growth across all years is 6.79 %.  
 
The explanatory power of the asset growth model largely follows the same pattern and level 
as the sales growth model, though without the spike in 2005. Again 2009 has the highest 
adjusted R2 value, reaching 13.8 %. The lowest value, 4.4 %, is observed in 2011. The 
average value in the asset growth model is 7.08 %.  
 
 
Figure 18: Adjusted R2 for growth models 
 
Moving on to the profitability models, we can see that these specifications generally account 
for a larger share of the variation in the dependent variable than their growth counterparts. 
Particularly the EBITDA model displays high adjusted R2 values, the lowest value being 40.1 
% in 2002, the highest 51.6 % in 2012. In contrast to the growth models, there now seems to 
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be dips in explanatory power in 2002 and 2009. The average value across all years is 46.5%, 
indicating that almost half of the variation in EBITDA margins is explained by our model.  
 
The R2 values for the ROA model are somewhat lower than its EBITDA counterpart. There is 
a more noticeable dip in 2003, with a value of 18.3 %. The highest adjusted R2 value occurs in 
2011, with 41.7 % of variation in ROA explained. There also seems to be a general positive 
trend in the explanatory power of the ROA model. The average value is 33.2 %. 
 
 
Figure 19: Adjusted R2 for profitabiliy models 
 
A key question we also address in this subchapter is what economic or practical significance 
the main variables contribute to the model. This is worth some attention given the large 
sample we are left with even after implementing our cutoffs and outlier trimming. Keller 
(2009, p.376) states that with large samples, the t-test of explanatory variable significance has 
so much statistical power that even “minuscule” impacts on the dependent variable is 
registered as significant. We investigate whether statistically significant variables can also be 
said to be economically significant by examining their contribution to overall explanatory 
power of the model. 
 
The table below displays the average increase in R2 for each model when including debt level 
and growth, their quadratic terms and the interaction effect – our main variables.  
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 Sales growth Asset growth ROA EBITDA 
Adj. R2 Control variables .0506 .0583 .2814 .4287 
Δ R2 incl. debt level .0009 .0085 .0228 .0104 
Δ R2 incl. growth .0017 .0016 .0129 .0152 
Δ R2 incl. interaction term .0004 .0002 .0003 -.0002 
Δ R2 incl. growth2 .0014 .0091 .0101 .0134 
Δ R2 incl. debt level2 .0009 .0001 .0098 .0129 
Table 7: Average increases in adjusted R2 
 
As we can see from the table above, including our main variables in the profitability models 
generally adds between 1 - 2 percentage point increase in explanatory power. The excepion is 
the interaction term, which adds very little economic significance and even detracts 
explanatory power in the EBITDA model. This occurs because adjusted R2 “punishes” 
inclusion of economically insignificant terms by adjusting explanatory power based on the 
number of independent variables (Keller, 2009). The highest economic significance is 
provided by the linear debt term in the ROA model, where explanatory power is increased by 
2.28 percentage points. There is no definite limit on the R2-increase a variable must contribute 
to be considered practically significant. That being said, the variables that only add around 1 
percentage point increase in explanatory power are arguably in the lower range of what we 
can consider practically significant. It is especially clear that the interaction term has a limited 
practical impact on profitability throughout our datasets. These findings indicate that we must 
be careful when interpreting the results of regression results, even when the coefficient is 
statistically significant.  
 
As we can see in the growth models, the addition of our main variables generally contribute 
lower explanatory power compared to the profitability models. Arguably, however, 
investigating these variables could still be of interest. In line with some predictions from the 
theory chapter, growth seems very hard to explain in our models, which can be seen from the 
low R2. The relative increase in explanatory power when including our main variables, 
therefore, is arguably substantial. Including the debt level variable in the asset growth model, 
for example, increases the explanatory power of the model by an average 8.5 percentage 
points. Thus, our main variables can still explain a consequential share of total variation. 
There are, however, again some exceptions. The interaction term once more appears to have 
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very little impact on total adjusted R2 also in the growth models. Furthermore, the quadratic 
growth term in the asset growth model also displays virtually no economic significance. This 
will be discussed in-depth in the discussion chapter. 
 
What becomes of interest in the analysis and discussion chapters is the R2 added by our main 
variables in individual years. The appendix therefore has complete tables that display the 
increase in explanatory power with the inclusion of individual variables for each year. They 
can be seen in appendix A.2., and we will refer to these tables frequently in the discussion 
chapter.   
 
 
4.2 Analysis and hypothesis testing 
To briefly recap, our two measures of performance, growth and profitability, are both 
subdivided into two different measures. Our profitability measures are ROA and EBITDA. 
Growth is measured through sales growth and asset growth. These four measures will 
function as our dependent variables in the different regression models.   
  
When interpreting coefficient values we must bear in mind that all variables have been 
adjusted for industry mean.  Therefore, the beta coefficients show the effect on the dependent 
variable with a one unit increase in the independent variable relative to industry mean. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the method section, the presence of a quadratic term means that 
the coefficient of the linear term provides the instantaneous effect when the linear variable 
equals 0. This means that the linear debt level term only provides the marginal effect of, for 
example, leverage on performance for firms with industry average debt levels. 
 
When presenting our results we were faced with a dilemma. We had 6 different specifications 
across 12 years with 4 separate models, which aggregated to a total of 288 different 
regressions. We therefore thought that the traditional method of presenting findings through 
regression tables would amount to an inhumane treatment of the reader. To achieve a more 
pedagogical presentation of findings, we instead provide graphs of how coefficient values 
develop across the years in our time period. Since explanatory variables are lagged one year, 
the graphs show the effects of independent variables in period t-1.   
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Moreover, we chose to analyze the individual effects of prior growth and capital structure 
without an interaction term included in the model, to allow for easier interpretation of 
coefficients. The interaction term is therefore first included in our models in subchapter 5.2.4, 
which deals specifically with the interaction effect. For the sake of clarity, the specifications 
we use when investigating the individual effects are therefore 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡+1 =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒2 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2 + [𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] + [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +  𝜀   
 
   
The rest of the analysis chapter follows the same structure as the theory section. First we look 
at how growth affects corporate performance during recessions. Second, we investigate the 
influence of capital structure. Third and last, we explore how the possible interaction effect of 
how growth and debt may affect performance measures. For all graphs we first provide a brief 
description of how the coefficient values develop, before turning to the implications for our 
hypotheses. In the discussion of the individual effects of capital structure and growth, we 
present developments in both the linear and quadratic terms. This should provide insights into 
how industry-average levels of debt and growth affected performance, as well as how highly 
leverarged and rapidly growing firms performed during recessions. 
 
5.2.1 The impact of growth  
The impact of prior growth on growth performance 
The hypotheses we are testing regarding the impact of prior growth on growth performance 
during recessions are  
 
H.1.a: Prior firm growth has negative effects on growth performance during recessions.  
 
H.1.b: During recessions the negative effect of prior growth on growth performance 
increases exponentially with prior growth levels.   
 
 
Sales growth model  
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The linear term of prior sales growth on sales growth is only sporadically significant 
throughout the period. However, when the relationship exists it displays a consistently 
negative effect on future growth. Overall, this indicates that industry-average growth has a 
sporadically negative influence on future growth. As an example, a 1 % increase in sales 
growth in 2000 reduced sales growth in 2001 with 0.035 %. The coefficient value then drops 
to - 0.06 in 2002, and displays a (non-significant) spike in 2003. After 2004 the negative 
effect of previous growth seems to decrease. Between 2006 and 2008 there are no significant 
relationships, though we observe a positive coefficient value in 2007. After 2008, the 
coefficients values are negative and declining, in other words the negative effect of prior 
growth on growth performance is increasing. 
 
  
Figure 20: Linear sales growth coefficient development in sales growth model 
 
We now turn to how these results relate to our hypothesis. The hypothesized negative effect 
of pre-recession growth does not seem to be present during the dot-com crisis for industry-
average growers. In the discussion above we identified 2002-2003 as the most severely 
affected years during this recession. We observe an increase in the negative influence of prior 
growth in 2002, which is in line with our expectations. However, 2003 sees a positive, albeit 
non-significant, increase in the coefficient value. This runs contrary to our expectations. It is 
also unexpected that firm growth in 2003 should have such a large negative and significant 
impact in 2004, which we identified as a retrieval year. The developments between 2005-2007 
are more in line with expectations. Based on our theoretical predictions regarding the effect of 
growth in normal years, this boom period should induce a positive relation for growth on 
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growth. As mentioned above, 2007 has a positive coefficient value, which coincides with the 
peak of the boom period. The 2006-2008 coefficient values are, however, not statistically 
significant. The coefficient value drop in 2009 provides some support for our hypothesis. On 
the other hand, this finding is confounded by the increasingly negative relationship in 2010-
2012. These last years were identified as retrieval and boom years, and given our theoretical 
predictions we should have expected a similar development as in 2004-2007.  
 
Overall, though we can identify a very crude pattern with decreasing coefficient values in and 
after recessions, this pattern is disrupted by the persistence of low beta values in retrieval 
periods. Taken together, the evidence is poor for hypothesis H.1.a in the linear term. We 
cannot conclude that recessions induce a particular negative effect of prior growth on 
industry-average growers. 
 
 
We now turn to the quadratic term in the sales growth model. As mentioned in the methods 
section, the quadratic function of sales growth explores the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship between prior growth and growth performance. If such a relationship exists, then 
sales growth would be interacted with itself, and the effects of prior growth depends on its 
magnitude. There are highly significant non-linearities in sales growth in 2002, 2005, 2011 
and 2012, with additional significant observations in 2004 and 2007. The squared sales 
growth have positive values for all the significant coefficients, which indicate a u-shaped 
shaped (convex) sales growth curve when combined with the negative coefficient values of 
the linear term. This finding changes the prediction from the discussion of the linear term 
above. The convex nature of sales growth indicates a positive relationship between sales 
growth and sales growth t+1 for particularly fast growers. In other words, high growth firms 
manage to sustain positive momentum in sales growth, while medium and low growth firms 
are unable to maintain above-industry growth.  
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Figure 21: Quadratic sales growth coefficient development in sales growth model 
 
The finding in the quadratic term is relevant for our hypotheses. As we can see from the graph 
above, the occurrence of significant non-linearities largely coincides with retrieval and boom 
years. No significant non-linear relationship is found at any level of significance during the 
crisis period 2008-2010, or during two of the years in the dot-com crisis, 2001 and 2003. This 
is interesting, as it indicates that the convex relationship between prior and future growth we 
identified above disappears during recessions. Our analysis shows that the quadratic term is 
no longer significant during the downturns in 2003 and 2008-2009.  In other words: When 
recessions hit, even high growth firms are unable to sustain a positive growth momentum. The 
finding is supported by squared coefficient values dropping towards zero, providing further 
evidence of the disappearance of the quadratic effect. 
 
This finding does not directly support hypothesis H.1.a or H.1.b, since the quadratic 
relationship is neither negative nor significant during recessions. Thus recessions do not 
appear to induce a strictly negative impact of prior growth. But our findings reveal a related 
effect: Recessions seem to deprive high growth firms of their growth momentum.  
 
Asset growth model 
We now turn to the second growth measure - asset growth. The coefficient of asset growth on 
asset growth t+1 follow a similar pattern as the sales model, but is less volatile during and after 
both recessions. The coefficient is again negative in all years with a statistically significant 
relationship. In 2001-2005 it fluctuates between -0.04 and -0.06, with alternating high and low 
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values. In 2006 and 2007 we observe noticeable increases in coefficient values, with the 2007 
value almost reaching zero. Neither of these are, however, statistically significant. After the 
start of the 2008-2009 recession, coefficient values drop and displays an increasingly negative 
relationship towards 2012.  
 
 
Figure 22: Linear asset growth coefficient development in asset growth model 
 
The results from the linear term provide mixed support for hypothesis H.1.a for industry-
average growers. There appears to be no evidence of the dot-com crisis exacerbating the 
negative growth effect we generally observe. There is a small increase in coefficient values 
from 2001 to 2002, which runs contrary to expectations. While there is a drop in coefficient 
values from 2002 to 2003, the levels do not fall below that of 2001, and not substantially 
lower than 2004 and 2005. That coefficient values remain low for these last two years indicate 
that there was either no growth effect during the dot-com crisis, or that effects lasted longer 
than we would intuitively expect. There is, on the other hand, some support for our hypothesis 
of a negative growth effect during the 2008-2009 recession. As we can see, coefficient values 
drop noticeably in 2008 and 2009. Similarly to the results from the sales growth model, 
however, this finding is somewhat confounded by the continued drop in beta values in 2010 
and 2011. Again, there seems to be limited support for hypothesis H.3.a when investigating 
the linear term. We cannot conclude that industry average growers experienced particularly 
negative growth effects during recessions.  
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Similar to the analysis above, we now include the quadratic term in the discussion. The 
quadratic term for asset growth follows a similar pattern to the squared growth variable. In 
non-recession years, there are significant, positive non-linearities in asset growth. The 
coefficient values are also higher in retrieval and boom years relative to slowdown and 
downturn years. There are clear peaks in 2001 and 2006, and the retrieval starting in 2011 and 
2012 shows a notable increase in both coefficient values and significance of the quadratic 
relationship.  
 
  
Figure 23: Quadratic asset growth coefficient development in asset growth model. 
 
The implications from the quadratic term are similar to our findings in the sales growth 
model. In normal years, firms with particularly high growth are able to sustain their 
momentum over time. More modest growers are unable to preserve positive growth levels. 
Similarly to the findings in the sales growth model this non-linear relationship disappears 
during recessions. This provides further support for the fact that high growers are unable to 
maintain positive growth effects during recessions. However, even though coefficient values 
dip during recessions, they do not turn negative. Therefore we arrive at the same conclusion 
regarding our hypotheses as above. We find no support for hypotheses H.3.b from the asset 
growth model.  
 
We briefly sum up the analysis on the effects of prior growth. The accumulated discussion of 
the linear terms in the sales and asset growth models indicate moderate to little support for 
H.3.a. However, including the quadratic term in the analysis provided additional insights. We 
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have seen that high growth firms are able to sustain positive growth momentum in normal 
years. Introducing recessions seems to remove this growth momentum. In other words, though 
recessions apparently do not punish average firms noticeably, they punish high growers by 
removing their growth momentum effect. The overall conclusion for H.3.a is therefore that 
even though recessions do not induce strictly negative effects of prior growth on growth, they 
do seem to remove the positive effects of growth for fast growing firms.  
  
There is, however, no evidence in favor of hypothesis H.1.b, where we expected an 
exponential negative relationship between prior growth and growth during recessions. As we 
have seen, the conclusion from the sales growth model suggests that there is no such negative 
effect of growth on growth in a crisis, rather a removal of positive effects. The overall 
conclusion is therefore a rejection of the hypothesis.  
 
 
The impact of prior growth on profitability 
We now turn to how prior growth affects our second performance measure, profitability. We 
start by analyzing the effect on EBITDA margins, before moving on to effects on ROA. 
  
The hypotheses we test in this subchapter are 
 
H.2.a: Prior firm growth has negative effects on profitability performance during recessions.  
  
H.2.b: During recessions the negative effect of prior growth on profitability performance 
increases exponentially with prior growth levels.   
 
 
EBITDA model  
Sales growth on next year’s EBITDA margins is consistently negative, as evidenced in the 
graph below. The observed effects of growth on EBITDA margins are less negative in 2002, 
2005 and 2009, but none of these observations are statistically significant. The first significant 
relationship occurs in 2003, where an 1 % increase in prior growth  reduced EBITDA margins 
by 0.025 %. Coefficient values then increase somewhat in 2004, before dropping back 
towards 2003 levels in the next significant year, 2006. Between 2007-2011 coefficient levels 
remain relatively constant. The exception is 2009, where sales growth did not have a 
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significant impact on EBITDA. Somewhat surprisingly, the largest negative effect of growth 
on EBITDA margins is found in 2012.   
 
 
Figure 24: Linear sales growth coefficient development in EBITDA model 
 
Overall, these findings provide little support for hypothesis in the linear term. There is a 
reduction in coefficient values in 2003, indicating that industry-average growth in 2002 might 
have a negative impact during the dot-com through the year later. However, the 2003 
coefficient value is higher than its 2006 counterpart, a year we identified as part of an 
expansion phase. Similarly, there is little evidence that the 2008-2009 recession induced a 
particularly negative relationship between growth and EBITDA margins, a finding that is 
strengthened by the substantial drop in coefficient values in 2012. In sum, there is little 
indication that industry average growth induced a negative impact on EBITDA during 
recessions. Overall, these findings provide little support for hypothesis H.4.a.   
 
We now turn to the quadratic sales growth term. The squared sales growth coefficient in the 
EBITDA model is negative for the first year of the dot-com crisis, indicating an exponentially 
increasing negative relation, before turning non-significant during 2002 and 2003. In the 
retrieval and expansion years the quadratic term has positive values, which combined with the 
linear term indicates that growth has a convex effect on EBITDA margins. The only year 
breaking the pattern in the boom period is 2005, where the exponential relationship for growth 
behaves similar to a recessionary year. The relationship turns negative again during the 
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entirety of the 2008-2011 period, which indicates the presence of a similar relationship as in 
2001.  
  
 
Figure 25: Quadratic sales growth coefficient developments in EBITDA model 
 
Once again, including the quadratic term changes the conclusions from the linear term. The 
results from the squared variable provide findings that are in line with hypotheses H.4.a and 
H.2.b. The negative quadratic term during 2001, the first year of the dot-com crisis, indicates 
that high pre-recession growth has increasingly negative impacts on EBITDA margins. The 
quadratic relationship is not significant in 2002 and 2003, however, which weakens the 
argument somewhat. The negative spike in 2005 is also hard to explain, but a recurring theme 
in our other main variables is that 2005 often display unexpected findings. Henriksen and 
Kvaslerud (2012), using the same datasets, also finds that 2005 coefficients frequently return 
highly discrepant values. This might indicate that there are issues with the 2005 dataset, so we 
chose to ignore the output in 2005 when values are highly discrepant. Moving on to the 2008-
2009 recession, a clear pattern in the quadratic term emerges. In 2008-2009 the term turns 
negative, indicating an exponential negative effect of growth on EBITDA margins. This 
relationship continues in 2010 and 2011.  
 
Overall, disregarding 2005, we can identify a pattern across the business cycle. The squared 
growth variable shows a concave (u-shaped) growth relationship in recessions, and a convex 
(inverse u-shape) relationship in normal years. The exponentially increasing negative effects 
on next year’s EBITDA margins from growth during recessions provides support for 
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hypotheses H.2.a and H.2.b. Recessions seem to induce a negative effect of high prior growth 
on profitability performance, and this negative relationship is non-linear.  
 
 
ROA model 
We now turn to our ROA model. When examining the linear term, prior growth generally 
appears to have a negative impact on ROA throughout the period. The lowest coefficient 
value is observed in 2001. The coefficient then increases in 2002 and 2003, though the latter 
is not statistically significant. Coefficient values are then relatively stable between 2004 and 
2008, with the exception of a non-significant spike in 2006. There is another non-significant 
spike in 2009, after which the coefficient dips in 2010, remaining relatively low in 2011 and 
2012.  
 
  
Figure 26: Linear sales growth coefficient developments in ROA model 
 
Again we find little evidence for hypothesis H.2.a when investigating the linear term. In 
support for our hypothesis, the start of each crisis, 2001 and 2008, display negative spikes in 
coefficient values. However, there are positive spikes in coefficient values in 2003 and 2009, 
even though we identified these years as the most severely affected in terms of GDP growth. 
This finding therefore runs contrary to hypothesized results. Furthermore, the two years 
following the start of the dot-com crisis do not display expected coefficient developments. 
Overall, therefore, support for H.2.a is limited. There does not appear to be an effect of prior 
growth on ROA for industry-average growers during recessions. 
● 
■ 
▲ 
● 
■ 
● 
● ● 
● 
-0.045
-0.04
-0.035
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Sales growth coefficient on ROA t+1   
Sales growth coefficient ●p<0.01 ■p<0.05 ▲p<0.1 
104 
 
We now turn to the quadratic variable. The squared growth effect on ROA t1 shows some 
interesting results. As we can see, there is no quadratic relationship in the boom period 2004-
2007. The presence of a quadratic effect only occurs in 2002, during the dot-com crisis, and in 
the 2009-2011 period. The relationship displays the highest level of significance in 2002 and 
2009, which coincides with sharp negative spikes in the coefficient values of the quadratic 
term. This indicates the presence of an exponential negative effect of growth on ROA. The 
negative effects of high growth on ROA t1 persists with significant values through 2010 and 
2011.  
 
 
Figure 27: Quadratic sales growth coefficient developments in ROA model 
 
The quadratic term shows clear support for both our profitability hypotheses. The squared 
sales growth coefficient values and significance levels indicate that high growth in the year 
before the onset of recessions may induce an exponentially inceasing negative relationship 
with profitability. This finding is similar to the conclusions we arrive at in the EBITDA 
model, but appears to be even more prominent in the ROA model. We argue that this offers 
support for hypotheses H.2.a and H.2.b. Firms with high pre-recession growth appear to have 
suffered negative profitability performance outcomes during downturns. 
 
We briefly sum up the analysis of growth on profitability. Developments in coefficient values 
and significance levels for the linear terms in both EBITDA and ROA models lend little 
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support to hypothesis H.2.a. There seems to be no identifiable pattern where recessions induce 
negative growth effects on profitability for industry-average growers. As with the growth 
models, however, introducing the squared term provides additional insights. There is a clear 
pattern, particularly in the ROA model, of a negative non-linear relationship between high 
prior growth and profitability in downturns. This indicates that recessions induce a negative 
relation between growth and profitability for rapidly growing firms. This lends support to 
hypothesis H.2.a. 
 
As implied above, the overall support for hypothesis H.2.b is also strong. Based on EBITDA 
model there is evidence of a negative quadratic relationship during recessions. The ROA 
model displays an unambiguous pattern of negative and significant squared coefficient values 
in most of the crisis years. We therefore accept the hypothesis H.2.b: there appears to be an 
exponentially increasing negative effect of growth on profitability during recessions. 
 
5.2.2 The impact of capital structure 
We now present our results on how capital structure affects corporate performance in 
recessions. As with growth, we explore the effects of debt across our four performance 
measures sales growth, asset growth, EBITDA margins and ROA. We again investigate both 
the linear and the quadratic relationships.   
 
The impact of capital structure on growth  
Similar to above, we start with the sales growth model before discussing asset growth. The 
hypotheses we test are   
  
H.3.a: Debt has a negative effect on corporate growth performance during recessions.  
  
H.3.b: During recessions the negative effect of debt on growth performance increases 
exponentially with debt levels. 
 
Sales growth model  
As we can see in the figure below, debt level appears to have a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with next year’s sales growth after 2006. Prior to this, however, 
coefficient values are not significant and fluctuate around zero. 2006 also displays the highest 
observed coefficient value. In 2007 we observe a decline in the positive debt effect that last 
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until 2009. 2010 does not display a significant relationship, but we can observe an increase in 
coefficient values in 2011 and 2012, both of which are statistically significant.  
 
 
 
Figure 28: Linear debt level coefficient development in sales growth model 
 
The findings provide partial support for hypothesis H.3.a. Coefficient values prior to 2006 
indicate that there was no debt effect on growth for averagely leveraged firms during the dot-
com crisis. Compared to the boom period in 2006-2007, coefficient values are noticeably 
lower during the dot-com crisis, but the relationships are not statistically significant. 
However, the pattern of reduced coefficient values repeats during the 2008-2009 recession, 
now with statistically significant relationships. Signs of the retrieval phase can be seen in 
2011 and 2012, as the positive effects on sales growth t1 from increasing debt rises. Though 
the effects of debt on growth remains positive during the recession, the reduced coefficient 
values during the 2008-2009 recession indicate a relative decrease in the positive impact of 
leverage. Strictly speaking, this is not the negative relation we hypothesized, but it indicates 
that recessions still have a negative impact on the effects of capital structure. We therefore 
conclude that partial support for hypothesis H.3.a is provided. Firms with industry-average 
debt levels appear to have experienced reduced positive effects of leverage on growth during 
the 2008-2009 recession.    
 
The squared debt level coefficient reveals two findings on capital structure's effect on 
performance. First, the quadratic variable of debt level’s effect on next year’s sales growth is 
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highly significant in the entire period except 2006. This indicates a consistent interaction 
effect of debt on debt. Second, all observations are in the negative range of values, implying a 
decreasing positive effect of debt on sales growth, and that sufficiently high leverage 
eventually causes negative growth. In other words: Increasing debt levels above industry 
average may have positive marginal effects on sales growth when leverage is relatively 
low.  At some point, however, increases in debt level will eventually entail negative effects on 
sales growth. Combined with the linear term, this creates a reverse u-shaped (concave) 
relationship between debt and growth after 2006, and a negative exponential relationship 
before. Moreover, there are also developments in the coefficient values. As we can see from 
the figure below, these values decrease from 2001 to 2004, before a spike in 2005 and 2006. 
A sharp reduction in coefficient values then occurs in 2007, after which there is a continuous 
increase towards 2011.   
 
  
Figure 29: Quadratic debt level coefficient development in sales growth model 
 
We argue that the findings from the quadratic variable support our findings from the 
discussion on the linear term. The non-significant linear term combined with the significant 
quadratic effect creates a negative exponential effect in and immediately after the dot-com 
crisis. The development in the coefficient values indicate that this effect worsened through the 
crisis, before starting to improve in 2005 and 2006, which we identified as boom years. That 
the relationship turns non-significant during 2006 indicates a complete removal of the 
negative leverage effect for high-debt firms. The findings so far are in line with our 
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theoretical predictions. The sharp negative spike as early as in 2007 is somewhat surprising, 
but the subsequently low quadratic coefficient values in 2008 and 2009 provides support for 
our hypothesis that recessions induce a negative effect of leverage. The general pattern seems 
to be increased negative coefficient values in or around recessions, with higher values in 
boom periods. This provides clear support for hypotheses H.3.a and H.3.b. It seems recessions 
reduce the threshold for ‘harmful’ leverage effects on growth.  
 
Asset growth model 
We now turn to capital structure's effect on asset growth. Debt levels show highly significant 
relationships with asset growth throughout all years in the period. Contrary to findings in the 
linear sales growth term, the coefficient values are all negative, indicating that marginal 
increases above industry-average leverage decreases asset growth. Regarding the 
developments in coefficient values, there appears to be a slight dip in 2002 relative to 2001 
values.  There is then a retrieval in 2003, bringing the effects of debt close to 2001 levels. The 
effect remains stable in 2004. After 2004, coefficient values steadily increase towards a peak 
in 2006. There is then a noticeable drop in 2007 and 2008, with a larger negative spike in 
2009. As we can see, 2009 brings coefficient values even lower than the dot-com crisis. 2010 
displays a marginal increase in coefficient levels. A more pronounced retrieval is evident in 
2011, continuing into 2012.  
 
  
Figure 30: Linear debt level coefficient development in asset growth model 
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Again we argue that there is support for hypothesis H.3.a in the linear term. The general 
pattern appears to be an increasingly negative relationship between leverage and growth 
during recessions. The dip in 2002 coincides with one of the most severely affected years of 
the dot-com crisis, even if the subsequent increase in coefficient value in 2003 is unexpected. 
The peak in coefficient values in 2005-2007 is also in line with expected developments during 
boom years. Furthermore, the 2008-2009 recessions appears to induce a sharp increase in the 
negative leverage effect. Again, however, we can observe an early decline in coefficient 
values. The larger decline in 2009, however, still provides strong support for hypothesis 
H.3.a. Recessions appear to exacerbate the negative effect of debt levels on growth for firms 
with industry-average debt levels. 
 
We now include the quadratic term in the discussion. The squared debt level coefficient 
shows consistently high levels of significance throughout all years in the dataset. The 
quadratic term does not, however, follow the pattern of the squared sales growth term. 
Generally, coefficient values appear to fluctuate around 0 until 2008, after which there is a 
spike in 2010. The coefficient values are negative in 2005 and 2007. There are also smaller 
spikes in 2003 and 2006. 2011 and 2012 sees two consecutive and sharp reductions in 
coefficient values. In 2012 the coefficient level is again close to zero.   
 
 
Figure 31: Quadratic debt level coefficient development in asset growth model 
 
The findings from the squared variable stand in sharp contrast what we hypothesized in both 
H.3.a. and H.3.b, and what we found in the sales growth model.  Largely, we find positive 
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squared debt variable values during recessions. Combined with findings from the linear term, 
the results indicate that sufficiently high leverage can cause a positive effect on asset growth 
in recessions, creating a u-shaped relationship. This directly contradicts our hypothesis. It is 
also hard to reconcile the peak in 2010 with our expected findings. However, as we saw in the 
model overview subchapter, and as can be seen in detail in appendix A.2, the economic 
significance of the quadratic debt term was either close or equal to zero across all years. Thus, 
we chose to lend little weight to the quadratic leverage effect in the asset growth model. We 
are then left with the linear term, which largely provided support for hypothesis H.3.a. The 
lack of economic significance in the squared term, however, means that there is no support for 
hypothesis H.3.b when investigating asset growth. 
 
We briefly sum up the analysis on capital structure effects on growth.  From the sales growth  
model we found no effect of leverage on growth prior to 2006, but  a sharp reduction in the 
positive values of the linear model during the 2008-2009 recession. The linear leverage effect 
on asset growth is negatively affected by both recessions. Both linear terms therefore provides 
support for hypothesis H.3.a, indicating that recessions induced a negative growth effect for 
firms with industry-average debt levels. When including the quadratic term in the analysis, we 
the ROA model indicated that leverage had increasingly negative effects on growth during 
downturns. The quadratic term in the EBITDA model, however, provided results that 
contradicted this finding. However, the squared debt did not contribute economic 
significance. In total, both the linear and quadratic terms in the sales growth model provided 
support for hypothesis H.3.a. The same applied for the linear asset growth term, but the 
findings from the quadratic term contradicted this hypothesis.  
 
Moving on to hypothesis H.3.b, the findings from the quadratic term displayed clear support 
in favor of the hypothesis. As we saw above, however there was no practically significant 
squared EBITDA variable. The overall findings on hypothesis H.3.b are therefore somewhat 
inconclusive in our growth models.  
 
The impact of capital structure on profitability 
We now discuss the effects of leverage on our profitability performance measures. The 
hypotheses we test are:  
  
H.4.a: Debt has a negative effect on corporate profitability performance during recessions. 
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H.4.b: During recessions the negative effect of debt on profitability performance increases 
exponentially with debt levels.   
 
  
EBITDA model 
Industry-average leverage is generally positively related with EBITDA margins. As we can 
see in the figure below, coefficient values are also rather volatile throughout the period. The 
first few years display no significant relationship, with coefficient levels close to zero. In 
2003, we see a sharp increase in coefficient values, after which all years display a statistically 
significant relationship. From 2003 and onwards, the effect of leverage fluctuates between 
0.05 and 0.02, with negative spikes in 2005, 2007 and 2010. Values outside these years are 
relatively stable at 0.05.   
 
 
Figure 32: Linear debt level coefficient development in EBITDA model 
 
According to our hypothesis H.4.a, recessions should negatively impact the effects of debt on 
EBITDA margins. Looking at the dot-com crisis, it seems that the debt level's influence on 
EBITDA margin is neither significant nor negative. To the contrary, in 2003 there is a large, 
positive and significant increase in the coefficient value. During the 2008-2009 recessions, 
there are also significant and positive effects of increasing debt levels on EBITDA margins. 
This provides further evidence against our hypothesis. When analyzing effects on EBITDA 
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margin performance for firms with industry-average debt levels, hypothesis H.4.a does not 
seem to hold.   
 
We now include the quadratic term in the discussion. The coefficient value of the squared 
debt level term lies close to zero in both 2001 and 2002, before dropping into negative values 
in 2003. The effect remains relatively stable and negative in 2004 and 2005, which combined 
with the linear term indicates a reverse u-shape during this period. The coefficient value then 
increases sharply and turns positive in 2006. 2007-2009 displays a continuous decline with a 
new trough occurring in 2009, where we again see a negative quadratic effect. This indicates 
that the concave relationship from 2003-2005 returns. Similarly to the asset growth model, the 
squared debt variable peaks sharply in 2010. We then observe an almost equally abrupt drop 
in the coefficient value in 2011, before a modest increase in 2012. 
 
  
Figure 33: Quadratic debt level coefficient development in EBITDA model 
 
The squared term provides some evidence for our hypotheses. The concave relationship we 
identified in 2001 and 2003-2005 indicates that the dot-com crisis induced a negative effect of 
high leverage on profitability. However, if the dot-com crisis is the real cause of this effect, it 
is surprising that the concave relationship lasts until 2005. It is also hard to explain why 2002 
displays a positive value. Evidence in support of our hypothesis is clearer during the 2008-
2009 recession. The decrease in coefficient values after 2006 coincide with the onset of the 
financial crisis, and the negative quadratic variable in 2009 occurs simultaneously as the 
trough in GDP growth we identified above. These findings therefore provide support for 
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hypothesis H.4.a. The 2008-2009 recession appear to have induced a negative effect of debt 
on growth for particularly highly leveraged firms. This finding is, however, only moderately 
supported in the dot-com crisis. Since the quadratic term is driving the negative effect of 
leverage during recessions, we also find support for hypothesis H.4.b.  
ROA model 
As we can see in the graph of the linear term below, industry-average debt levels show 
consistent positive effects on ROA. The relationship is also highly significant throughout the 
period. Compared to other years, coefficient values are relatively low between 2001 - 2003. 
There is then an increase in 2004, after which values fluctuate between 0.06 and 0.10 until 
2009. The positive effect of debt on ROA t1 all but vanishes in 2010, which sees a sharp 
negative spike in the coefficient value, which renders the effects of debt comparable to 2001-
2003 levels. Coefficient values then rebound in 2011 and 2012.  
  
Figure 34: Linear debt level coefficient development in ROA model 
 
These findings offer some support for hypothesis H.4.a. Though the relationship remains 
positive, the effects of leverage on profitability were somewhat lower during the dot-com 
crisis relative to most other years. This could indicate that the dot-com crisis reduced the 
positive growth effects of leverage. However, this pattern does not repeat itself during the 
2008-2009 recession. The large negative spike in coefficient value in 2010 arrives too late to 
be assumed induced by the recession. Overall, there is moderate to limited support for H.4.a. 
Though a negative effect might be observed in the dot-com crisis, it appears recessions induce 
● ■ ● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● ● 
● 
● ● 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Debt level coefficient values on ROA t+1 
Debt level coefficient ●p<0.01 ■p<0.05 ▲p<0.1 
114 
 
a limited negative effect of leverage on profitability for firms with industry-average debt 
levels.  
 
We now include the squared debt level in the discussion. During 2002 and 2003 we can 
observe negative coefficient values, which combined with the positive linear term indicates a 
reverse u-shaped (concave) relationship between debt and profitability. 2005 show a highly 
significant negative spike in the effect of leverage on ROA, which is then reversed in 2006. 
Again we point out that 2005 continues to display disparate results. The quadratic term turns 
insignificant in 2007 and 2008, before the concave relationship from 2002 - 2003 returns in 
2009. The relationship then turns positive again in 2010, with relatively stable values in 2011 
and 2012. 
 
 
Figure 35: Quadratic debt level coefficient development in ROA model 
 
We argue that these results provide support for our hypotheses H.4.a and H.4.b. In the two 
most severely affected years of the dot-com crisis, the presence of a negative quadratic term 
indicates that high levels of leverage had a negative effect on profitability. A caveat here is the 
significance level of 10%, which is above the conventional threshold of 5 %. However, the 
pattern repeats itself in 2009, now with high statistical significance. Disregarding 2005, it 
seems that recessions punish high debt levels in terms of ROA performance. This provides 
support for both hypothesis H.4.a and H.4.ab. We document that recessions induce a negative 
effect of leverage on profitability for firms with high debt levels, and that this negative effect 
increases exponentially. 
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As before, we provide a brief summary of our profitability hypotheses. In the EBITDA model, 
we found that the linear debt level term did not appear to systematically affect margins 
negatively during recessions. Including the quadratic term, however, indicated that recessions 
did induce a negative effect on EBITDA for highly leverage firms. In the ROA model, we 
found lower coefficient values during the dot-com crisis, indicating a potential effect. 
Including the quadratic term again provided evidence of a negative effect of debt in 
recessions. These findings show support for hypothesis H.4.a. We document a negative effect 
for firms with particularly high leverage. Our findings also show strong evidence in support of 
hypothesis H.4.b: There seems to be a negative exponential relationship between leverage and 
profitability during recessions. 
 
This concludes our analysis of the individual effects of growth and capital structure during 
recessions. We now turn to the interaction between these two. 
 
5.2.3 Interaction effects of debt and growth 
Going back to the red thread in our overall structure, we now explore the possibility of an 
interaction effect between debt and growth on firm performance. The econometric 
specification we use then reads 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡+1= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 +  𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒2 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2+  [𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] + [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +  𝜀 
 
The hypotheses we test are: 
  
H.5: There is a negative interaction effect between prior growth and debt levels on growth 
performance in recessions. 
 
H.6: There is a negative interaction effect between prior growth and debt levels on 
profitability performance in recessions. 
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Interaction effects in the growth models 
We start with the interaction effect on growth. As we can see in the graph below, the effect on 
next year’s sales growth is generally positive, with the exception of 2002, where the 
interaction coefficient displays a negative spike. We can also see that the effect is only 
sporadically significant. After 2002, the coefficient values seem relatively stable for the years 
where we observe a statistically significant effect. When the effect is not significant, it 
displays small dips in coefficient values. There also appears to be an increase in coefficient 
value in 2012.   
 
 
Figure 36: Interaction effect in sales growth model 
 
Based on the discussion and the figure above, there seems to be limited support for hypothesis 
H.5. The pattern in the Dot-com crisis indicates that there could be a negative interaction 
effect between growth and leverage, since we see a clear drop in coefficient values during 
2002. Here, our findings indicate a negative effect of prior growth on sales growth when 
leverage increases. However, this pattern does not repeat itself during the 2008-2009 
recession. At the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the interaction effect between debt on 
growth is actually positive for next year’s sales growth. Additionally, as we can see in 
appendix A.2, the interaction term in the sales growth model contributes very little to the 
overall explanatory model, indicating that the interaction has limited economic significance. 
In sum, though we appear to observe the expected interaction effect during the dot-com crisis, 
the lack of economic significance leads us to conclude that evidence for H.5 is limited in the 
sales growth model. 
 
■ 
● 
 
● ● ■ 
● 
● 
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Interaction of debt and growth on sales growth 
Interaction Debt levelXSales growth… ●p<0.01 ■p<0.05 ▲p<0.1 Interaction effect on sales growth 
117 
 
We now turn to the asset growth model. The interaction effect on next year’s asset growth is 
generally negative, again with only sporadically significant relationships. As we can see 
below, there is a highly significant interaction effect in 2001, which persists in 2002 and 
2003. There is then a (non-significant) spike in coefficient value in 2004, followed by a 
negative spike in 2005. After 2005, the interaction coefficient seems to be less negative 
overall, but only 2007 displays a significant interaction effect.  
 
 
Figure 37: Interaction effect in asset growth model 
 
Regarding hypothesis H.5, there again appears to be a negative interaction between growth 
and leverage in the dot-com crisis. As we frequently saw in the analyses of the individual 
effects, this finding is somewhat confounded by a sharp negative spike in 2005. Similar to the 
interaction effect in the sales growth model, the pattern from the dot-com crisis does not 
repeat itself during the 2008-2009 recession. Disregarding the potentially misleading result in 
2005, these results lend support to the findings above: there seems to be a negative interaction 
effect during the dot-com crisis. However, the caveat once more is that the economic 
significance contributed by the interaction term was virtually zero. The conclusion in the asset 
growth model is therefore that evidence in support of hypothesis H.5 is at best modest.  
 
Interaction effects in the profitability models 
The interaction effect of debt and growth on next year’s EBITDA margin is negative for all 
observed values of the coefficient. This indicates that the moderation effect between debt and 
growth reduces EBITDA margins. In 2002 and 2003, the interaction effect is highly 
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significant. The surprising observation is again 2005, where we find the largest negative 
interaction of debt and growth on EBITDA margin t1, as well as highest level of significance. 
After 2005 significant coefficient values are rather stable, although positive spikes occur in 
years without statistical significance.  
 
 
Figure 38: Interaction effect in EBITDA model 
 
Regarding H.6, there is little support for our interaction hypothesis in the findings discussed 
above. If we disregard 2005, coefficient values in the dot-com crisis are marginally lower than 
the rest of the period, but the difference seems too low to justify support of our hypothesis. 
Furthermore, there does not seem to be any identifiable pattern in the 2008-2009 recession. In 
sum, the EBITDA model does not provide any support for hypothesis H.6. 
We now turn to the ROA model. The interaction effect of debt and growth on next year’s 
ROA follows the general pattern as in the EBITDA model. We observe a negative interaction 
term for all significant observations. The lowest value of the interactional effect was in 2001, 
after which the coefficient value increases in 2002. Coefficient values are then relatively 
stable when statistically significant. The exception is 2007, which sees a slight increase in 
coefficient values. When not significant, the values are generally somewhat higher. The 
second lowest observed value is at the start of the financial crisis in 2008, when the 
interaction effect is highly significant.  
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Figure 39: Interaction effect in ROA model 
 
Similar to our findings above, there seems little evidence of a particularly negative interaction 
effect during recessions in the ROA model. Both 2003 and 2009, the most severely affected 
years, display statistically insignificant interaction terms. Moreover, recessionary years that 
do display a significant interaction effect, such as 2002 and 2008 do not show noticeably 
different coefficient values than normal years. The exception is 2001, which might provide 
further support for the presence of a negative interaction effect during the dot-com crisis. 
However, if the negative effect induced in 2001 was induced by a recession, we should expect 
the coefficient values to either remain low or drop during the more severely affected years of 
2002 and 2003. Moreover, we again found that the interaction term had very little economic 
significance. The conclusion for the ROA model is therefore that highly limited support for 
hypothesis H.6 is found.  
  
We briefly summarize the findings from our analysis of the interaction term. From our growth 
models we found partial evidence of a negative interaction term during recessions. It appeared 
that the dot-com crisis might have induced a negative interaction effect between debt levels 
and growth. The profitability measures are somewhat divided, with EBITDA margins 
showing no support, while the ROA model provided some evidence of an effect during the 
early stages of the dot-com crisis. Any inferences we make, however, are confounded by the 
highly limited economic significance of the interaction term across models. For example, as 
we can see in appendix A.2, the adjusted R2 in the EBITDA model actually decreased upon 
including the term.  
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Accounting for non-linearities among the interaction effects 
The findings above indicated little evidence of an interaction effect during recessions. 
However, we are not quite ready to give up on the interaction term yet. When investigating 
the individual effects of capital structure and growth we repeatedly found non-linearities in 
their effects on corporate performance. It seems reasonable to expect similar non-linearities in 
the interaction term. In other words, the interaction effect between our two main variables 
might depend on their levels. There are multiple approaches to testing for this. We chose to 
segment our sample based on the levels of prior growth and leverage. We did this by using the 
visual binning function in SPSS, as discussed in the methods section. We first split our 
datafiles into 10 equal percentiles based on prior growth levels, before doing the same based 
on debt levels. We subsequently ran multiple regression analysis for each percentile. Since 
non-linearities should be adequately captured by segmenting the sample into percentiles, we 
dropped the quadratic terms from the specification. The general specification therefore now 
reads 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡+1= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + [𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠]+ [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠] +  𝜀 
 
We then compared interaction coefficient outputs of firms within the 10 %, 50 % and 90 % 
percentiles of debt and growth levels. When aggregating the developments for the three 
different percentile groups, this left us with 8 different graphs, one for each performance 
measures for both debt and growth percentiles. 
 
Accounting for different levels of prior growth and debt yielded a small degree of support for 
our hypothesis. Below we present the models where we did find statistically significant and 
clearly identifiable patterns across business cycles. The other models are presented in 
appendix A.3. The orange lines represent interaction coefficient values of firms among those 
that have higher leverage or faster growth than 90 % of the rest of the sample. Conversely, the 
blue line indicates firms that are among the 10 % lowest leveraged or slowest growing firms. 
The dotted black line represents firms that have average debt or growth levels.  
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The first graph displays developments in the interaction coefficient values in the ROA model 
when the sample is split into different growth percentiles. As we can see, there is a significant 
negative interaction effect for both fast and slow growers during 2003, while industry-average 
growers experienced a positive effect. The negative interaction also occurs during the 2008-
2009 recession, but now only for highly leveraged firms. Companies with the lowest growth 
levels now experience a positive interaction effect. Particularly the findings from the 90th 
percentile provides support for our interaction hypothesis, as we do not find an effect outside 
the recessions, and since these firms display different performance outcomes than firms in the 
50th percentile.  However, again the R2 contributed by the interaction term is relatively low. 
For 90th percentile firms, the presence of the interaction effect increased explanatory power by 
an average of 0.03 percentage points in the four years it is statistically significant. 
 
 
Figure 40: Interaction effects on asset growth for different percentiles of growth 
 
The second figure displays developments in the interaction term’s coefficient values in the 
ROA model, now with the sample segmented into percentiles based on debt levels. As we can 
see, the highest leveraged firms (orange line) experienced a statistically significant and 
negative interaction effect of debt and prior growth in both 2003 and 2009. This interaction 
does not appear in any other year. This provides support for our hypothesis, which is further 
bolstered by a relatively high contribution to R2. On average, the three significant coefficient 
values for 90th percentile firms contributed 1.29 percentage points to explanatory power. 
However, it is unexpected that we find a positive interaction effect in 2008. Furthermore, our 
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finding is somewhat confounded by a similar development in the firms with lowest leverage 
(blue line).  
 
 
Figure 41: Interaction effect on ROA for different percentiles of leverage 
 
In sum, these two models generated some support for the presence of an interaction effect 
during recessions. However, in the rest of the percentile graphs we find that the interaction 
term was statistically insignificant in most years, and did not yield any distinguishable 
patterns across business cycles in the majority of our models. Overall, therefore, only 2 out of 
8 models provided any support for our hypothesis. Neither did we find any further evidence of 
a local interaction effect in the dot-com crisis, as indicated in the main interaction models. In 
sum, therefore, we have to conclude that attempting to account for non-lineartities in the 
interaction term only yielded marginal support for our hypothesis.  
 
When aggregating our analyses of the interaction effect between capital structure and growth, 
our conclusion is therefore that there is limited evidence in support of our interaction 
hypothesis. 
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5 Discussion 
The previous chapter provided the findings from our analysis on the effects of growth and 
capital structure during recessions. We now provide a more in-depth discussion on how our 
findings can be interpreted, and the implications that follow. Again we follow the same 
structure as in the theory and analysis sections: First growth, then capital structure, and finally 
the interaction effect between the two. 
 
5.1 Overall developments in recessions 
As we could see in subchapter 4.2, the explanatory power of our models seemed to vary 
systematically during recessions. In the growth models, adjusted R2 spiked during 
recessionary years, indicating that our models were better able to explain sales growth during 
downturns. This might make sense, since all explanatory variables were included on the basis 
that they covered a firm or industry characteristic that was important during recessions. In a 
model designed for explaining performance in recessions, then, increased explanatory power 
during downturns is as expected.  
 
This argument, however, is confounded by the opposite effect on R2 in the profitability 
models. There appears to be dips in explanatory power during downturns. This disparity in 
adjusted R2 developments is highly interesting. One possible explanation could lie with the 
model for recessionary impact we presented in subchapter 2.2.1.2. Here we saw that the net 
effect of recessions is the sum of performance impacts, firm responses and an error term. Our 
point is that we are unable to differentiate between impact and firm response. Many of the 
measures firms undertake during recessions are likely to negatively impact their profitability, 
such as investments in human capital for temporarily superfluous workers (Lien & Knudsen 
2013). These measures impact ROA and EBITDA margins, but we are unable to account for 
firms response. This could explain the dips in adjusted R2 during reessions for our 
profitability models. 
 
 
5.2 The effects of growth 
In line with the structure of the analysis chapter, we start with the effects of prior growth on 
growth performance. To provide a theoretical foundation with which to discuss the effects of 
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recessions, we start by discussing mechanisms that could explain the general relationships we 
observe in normal years. 
 
5.2.1 Prior growth on growth 
 
The general effect 
The key finding in our analysis of prior growth on growth performance in normal years was a 
positive growth momentum effect of rapidly growing firms. To briefly recap, we found a 
convex effect of growth in normal years, where high-growth firms were able to sustain their 
growth. More modest growers, however, experienced negative effects of prior growth on 
growth performance. This applied to both the sales and asset growth model. The relationship 
is visualized in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 42: Effects of prior growth on growth performance in normal years 
 
An explanation might be found through the optimum firm size theory. For simplicity we refer 
to firms in the negative growth effect interval as modest growers. If firms around industry 
average growth (modest growers), have surpassed their optimum size, we could expect the 
negative relationship between growth and performance we observed in the analysis chapter. 
When moderate growers surpass this optimal size threshold, further growth causes a negative 
performance effect, since increased bureaucracy and agency costs outweigh the economies of 
125 
 
scale realized through greater size. Fast growers could plausibly avoid this if they are 
relatively small firms, thus far below their optimum size. Our regression results provide some 
support for this, as our size measures indicate that smaller firms grow faster (size is negatively 
related to growth the following year). However, this argument seems flawed. We find no 
obvious reason to expect moderate growers to be particularly susceptible to overshooting their 
optimum size. If firms act rationally, they should observe diminishing marginal returns to 
growth, and cease growing when bureaucracy and agency costs exceed scale benefits. We 
therefore argue that the optimum size theory is unable to provide an adequate explanation.  
 
Another possible explanation lies along the way of Gibrat’s law, which stated that growth 
should be random. Though this theory technically predicts no relationship between prior 
growth and growth, the more general implication is that growth is very hard to maintain. This 
seems to resonate well with the average firm in our sample. We find that growth is 
immediately “punished” by a negative impact on growth the following year. This indicates a 
possible mean reversion effect, where growth rates quickly revert back towards industry 
average after a high-growth year. Though not quite in line with Gibrat’s predictions, this 
explanation fits well with the general empirical findings on the inconsistency of firm growth 
rates (Geroski, 1999: Coad & Holzl, 2009).  
 
However, the theory perhaps best suited to explaining our finding is the RBT model presented 
in subchapter 2.1.1.2. Firms with highly valuable and immobile resources or competencies are 
able to sustain their growth. Firms with inferior resource stocks, on the other hand, will suffer 
from the mean reversion effect discussed above. Seen in light of the RBT model then, firms 
that have ρ1 + ρ2 > 1 manage to maintain their growth momentum. More moderate growers (ρ1 
+ ρ2 < 1), or firms that achieve growth randomly (through εi(t)), are unable to maintain their 
growth rates. 
 
 What is still somewhat unexpected is the speed with which growth reverts towards industry 
mean. This effect occurs “instantly” the following year. This indicates that once a valuable 
resource base is lost, performance will deteriorate rapidly. 
 
Our resource-based argument is supported by Davidsson, Steffens and Fitzsimmons (2008). 
They find that sustainable growth should be preceded by high profitability; otherwise both 
performance measures suffer in the long term.  
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The effect in recessions 
We now turn to our main focus, the impact of recessions. The linear term in both growth 
models provided little evidence to support the hypothesis that prior growth negatively 
impacted industry average firms during recessions. Firms growing at industry average did not 
experience any particularly negative effects from their growth during the most severely 
affected years, 2002-2003 and 2009. This indicates that firms with industry average growth 
levels do not suffer from the negative growth effects documented by Knudsen (2014) and 
Geroski and Gregg (1996).  
 
However, investigations of the quadratic term revealed that recessions negated the growth 
momentum effect we discussed above. This is visualized in the figure below, which shows the 
contrast to growth effects in normal years in figure 42. 
 
 
Figure 43: Effects of prior growth on growth performance in recessions 
 
Returning to the discussion on RBT, this might indicate that recessions negate the positive 
growth effects stemming from superior resource stocks. In other words, even firms with ρ1 + 
ρ2 > 1 are unable to sustain their growth. An alternative method of viewing this is that the 
resource stock threshold for positive growth is raised higher than most (or any firms) are able 
to attain.   
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The effect of this is that downturns render even resource rich firms vulnerable to the general 
mean-reversion effect we discussed above. This has potentially great implications: recessions 
seem to negate the theoretical predictions from RBT, one of the most widespread theoretical 
views on competitive advantage. We now turn to discuss possible mechanisms that can 
explain this negation. 
 
This negation effect might be partly explained by organizational inertia theory. During 
recessions, firms are faced with the sudden need for adaption. This change might be 
temporary, given that recessions have limited duration, but adaption might still be required. 
Fast growers might be particularly vulnerable if their quick growth has induced high inertia 
pressures. In conjunction with the capital flows model from Knudsen and Lien (2014), this 
might occur if high growers have large sunk costs in growth investments projects. In light of 
inertia theory, then, fast growers might be less agile and unable to respond, which leads to 
them suffering the same fate as their industry-average counterparts.  However, inertia theory 
only brings us so far. According to Hannan and Freeman (1984) size is the main determinant 
of inertia, so to lend too much weight to growth in an inertia discussion might be ad hoc 
theorizing. To establish growth as an inertia driver, we would have to interact the growth 
variable on firm size, but this would fall somewhat outside the main focus of our thesis. We 
therefore leave this for future researchers.  
 
A more plausible explanation, perhaps, could lie with fitness landscape theory. In normal 
times, firms with superior resource stocks lie on or close to peaks in the fitness landscape, 
which allows them to sustain growth. Modest growers lie farther away from peaks and closer 
to the ‘valley floors’. When recessions hit, the peaks can change shape, be reduced or even be 
completely removed, and new peaks can arise. In light of Geroski’s resource-based model, the 
total removal of a peak would involve obsolesce of a previously superior resource stock. If a 
new peak is created by the recession, reaching the peak could require entirely different 
resources or competencies. In the resource-based model, this can modeled by assuming that 
the required resource stock for sustained growth changes from 
 
ρ1 + ρ2 > 1 
 
to  
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Ρ1 + Ρ2 > 1 
 
where Ρ signifies a different resource stock or portfolio. The threshold for sustaining growth is 
then not so much increased as it is changed. This could explain how previous high growers, 
who are able to maintain their growth, suddenly lose this ability during recessions. Their 
resource base no longer provides them with a relevant advantage because the downturn has 
changed the fitness landscape.  
 
Another potential explanation could lie with the marginal customer theorem presented by 
Lien (2010). He argued that industries which experienced particularly high growth towards 
the end of boom period could have a large share of marginal customers, who were likely to 
exit the industry when the economy started contracting. If these marginal customers were the 
drivers behind fast growing firms prior to a recessions, we would expect to see the negative 
growth effect we observed above. 
 
 
5.2.2 Prior growth on profitability 
 
The general effect 
In general, it seems prior growth has a negative effect on profitability margins in normal 
years. This is similar to the findings of Reid (1995), who also found a negative relation 
between firm growth and profit rates, but dissimilar to Chandler and Jansen (1992) and 
Mendelson (2000). This is also against many of our theoretical predictions.  
 
A possible explanation could lie once more with diseconomies of scale. It seems, however, to 
be a somewhat unreasonable assumption that the majority of firms with industry-average and 
above growth have overshot their optimum size. A similar argument could be presented 
against inertia theory. It is difficult to explain the general negative relationship between firm 
growth and profitability by inertia forces alone. If inertia effects induce negative profitability 
outcomes, why do firms continue to grow? Another argument against organization inertia in 
this context is that, given high external and internal inertia pressures, the negative effect of 
growth should be increased during times which heightens the need for adaption. We have 
spent some time discussion how recessions likely affect both customer and investor/creditor 
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preferences. The likelihood of increased adaption requirements during recessions is therefore 
high. The lack of a significant impact on the negative coefficient for growth on profitability 
during downturns for industry-average growers therefore speaks against organizational inertia 
as an explanation for the negative relationship.  
 
A more plausible explanation lies with the capital flows model by Lien and Knudsen (2014). 
Here we saw that there was a connection between growth potential and capital outflows and 
inflows. In the theory, more mature and well-established firms are likely to have a solid influx 
of cash through earnings, but are be likely to have fewer growth investment opportunities. 
Firms with high growth potential, however, are likely to spend the majority of their cash 
expenditures on growth investments. Their current profitability, on the other hand, might be 
very low, or even negative. This could explain the negative relationship we observe: Firms 
must ‘decide’ between focusing on current growth and future profitability, or on being 
profitable today. This would indicate that the negative year-on-year effect we observe turns 
positive in the long term. This would also fit well with the resource stocks-and-flows view we 
have focused on: it could take years to accumulate a sufficient resource stock to generate 
superior profitability. A less formal, but similar, explanation could be that growth firms 
simply do not focus on efficiency and profitability. This could be either because they spend 
their money and energy on growing, or if high-growth industries lack the market discipline to 
select away unprofitable firms. 
 
 
The effect in recessions 
As we saw from the analysis section, recessions did induce a negative growth effect when 
including the quadratic term. During both the dot-com crisis and the 2008-2009 recessions, 
and for both profitability measures, there was evidence of a negative quadratic effect. The 
aggregate effect is visualized in the graph below. 
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Figure 44: Effects of prior growth on profitability performance during recessions 
 
The implication is that during recessions, the linear negative relationship we discussed above 
is turned into a concave negative relationship. In other words, recessions seems to punish fast 
growers relatively more than moderate growers. We again turn to the capital flows model to 
explain this. A key implication from the theory was that, in normal times, investors and 
creditors are indifferent to the period in which profitability occurs. Firms that are highly 
profitable today can be valued the same as firms with low or even negative profitability today, 
but with perceived high future profitability potential.  
 
As we saw in the discussion on recessions, however, this intertemporal productivity 
indifference was likely to break down during recessions, when investor and creditor 
preferences became biased towards current profitability. Our findings provide support for the 
predictions made by the capital flows model. It seems like investors and creditor’s 
productivity indifference is largely removed during recessions. This would explain the 
negative relationship between prior growth and profitability induced by recessions.  
 
Another potential explanation could again lie with the combination of resource-based model 
and fitness landscape theory. As we argued in the theory section: If resources are the driving 
factor between growth, we can assume they would also cause high profitability. If recessions 
abruptly remove or reduce peaks in the fitness landscape, as we discussed above, this would 
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cause a relatively larger impact on firms close to the peak. For example, given the complete 
removal of a fitness peak, a firm located on the top would suffer a performance drop equal to 
the entire height of the peak. Firms on lower altitudes would suffer relatively less. If there is a 
relationship between resource bases, fitness and growth, high performers should therefore 
suffer relatively more during downturns than other firms. This could explain the negative 
relation between high prior growth and negative profitability performance in recessions.  
 
 
5.3 The effects of capital structure 
Similar to the discussion on the effects of prior growth, we start with capital structure’s effect 
on growth performance, before discussing effects on profitability. Again we start with the 
general relationships we observe in normal years, before moving on to the effect of 
recessions. 
 
5.3.1 Capital structure on growth 
 
The general effect 
A surprising finding in the analysis section was the disparity between the coefficient signs in 
the sales and asset growth models. In the sales growth model, the linear term was not 
significant until 2006, but afterwards there is a general positive relation between debt and 
growth, with a negative quadratic term. In total, this indicates a concave relationship where 
high leverage has a negative effect on growth. However, the asset growth model predicted the 
reverse general relationship – negative linear values with a frequently positive quadratic term. 
This created a convex relationship. However, as we pointed out in the analysis chapter, the 
squared debt level term in the asset growth model adds very little economic significance, so 
we choose to disregard the quadratic effect in the asset growth model. The statistical 
significance of the squared term can be attributed to the large sample we used. This can cause 
the statistical power of our t-tests to register even minimal impacts of the independent 
variables on performance as statistically significant (Keller, 2009). This leaves us with the 
linear term, which displayed negative values throughout the period. The relationships are 
illustrated in the figure below. 
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Figure 45: Effect of capital structure in normal years 
 
 
The positive effect of moderate leverage on sales growth can be partially explained by capital 
opportunity cost theory. Assuming moderately leveraged firms face profitable growth 
investment prospects, the opportunity cost of withholding capital should incentivize firms to 
invest the money in growth. At some point, the ability to finance investments through retained 
earnings is exhausted. If firms’ preferred alternative method of financing investment is 
through credit, this would explain the positive relationship between leverage and growth we 
observe. However, this cannot explain the non-linearity that eventually turns the leverage-
growth relationship negative. 
 
Potential explanations for the non-linearity can lie with debt overhang theory. An implication 
from debt overhang theory is that there exists some threshold where debt starts causing 
underinvestment issues. A fully equity-financed firm, for example, is unlikely to start 
forgoing growth investments if they increase leverage by, say, 10 percentage points. It is more 
likely that a substantially higher debt rate would be required for underinvestment to become 
an issue. This could plausibly occur in the transition between moderate and high leverage, 
causing the negative effects of high debt levels. Debt overhang theory is therefore fully 
compatible with our observations.  
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It is harder to explain the non-significance of the linear debt level variable prior to 2006 in the 
sales growth model. This indicates that firms with industry-average leverage did not have any 
capital structure effects on sales growth between 2000 - 2005. This finding is, of course, 
consistent with the Modigliani-Miller theorem, but it is hard to explain why these particular 
years should display such a relationship. Furthermore, this pattern does not replicate in the 
asset growth model, and the presence of a significant quadratic term during the period 
indicates that as we move away from industry average, this finding no longer holds. 
 
Moving on to the asset growth model, we now have to explain the overall negative effect of 
leverage on growth.  The negative relationship is incompatible with capital opportunity cost 
theory and the capital flow model. It is, however, in line with findings from Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1998), who also found a negative relationship 
between debt and growth. That high levels of debt have a negative effect on growth could be 
explained by debt overhang theory, but given our reasoning above, it cannot reasonably 
explain the negative relationship for moderately leveraged firms. A possible explanation 
could lie with pecking-order theory. Contrary to debt overhang theory, this theory implied that 
underinvestment problems can arise at any debt level. The overall negative relationship could 
for example arise if firms have to disclose proprietary information or pay flotation costs, 
causing them to forgo investment opportunities and therefore reducing growth.   
 
The effect in recessions 
Our finding in recessions was that recessions exacerbated the negative effect of debt found in 
normal years. Since the findings in the asset and sales growth model were somewhat 
disparate, we discuss them separately. We start with the sales growth model. Though the 
linear debt term was not significant in the sales growth model during the dot-com crisis, the 
squared term was significant and negative throughout the downturn. This indicated an 
increasingly negative relation between debt and sales growth during the dot-com crisis. The 
developments in the linear term from 2006 and onwards also provided support for our 
hypotheses. Though the relationship did not turn negative, we saw a sharp decline in 
coefficient values during the 2008-2009 recession.  Simultaneously, the negative value of the 
quadratic coefficient value increased in downturns. In sum there is a combined effect on sales 
growth:  the positive slope of the linear term is reduced, while the threshold for negative 
leverage effects is lowered. This is illustrated in the figure below, where the dotted line 
signifies the impact of recessions.  
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Figure 46: Effect of debt on sales growth during recessions 
 
Turning to the asset growth model, we have a similar effect for the linear term. We observed a 
clear decrease in coefficient values during recessions. Since we disregard the quadratic term 
in the asset growth model due to low economic significance, we can model the effect of 
recessions in the graph below.  
 
 
Figure 47: Effect of debt on asset growth during recessions 
 
Sales 
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How can we explain these effects? An explanation might be that downturns exacerbate the 
mechanisms of debt overhang and pecking-order theories mentioned above. We start with 
debt overhang theory. If creditors increase their requirements for providing credit to highly 
leveraged firms during a recession, this would provide further incentive for managers to forgo 
investment opportunities. This seems a reasonable assumption if creditors base their lending 
conditions on perceived risk, as uncertainty increases during recessions (Schaal, 2012). 
Managers either delay growth investment decisions, or they discard them completely, because 
investments would basically transfer value from shareholders to creditors due to the 
disproportionally high interest rates or unfavorable debt covenants. In essence, then, 
recessions lower the threshold for ‘harmful’ leverage in the debt overhang theory, effectively 
causing underinvestment problems to occur for lower levels of debt.  
 
The reduction in the linear term can be explained by pecking-order theory. As recessions 
reduce customer demand, so will they reduce the internally generated funds of firms. As we 
saw, the preferred option is then to seek external credit. However, with a tightening of credit 
availability, they might instead be forced to issue new equity. This would only be done as a 
last resort, and might cause underinvestment issues if firms anticipate a reduced valuation due 
to negative market responses. In sum, recessions could force firms down the pecking-order, to 
the point where they refrain from investing in growth opportunities due to the lack of 
internally generated funds, and the likelihood of being punished by market forces. This could 
occur for all levels of debt, which would explain the uniform increase in the negative effect of 
debt. 
 
Another explanation could lie with the theories we presented on capital structure’s implication 
for product market outcomes. One of the predictions was that as debt increases, so does the 
vulnerability to predation from other firms. This could be a plausible explanation for the 
worsening negative relationship between debt and growth we observe during downturns. 
Recessions are likely to exacerbate the vulnerability of highly leveraged firms to predatory 
moves. Such firms are poorly equipped to deal with, say, prolonged price wars in the first 
place, since they are dependent on maintaining margins to continuously service and 
renegotiate loans. Downturns are likely to induce some reduction in growth by themselves, as 
we saw in the descriptive statistics chapter. Predation might then exacerbate this effect. 
Moderately leveraged competitors can exploit the weakened high-debt firms, either to capture 
market shares or completely drive them from the market. The end result is that highly 
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leveraged firms end up with reduced market shares or go bankrupt. In practice, this could 
occur if for example heavily leveraged firms are unable to match price cuts by competitors 
over time due to low financial reserves. This seems reasonable in light of capital opportunity 
cost theory, which predicted that highly leveraged firms should have lower financial reserves 
because the alternative cost of hoarding capital was greater. This can cause leveraged firms to 
lose market shares, and experience negative growth as the end result. Another mechanism 
could be that leveraged firms have to maintain a certain price level to service debts, preferring 
to forsake market shares to price-cutting competitors over a reduction in profitability. These 
effects could explain the developments we observe in the effects of debt on growth. This 
explanation is in line with findings in Chevalier (1995a; 1995b), Titman and Parsons (1988) 
and Zingales (1998). 
 
A related effect that could also explain the pattern we observe are risk compensation costs 
paid to suppliers and customers. Suppliers may view the highly leveraged firm as risky may 
demand a premium as compensation for higher risk, due to potential asset specificity in 
mutual investments. This could cause leveraged firms to forgo investment opportunities, if 
they are unable or unwilling to accept supplier risk premiums. Suppliers could also choose not 
to enter into asset specific investments with risky firms. The same argument might apply to 
customers, especially for products with high switching costs. Customers who purchase such 
goods might instead turn to companies they anticipate have a better chance of surviving. They 
therefore minimize anticipated losses from switching costs. This could then lead to reduced 
markets shares, particularly for highly risk-averse customers.   
 
 
5.3.2 Capital structure on profitability 
 
The general effect 
We found a general positive linear effect of leverage on both EBITDA and ROA across the 
period. The squared debt level on EBITDA margins show that, outside recessions, there is an 
increasingly positive relationship with debt and profitability.  The squared debt level on ROA 
was also frequently significant and positive outside relationship. The combined linear and 
quadratic effects therefore indicate a convex relationship in normal years, where the positive 
marginal effects of leverage on profitability are increasing. The relationship is illustrated in 
the figure below.  
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Figure 48: Effect of debt on profitability in normal years 
 
This is somewhat unexpected given our theoretical predictions. Our findings seem to fit 
poorly with the Modigliani-Miller theorem, but this is not too surprising given the wide range 
of market imperfections that could arise. However, many of our theories predicted a negative 
relationship between debt and profitability. Our findings seems to run contrary to pecking-
order, debt overhang and product market outcome theories. In light of the capital flows model 
of Knudsen and Lien (2014) this is also a surprising finding. Our findings also run contrary to 
the empirical findings of Hurdle (1974) and  Shubita & Alsawalha (2012), but are consistent 
with Abor (2005) and Gill, Biger and Mathur (2011). 
 
One theoretical explanation could lie with the capital opportunity cost theory, which stated 
that firms with a large amount of profitable investment opportunities would often need to rely 
on external financing. Given that these projects provide above-average returns, this would 
explain the positive relationship between leverage and profitability we observe.  
 
It could also be partially explained by trade-off theory. We know from Gartner (2009) that 
boom periods typically involve positive outlooks in capital markets. This might reflect an 
overall reduction in perceived firm bankruptcy risk of creditors. According to trade-off 
theory, as perceived bankruptcy risk decreases, the optimal debt ratio of firm increases. In 
retrieval and expansion phases, the presences of decreasing bankruptcy costs could explain 
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the positive relationship between debt and profitability: it becomes less costly for firms to 
issue more debt, allowing them to reap further tax shield benefits. Some evidence for this can 
be seen in the wake of the financial crisis, where the interest rates in Norway were relatively 
low (even though this was hardly solely caused by optimistic creditors).  However, trade-off 
theory has its limitations in this application. It seems unreasonable that reduced risk 
perceptions of creditors should induce an increasingly positive relationship between debt and 
profitability.  
 
Though we struggle to explain the positive effect we saw above, we now turn to the more 
central issue: how the relationship changed during recessions. 
 
The effect in recessions 
As we saw in the analysis section, the positive quadratic effect of debt on profitability was 
reversed in both profitability models during recessions. This means that the relationship turns 
from convex to concave, indicating that firms with sufficiently high leverage suffered reduced 
profitability in downturns. This finding is illustrated in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 49: Effect of debt on profitability in recessions 
 
Similar to the sales growth model, we find a threshold effect where leverage has positive 
influence on growth until a critical debt level is reached. After this point, debt has a negative 
effect on performance.  
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How can we explain this finding? Debt overhang theory can again provide a potential 
explanation. The underinvestment problems associated with exceeding the leverage threshold 
can credibly be thought to also reduce profitability. If firms are faced with a more or less 
stable portfolio of potential positive NPV projects, the introduction of a recession can cause 
several of these projects to become unfeasible. As we argued above, downturns are likely to 
increase creditors’ perceived risk, therefore increasing lending rates, incurring stricter debt 
covenants and generally making debt more costly for firms (Bernanke, Gilchrist & Gertler, 
1991). In light of debt overhang theory, this would exacerbate managers’ incentives to avoid 
investments, even in positive NPV projects, because potential profits will accrue to creditors. 
Effectively, it causes a uniform reduction in the estimated returns on investments, which 
increases as creditors’ perceived risk (i.e. leverage) increases. This could explain the decline 
in profitability for highly-leveraged firms during recessions. However, it seems 
counterintuitive that this effect should occur so quickly. A sudden increase in 
underinvestment problems should intuitively take several years to affect the profit margins of 
firms.  
 
We argue that more plausible explanations might lie with trade-off and product market 
outcomes theories. We start with the latter. The arguments we provide here are largely 
analogous to the effects of leverage on growth. Predatory moves by competitors are likely to 
also affect profit margins. Price wars in particular can be used as an explanation for our 
observations. Our reasoning is similar to above: Highly indebted firms should be more 
vulnerable and unable to sustain lower profit margins over time. The effect of reduced 
margins might be compensated by increased sales volume. However, we know from Knudsen 
and Lien (2014) and Gartner (2009) that recessions are likely reduce overall demand, so a 
large increase in sales quantity following a price reduction is unlikely. The net effect of a 
price war should therefore be reduced profit margins, where highly leveraged firms are 
particularly vulnerable.  
 
Risk compensation costs to suppliers and customers might also affect profit margins. Similar 
to the discussion above on growth, high perceived default risk among potential suppliers 
might cause underinvestment problems in mutually beneficial projects with high asset 
specificity. This might force highly leveraged firms to turn to more expensive supplier 
options, where the need for relation specific investments is lower. Suppliers could plausibly 
also stop delivering services and goods on credit, or charge premium credit rates. One recent 
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example could be the Radioshack bankruptcy, where suppliers started demanding extra 
compensation because of their high perceived risk of default (Forbes, 2015).  The net effect is 
reduced profitability during recessions. 
 
As mentioned, another explanation could be found with trade-off theory. Assuming most 
firms have identified and reached their optimal capital structure prior to a recession, 
introducing a negative shock on bankruptcy costs would cause a uniform decrease optimal 
capital structure. This could for example occur through in increase in perceived risk of 
creditors, as discussed above. This would in turn increase the marginal cost of holding debt, 
as firms would have to provide additional compensation to creditors in exchange for higher 
bankruptcy risks. If bankruptcy risk increases disproportionally for highly leveraged firms, it 
could also explain the negative quadratic effect.  
 
This concludes our discussion of the individual effects. We now turn to the interaction effect 
between capital structure and growth. 
 
5.3 Interaction effects between growth and capital 
structure 
As we could see in the analysis chapter, we found little evidence of an interaction effect 
between growth and capital structure in recessions. In the main interaction analysis, without 
splitting the sample into percentiles, we found some evidence of a negative interaction effect 
during the dot-com crisis. However, this pattern did not replicate itself during the 2008-2009 
recession, and the finding was further weakened by low economic significance.  
 
We then split our sample into percentiles based on prior growth and debt levels to account for 
non-linearities in the interaction effect. Even though this generated some findings that 
supported our expectations, 6 out of 8 models did not yield results that supported our 
hypothesis of a negative interaction effect between debt and growth during recessions.  
 
This is somewhat surprising. Our theoretical predictions regarding the combination of these 
factors predicted the presence of a negative interaction effect during recessions. Furthermore, 
our empirical findings above indicate that both high growth and high leverage, when studied 
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in isolation, could affect performance negatively during recessions. The lack of findings on 
the interaction effect is therefore unexpected.  
 
A possible explanation for why we do not find an interaction effect is, of course, that there is 
none. However, because of the many theoretical and empirical indications that there should be 
an interaction between debt and growth, we have explored some possibilities for why we 
might have been unable to document its presence. One explanation could lie with survivor 
bias. In short, this is a flaw in our research design that leaves us unable to account for firms 
that go bankrupt, engage in voluntary liquidation or otherwise cease operations. Therefore, the 
impact of our different independent variables on corporate performance is only measured for 
firms that “survive” from one year to the next. It could be argued that heavily indebted, fast 
growing firms might have experienced sufficiently negative impacts from recessions that they 
go bankrupt before we were able to register the negative interaction effect. However, while 
this might underestimate the interaction effect, it seems unlikely that it should remove it 
completely. It seems unlikely that the majority of fast growing, high-leveraged firms should 
go bankrupt. Survivor bias can therefore only partly explain the lack of an interaction effect. 
 
Another partial explanation might lie with the recessionary impact model we presented in 
2.1.2.2. A limitation of our research design is that we are unable to separate the impact of 
recessions from the responses of firms. The error term in the model further illustrates the 
difficulty of accurately measuring the impact of recessions. Our point is that the measures 
firms during various recessions could affect their performance to such a large degree that we 
are unable to identify an interaction effect. A related argument is the difficult of identifying 
the precise time of impact of recessions. As we have argued before, firms can be severely 
affected during the second and first half of two consecutive fiscal years, but otherwise 
perform well. The effect on annual data is then contaminated by this ‘distorted’ performance 
drop. However, we again arrive at the conclusion that while this might influence our results, it 
seems far-fetched that such effects should completely remove the interaction term with such a 
large sample. 
 
A final explanation for the lack of an interaction effect we present is the possibility that 
capital structure and prior growth influence performance at different stages during a recession. 
Knudsen and Lien (2014) identified two main effects of recessions: a change in investors and 
creditors’ preferences, and a change in customers’ preferences. Particularly during the 2008-
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2009 recession we had a severe financial crisis before the real economic crisis developed. 
This might have caused creditors and investors’ preferences to change before customer 
preferences. This implies that the effects of capital structure impacted firms before the 
negative impact of prior growth. In other words, the mechanisms of debt overhang and 
pecking order theory might occur before, say, inertia effects and marginal customer effects. 
This would indicate that the worst effects of high debt have already impacted firms by the 
time customer preferences changes starts affecting performance. If this holds, and the 2008 
financial crisis was worse than the onset of the dot-com crisis, this would also explain why we 
found traces of an interaction effect in 2001-2003 but not in the 2008-2009 recession.  
 
A brief summary of the discussion 
What have we learned from the discussion of our findings? It seems that both capital structure 
and prior growth have negative impacts on performance of firms during recessions, at least 
when studied as isolated variables not interacted with each other. A recurring theme in our 
findings is the presence of non-linearities in the relationships between our main variables and 
our performance measures. The results of these non-linearities all indicate that particularly 
fast growers or highly leveraged firms either are the only ones affected by the negative effects 
we document, or are more severely affected than their more ‘moderate’ counterparts. As a 
rule, we seldom found effects in the linear terms, indicating that industry-average growth or 
leverage was not sufficient to experience particularly severe impacts from recessions. The 
exception to this was debt’s effect on growth performance, where firms with industry-average 
leverage also suffered negative consequences during recessions. As we saw from the recent 
discussion, we struggled to document an interaction effect between capital structure and 
growth. 
 
 
5.4 Causal mechanisms 
As stated in the methods sections, this thesis has a descripto-exploratory focus. This means 
that the causal pathways growth and capital structure take when impacting firm performance 
have not been explored in great detail. We have compared our findings to the theoretical 
predictions we arrived at in the theory section, but we have not tested whether our findings 
can be attributed to specific mechanisms. There could therefore be alternative, “unseen” 
mechanisms that are the real causation behind our findings.  
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Scope restrictions aside, there are two mechanisms we would like to briefly explore under an 
explanatory lens. First, the wanted to investigate one of the key theoretical predictions our 
thesis is based on: the removal of the “intertemporal productivity indifference” theorem of 
investors during recessions, as presented in Knudsen and Lien’s (2014) capital flow model. 
Second, we have spent a great deal of energy on separating industry effects from idiosyncratic 
firm effects. The second question we would like to have answered was therefore: To which 
degree does industry affiliation provide a path for recessionary impact?  
 
We start with the first question. A natural way to test the intertemporal productivity 
indifference thesis would be to investigate how prior profitability affects performance in 
recessions. In the cash flow model, firms with high recent or current profitability would likely 
be considered safe and therefore attractive for investors during recessions. In contrast, firms 
of equal value, but low current profitability would likely be punished by investors and 
creditors in downturns. However, previous profitability likely encompasses a host of different 
effects, including the general “proficiency” of firms, as well as their resource base. The 
number of effects captured by the profitability variable confounds a clear interpretation. 
Therefore, we instead use the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as a proxy for firms’ 
attractiveness during recessions. We argue that fixed assets could be an appropriate proxy if 
future growth investments in the current period are intangible or uncertain. This assumption 
seems especially justifiable for R&D-intensive growth projects, or long-term investments that 
rely on favorable forecasts to be attractive. Given our assumption, this means that firms with 
high growth potential and modest performance today have little current collateral to offer 
creditors. If the indifference theorem holds, we should expect a positive relation between the 
ratio of fixed assets and firm performance during recessions, but not in normal times.  
 
Below we have graphed the coefficient of the fixed assets ratio variable against our different 
performance measures. The results are from the full specifications presented in subchapter 
3.4.1.5. When looking at the fixed assets ratio impact on performance, we see an 
unambiguous relationship during both crises. In three of four performance measures it appears 
that the ratio of fixed assets positively impact firms during recessions. The positive 
relationship between fixed assets and performance is consistent for both the Dot-com crisis 
and the financial crisis of 2008. As we can see below, the general picture painted in the sales 
growth, asset growth and ROA models seems to be positive significant values in both crises, 
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and weak or no relationship in normal years. This effect does, not replicate in the EBITDA 
model.  The unexpected effect in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis is that the favorable 
effect on performance from increasing fixed assets seems to persist in the retrieval period as 
well. This might be contributed to the turmoil created by the crisis, and the fear of a “double 
dip” scenario for the world economy. 
 
 
Figure 50: Effects of fixed assets ratio on performance 
 
Overall these findings provide solid support for the removal of the intertemporal productivity 
indifference theorem during recessions. We see that the downturns during the 2000s appear to 
induce a positive relationship between short term solidity and performance, which otherwise 
is not present. The removal of this effect could therefore be an important causal pathway for 
capital structure and growth effects during recessions. The removal of the intertemporal 
productivity indifference of investors and creditors also indicates that recessions have a 
myopic or shortsighted selection effect, which punishes firms with high future growth 
potential but low current performance. 
 
The second question we wanted to explore was the degree to which industry affiliation 
provided a pathway for recessionary impact. Since we use aggregated industry-level 
impairments as a control variable for how severely an industry was impacted by recessions, 
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we are able to explore this in further detail. These results are also collected from the full 
specifications. As we can see, the coefficient values for industry impairment in the sales 
growth, ROA and EBITDA models display a sharp negative spike in 2009, the most severely 
affected year of the 2008-2009 recession. An interesting finding is that this effect does not 
replicate as clearly during the dot-com crisis. This leads us to believe that the financial crisis 
in 2008 differs from the dot-com crisis in the way recessions were channeled by industry 
affiliation. The industry impairment effect on asset growth is more nuanced, and show 
negative effects of industry affiliation on asset growth in the start of the dot-com crisis, as 
well as before and after the 2008-2009 recession. What these findings do clearly indicate is 
that firms in high-impairment industries were likely to  suffer performance issues during the 
2008-2009 recession. This indicates that, at least during the 2008-2009 recession, industry 
affiliation provided an important channel for recessionary impact. This is an interesting 
finding, as it indicates that some industries are inherently more vulnerable to recessions that 
others. Firms affiliated with such industries might have to take additional counter-
recessionary measures.   
 
 
Figure 51: Effects of industry impairment on performance 
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The third causal mechanism we wanted to investigate was the effect of credit constraints on 
corporate performance. Since the databases included Dunford & Bradstreet’s internal credit 
rating of all companies, this is also something we can explore in greater detail. Credit rating 
effects on performance can give us some insights into how the lack of access to external 
finance influenced firms’ performance during recessions. Unfortunately, the data is only 
available after 2005. The reference variable for the credit rating dummies is low credit rating, 
and the results in our graphs are therefore the effect on performance from having high credit 
rating, relative to having low credit rating. As we can see in the figures below, the sales 
growth, asset growth and EBITDA models do not significant effect before the 2008-2009 
recession. When the brunt of the real economic downturn hits the Norwegian economy in 
2009, we find a significant, positive effect of high credit rating on all performance measures. 
This provides an expansion on the finding we introduced in the descriptives, that the crisis 
created increased standard deviation in the debt levels of firms. When access to credit got 
restricted during the financial crisis of 2008, the firms qualifying for high credit ratings had 
easier lending constraints and better access to credit than firms with low credit rating. For 
firms with high credit rating, this induced better performance than for their low rating 
counterparts. Another interesting finding is that the positive performance effects of high credit 
rating does not end after the recessional years, as high credit rating continues to significantly 
outperform low credit rating in the years after the crisis. Although we are not able to fully 
explore the causal reason for this continued relationship, we see that it fits with the findings 
from fixed assets argument, which also persisted in the retrieval period.  
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Figure 52: Effects of high credit rating on performance 
 
This finding provides support for credit constraints as a causal pathway for reduced 
performance during recessions. According to Campello et al. (2010), credit constraints could 
influence performance of firms through forcing them to reduce their number of employees, 
marketing expenditures, or paying premium interest rates on debt.  
 
However, using credit ratings as a proxy for credit constraints suffer from severe reverse 
causality bias. We argue that the credit rating of a firm has a causal impact on performance, 
but a firm’s prior performance could very plausibly also influence credit ratings. Therefore, 
the causal conclusions we can make based on this variable is somewhat limited.  
 
5.5 Limitations 
In this subchapter we sum the limitations of our thesis. Most have been mentioned before, so 
this serves mostly to collect the strands. One of the drawbacks with our method of shifting the 
regressions across individual annual databases is survivor bias. We cannot account for firms 
that for various reasons go bankrupt. This might have incurred an underestimation of the 
effects of debt and growth during recessions, and confounded our attempts at identifying an 
interaction effect between the two.  
 
148 
 
Another weakness is that the impact of recessions is not uniformly implemented. Firms are 
affected at different times. For example, export-oriented industries such as fish farming might 
have experienced effects relatively quickly. The shipbuilding industry, however, might ‘feel’ 
the impact of recessions in financial statement data only when back orders are completed and 
fresh orders have stopped coming in. This is exacerbated by only having access to yearly data. 
A firm might, for example, do very well in the first half of 2009, and then suffer a severe drop 
in performance during the last half of the year. On a yearly aggregate, this would only register 
as a moderate drop in performance.  
 
Moreover, as we saw from the model of recessionary impact presented in subchapter 2.2.1.2, 
we cannot account for the measures or responses firms take when hit by recessions. These 
actions can influence the total impact of recessions positively, negatively or not at all, but 
with our data we are unable to control for them.  
 
Another limitation regarding our data is the low precision of industry NACE codes. As we 
demonstrated in the methods section, these are of moderate quality, and since all our data are 
adjusted for industry average, this could potentially impact our results substantially.  
 
5.6   Future research 
  
We would like to point out that we have only scratched the surface of the effects of capital 
structure and growth. Though we have established some broad patterns, we believe much can 
be gained from testing specific causal mechanisms that channel the impact of recessions. Are 
the negative effects of recessions caused by managerial underinvestment problems, as posited 
by pecking-order and debt overhang theory? Or can it be attributed to the removal of the 
intertemporal productivity indifference of creditors and investors? We have provided some 
brief explorations of a few causal pathways, but we have not given them the attention they 
deserve. 
  
We also believe future research could benefit from using different approaches to generating or 
acquiring data. One method could be to aggregate the individual datasets and use panel data 
techniques to investigate the effects of capital structure and growth further. An advantage of 
this would be to eliminate survivor bias, since panel data could account for firms going 
149 
 
bankrupt. Another approach that would also alleviate survivor bias in estimations would be to 
investigate the effect of capital structure and prior growth on bankruptcy rates. A third 
potentially fruitful approach could be to combine survey and financial statement data, similar 
to Knudsen (2014). This could generate more precise estimations on the time of impact of 
recessions, and allow for controlling for many of the firm and industry characteristics we had 
to exclude from our analyses, such as durability of products or industry concentration. 
  
We also believe much gain be gained from conducting analyses on individual industries. 
Though the NACE codes are far from perfect, we saw above that industry affiliation is an 
important pathway for recessionary impact. Furthermore, the fact that certain industries are 
more vulnerable to downturns merits further investigation. Though the subject has been 
explored internationally (Petersen & Strongin, 1996) and domestically (Lien, 2010; Knudsen, 
2014), it can still be investigated further.  
  
Furthermore, while we have identified some clear effects of growth and capital structure 
during recessions, we also saw in the discussion of model R2 that they account for a modest 
share of the variation in our performance measures. We know from the descriptive statistics 
that all performance measures suffered noticeably during the recessions we investigated. An 
important direction for future research will therefore be to identify which variables are the 
‘main actors’ in this context.  
 
Moreover, our research indicated that particularly fast growers or highly leveraged firms 
either were the only ones experiencing negative debt or growth effects during recessions, or 
they experienced these negative effects more strongly. We believe a fruitful approach could 
be to investigate these subsets of firms in greater detail. This approach has received some 
attention, for example Brynhildsrud (2013), but could benefit from improved econometric 
methods. 
 
Although our interaction variable showed little promise in our model, future research could 
further and explore the possibility of interaction effects between other variables of interest. 
One possibility could be to test interaction effects between the quadratic debt level and 
growth variables. Interacting size on growth is another option, which would allow for testing 
the effects of inertia theory in greater detail.  
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As previously mentioned, we have only scratched the surface with this thesis, but this was 
also the intention of this thesis. Hopefully we have provided a useful foundation for future 
research, as well as some directions for which it can take. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate empirically the effects of prior growth and debt 
level on corporate performance in recessions. We found that combined studies of growth and 
capital structure had seldom been performed before, even though these are central and 
mutually determining attributes of firms. Furthermore, and arguably an even greater omission, 
was that existing literature has been relatively quiet on the subject of firms performance 
outcomes in recessions. We therefore aimed at performing a broad exploratory study on how 
debt and prior growth affected firm outcomes during the two economic downturns in the 
2000s. Our sample was a selection of approximately 20 000 Norwegian firms over the period 
1999-2012. The sample was analyzed using multiple regression analysis, with subsequent 
comparison of developments in coefficient values across the business cycles in our period. A 
large part of our research involved testing for interaction effects and non-linearities in our 
main variables. To our knowledge, testing for interaction effects and non-linearities in capital 
structure and growth’s effect on corporate performance has never been done before. 
 
In our analysis of prior growth on growth, we find that a negative linear term combined with a 
positive quadratic term creates a convex effect in normal years. This indicates that fast 
growers are able to maintain their growth momentum, but that more modest growers are 
subject to a mean-reversion effect where prior negatively affects growth the following year. 
The interesting finding during recessions is that the momentum effect of fast growers 
disappears, rendering them vulnerable to the general mean reversion of the rest of the sample. 
We argue that this finding is consistent with implications from the resource-based model, 
fitness landscape theory and the capital flow model. 
 
Regarding the effects of growth on profitability, we find that in normal years there appears to 
be a general negative relationship between prior growth and both ROA and EBITDA margins. 
Our finding in recessions is that downturns appear to exacerbate this negative effect. We 
again found a non-linear relationship, which indicated that growth had an exponentially 
negative effect on profitability outcomes during recessions. We found that this result could be 
explained with the capital flow model and combined insights from resource-based theory and 
fitness landscape theory. 
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When we analyzed the effects of capital structure on growth we found slightly disparate 
results in our asset and sales growth models for normal years, as these predicted negative and 
positive relationships, respectively. Both models were, however, predicted a negative effect of 
recessions. Again we find evidence of a non-linear relationship, where highly leveraged firms 
suffered exponentially increasing negative effects on growth. We argued that this finding was 
consistent with debt overhang, pecking-order and product market outcome theories. 
 
Investigating the effects of capital structure on profitability we found a generally positive and 
convex relationship in normal years, where debt had an increasingly positive effect on both 
our profitability measures. We find that recessions completely reverse the positive quadratic 
effect of leverage on ROA and EBITDA, indicating that downturns punish highly leveraged 
firms. We argued that this finding could be explained by product market outcomes theories, 
debt overhang and trade-off theory. 
 
We did not find definite evidence of an interaction effect between prior growth and capital 
structure during recessions. There were indications of the expected negative interaction effect 
during the dot-com crisis, but a lack of a similar effect during the 2008-2009 recession 
coupled with low or negative contributions to R2 led us to conclude with the lack of an 
interaction effect. Given our theoretical discussion and empirical findings on the individual 
variables this was somewhat surprising, since both indicate a negative relationship with 
corporate performance in recessions. We therefore expected an interaction effect. In an 
attempt to explore possible interaction effects further, we split our sample into 10% 
percentiles based on firm debt and prior growth levels. This was done to account for possible 
non-linear relationships in the interaction effect. However, this method too yielded only 
marginal support for our interaction hypotheses. We therefore conclude that we were unable 
to document any interaction effect between capital structure and growth during recessions. 
 
In our causal mechanisms subchapter, we briefly explored some potential theoretical 
mechanisms that could explain the negative effects of prior growth and leverage on 
performance outcomes in recessions. We found that the fixed assets ratio does not show any 
significance relationship with performance in normal years, but during recessions there is a 
significant positive effect of possessing fixed assets. The finding indicates discrimination 
against intangible assets by creditors and investors during crises, and provides support for the 
removal of the intertemporal productivity indifference theorem. We also found evidence that 
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industry affiliation provides an important causal pathway for recessionary impact during the 
2008-2009 recession. Our results indicate that there was no real performance effect from 
industry affiliation until 2009, where a substantial negative effect from being affiliated with 
high-impairment industries can be observed. Our third finding on causal mechanisms was that 
credit constraints appeared to induce a significant negative impact on firms during recessions. 
After the onset of the crisis, firms qualifying for high credit rating experienced positive effects 
on performance, compared to firms with low credit rating.  
 
We conclude that both growth and capital structure have been shown to substantially impact 
firms during recessions. A recurring theme in our findings is the presence of non-linear 
effects. Our findings indicate that many of the negative effects of recessions are either only 
experienced by high growth or leverage firms, or that these firms experience more severe 
effects. The second general conclusion is that we were unable to document the presence of an 
interaction effect between capital structure and growth. Finally, we wish to round off by 
stating that we have only scratched the surface of the effects of capital structure and growth in 
recessions, and we hope that this thesis can provide a platform for future research. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Inflation rate index 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
0.8895 0.9165 0.928 0.9511 0.9553 0.9705 0.9924 1.0000 1.0379 1.0599 1.0860 1.0995 1.1079 
 
A.2 R2 increases for different specifications 
Sales growth 
            R^2 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Control variables .051 .107 .040 .035 .080 .040 .037 .042 .133 .026 .037 .033 
Δ Incl. debt level .001 .001 .000 .001 .001 .002 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .003 
Δ Incl. sales growth .001 .006 .001 .002 .002 .002 .002 .001 .002 .002 .002 .002 
Δ Incl. Interaction term .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Δ Incl. sq sales growth .000 .001 .000 .002 .002 .001 .001 .002 .000 .001 .001 .003 
Δ Incl. sq debt level .001 .002 .002 .003 .003 .002 .003 .002 .003 .002 .000 .002 
 
Asset growth 
            R^2 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Control variables .073 .069 .033 .040 .042 .068 .063 .063 .118 .056 .038 .053 
Δ Incl. debt level .004 .016 .011 .011 .006 .002 .005 .006 .012 .008 .004 .006 
Δ Incl. sales growth .004 .003 .003 .001 .004 .002 .002 .003 .005 .002 .001 .004 
Δ Incl. Interaction term .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Δ Incl. sq asset growth .002 .003 .002 .003 .002 .002 .001 .002 .002 .003 .001 .002 
Δ Incl. sq debt level .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 
 
ROA 
            R^2 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Control variables .262 .225 .144 .273 .271 .323 .338 .325 .257 .316 .376 .339 
Δ Incl. debt level .009 .017 .017 .025 .031 .011 .022 .030 .033 .018 .026 .031 
Δ Incl. sales growth .010 .009 .019 .013 .008 .006 .005 .009 .019 .005 .005 .007 
Δ Incl. Interaction term .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Δ Incl. sq sales growth .020 .033 .001 .012 .001 .003 .005 .001 .042 .001 .002 .003 
Δ Incl. sq debt level .003 .009 .011 .002 .014 .017 .001 .004 .026 .013 .005 .006 
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EBITDA 
            R^2 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Control variables .383 .373 .421 .445 .431 .465 .459 .464 .415 .425 .449 .423 
Δ Incl. debt level .000 .008 .008 .006 .004 .008 .003 .007 .003 .002 .011 .072 
Δ Incl. sales growth .006 .009 .011 .001 .004 .003 .001 .011 .006 .003 .003 .010 
Δ Incl. Interaction term 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -
.002 
.000 .000 .000 .000 -
.003 
Δ Incl. sq sales growth .022 .003 .001 .012 .019 .013 .005 .001 .022 .005 .007 .009 
Δ Incl. sq debt level .009 .011 .007 .004 .006 .009 .013 .015 .016 .007 .004 .009 
 
 
A.3 Interaction effects in the segmented sample 
We first present the interaction effects in performance models with sample segmented on debt 
level. The firms in the 90th percentile had the highest levels of debt, and vice versa in the 10th 
percentile.  
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Below are the interaction coefficient developments for models where the sample was 
segmented based on prior growth.  
 
■ 
■ 
▲ 
■ 
■ ■ ■ 
▲ 
▲ 
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Interaction effect on asset growth for different 
percentiles of leverage 
10 % 50 % 90 % ●p<0.01 ■p<0.05 ▲p<0.1 
■ 
● 
■ 
▲ ■ 
▲ 
● 
● ■ 
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Interaction effect on EBITDA for different percentiles 
of leverage 
10 % 50 % 90 % ●p<0.01 ■p<0.05 ▲p<0.1 
169 
 
  
 
  
 
▲ ● ▲ ▲ 
● 
▲ 
■ 
▲ 
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Interaction effect on sales growth for different 
percentiles of growth 
10 % 50 % 90 % ●p<0.01 ■p<0.05 ▲p<0.1 
▲ 
■ ■ 
■ ● 
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Interaction effect on EBITDA for different percentiles 
of growth 
10 % 50 % 90 % ●p<0.01 ■p<0.05 ▲p<0.1 
170 
 
   
● 
■ 
▲ 
■ 
■ 
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Interaction effect on ROA for different percentiles of 
growth 
10 % 50 % 90 % ●p<0.01 ■p<0.05 ▲p<0.1 
171 
 
A.3  Correlation matrix 
Correlation matrix from 2008. Industry EBITDA removed due to high negative correlation with industry 
impairments. 
 
